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ABSTRACT 
The primary piupose of this dissertation is to construct a game theoretic model to 
explore the economic incentives encoiiraging strategic lawsuits against public participation 
(SLAPPs), and to e)q)lore the efficiency consequences of eliminating SLAPPs. The model 
that is constructed is a two-stage contest with asymmetric incon:q)lete information regarding 
agents' benefits. Using the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept, equihbrium behavior is 
characterized assuming a ratio contest success fimction with asymmetric abiUties. 
Con^arative static results are derived for the second-stage of the contest, and efficiency is 
evaluated using contest efficiency as the primitive measure of efficiency where the concept of 
contest efficiency is developed in an appendix. Given the general ambiguity of the analytic 
efficiency results, the contest success fimction is parameterized and efficiency is evaluated 
assuming that the firm has normal and tmiform a priori beliefs regarding the distribution of the 
homeowner's benefit of winning the contest. Finally, the predictive power of the perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium concept and the intuitive refinement is tested using e?q)erimental 
methods and a specific case of the general SLAPP model. The primary conclusions are that 
SLAPPs represent a strategic commitment of effort by an agent with incoiiq)lete information 
and relatively low benefits and/or ability to reduce the total amoimt of effort invested in the 
contest, and that the elimination of SLAPPs will either reduce or have no effect on the 
efficiency of the contest. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1970s, clauses written into the Clean Air and Water Acts granted private 
citizens the right to sue firms violating environmental regulations. These clauses w^ere 
characteristic of a three decade trend by Congress and the courts to increase private 
participation in the enforcement of regulations where government efforts had failed due to a 
lack of resources and/or motivation (see Jordan 1987). Since this time, Pring and Canan 
(1993) have found evidence of a proliferation of lawsuits that claim "injury firom citizen eflForts 
to influence a government body or electorate on an issue of public significance." Pring and 
Canan (1993) find that these multi-million dollar lawsuits, labeled strategic lawsuits against 
public participation (SLAPPs), have occurred in conflicts involving environmental protection 
and animal rights, as well as real estate development and zoning, neighborhood (NIMBY) 
problems, civil rights, consumer issues and criticism of public officials and employees. In the 
seventy SLAPPs investigated by Canan and Pring (1988), the average claim for damages by a 
plaintiff was $7.4 million, with one plaintiff clamiing damages of $100 million. Canan and 
Pring (1988) also note that in thirteen particular SLAPPs it took an average of about 31.4 
months to resolve the SLAPP with one SLAPP requiring 140 months to dispose with the 
defendant emerging victorious. While many of these lawsuits are eventually decided in favor 
of the defendant, the anecdotal evidence provided here suggest the cost of SLAPPs, including 
legal fees and time, is significant. Based on their analysis, Pring and Canan (1993) conclude 
that these strategic, retaliatory lawsuits discourage the continued and fixture involvement of 
private citizens in the political process, and violate these private citizens' first amendment 
rights to fi*ee speech. They also conclude that reform is necessary, and suggest alternative 
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judicial, legislative and executive cures as well as reform within the legal profession aimed at 
discowaging future SLAPPs. 
While Pring and Canan formulate their argument against SLAPPs based on an 
inteipretation that SLAPPs are a retaUatoiy civil rights violation, they do not consider the 
economic implications of SLAPPs fiuther than recognizing that the cost of the conflict 
associated with a SLAPP may be significant.' Important questions that remain regard the 
economic incentives and consequences of SLAPPs. For instance, what are the economic 
incentives encowaging SLAPPs, and what are the efficiency consequences of eliminating 
SLAPPs? The purpose of this dissertation is to explore these questions within the context of 
a contest model with asymmetric incomplete information and endogenous timing using the 
perfect Bayesian equilibriimi as the solution concept. The predictive power of the perfect 
Bayesian equiUbrium concept and the intuitive refinement is then tested using a specific case 
of the SLAPP model and experimental methods. 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An Example of a Simple Game 
To illustrate the basic structure of the model, consider the simple example of the 
externality conflict diagrammed in Figure 1. A firm has just purchased a large parcel of land 
in a residential neighborhood in order to build a shopping mall. A local homeowner or group 
of homeowners hear of the firm's plan to develop and become fearfiil that their nice, quiet 
neighborhood is about to be overwhehned with congestion, and increased crime due to an 
' Canan and Pring(1988) do recognize the possible social cost associated with citizen abuse of the process, but 
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Figure 1: Simplified extensive form SLAPP game 
4 
influx of people coming to the mall from surroimding areas. The homeowner has a choice to 
make. She can idly stand by and watch her quality of life deteriorate, or she can become an 
active private citizen and contest the firm's decision to build the shopping maU. The 
homeowner's decision depends crucially on how the homeowner values the development. In 
some cases, the benefit to the homeowner of having convenient shopping may outweigh the 
cost of increased congestion and crime, in which case, the homeowner might favor the 
development. However, if this is not the case, the homeowner will fight the development. 
Assume that the homeowner can expend irreversible and observable effort that 
decreases the probability that the firm develops the land. The firm can also e)q)end irreversible 
and observable effort to increase the probability that it can proceed with the development. 
Effort can be thought of as attorneys fees, cost of discovery, court fees and other cost 
common to pohtical and legal action that increase the probability that the party expending the 
effort prevails in the conflict. 
The homeowner is aware of the firm's potential gain because she has seen the results 
of similar developments in the past. However, the firm is not sure if the homeowner or 
homeowners consist of a well organized group of private citizens that have a high negative 
valuation should the development occur, or a smgle environmental fanatic who has httle 
support of her neighbors and a low valuation relative to the firm This assun:q)tion is 
consistent with the observation that the cost of preventing an externality is generally well 
defined because it involves profits which are observable (at least in theory), while the benefit 
of preventing the extemaUty is usually not well defined because it involves agents' utilities 
which are unobservable (both in theory and in practice). Since the firm does not know the 
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strength of the homeowner's preferences, the firm does not know who, if anybody, will 
contest its development. Before the firm can defend its right to develop it must wait for any 
homeowner against the development to reveal themselves. 
Exphcitly, assume the homeowner has either strong or weak preferences against the 
development. This is seen in Figure 1 as Nature randomly choosing the strong type of 
homeowner with probabiUty P and the weak type with probability 1 - P. P is often interpreted 
in the Uterature as the firm's a priori behef that the homeowner has strong preferences. Given 
the development is not allowed to occur, assume homeowner with strong preferences avoids a 
loss of 120, while the homeowner with weak preferences avoids a loss of 20. Also assume 
that the firm receives 100 given the development is allowed to proceed. The homeowner's 
avoided loss and the firm's gain are measured in conq)arable units, for instance, thousands of 
dollars. 
Consider a two-stage game.^ In the fitrst-stage, the firm and homeowner determine the 
sequence of play in the second-stage. This stage is seen in Figure 1 as the homeowner's 
choice of Sue or Squawk given Nature's choice of the homeowner's preferences, and the 
firm's choice of SLAPP or NASH given the homeovmer chooses Squawk. Sue can be 
thought of as a homeowner's private consultation with an attorney which is them immediately 
followed by a strategic commitment of effort in the second-stage of the game. Squawk can be 
thought of as a costless public display by the homeowner expressing her aversion to the firm's 
^ Because a game of incomplete information is being considered, the firm does not know Nature's initial move. 
Therefore, when the two stages of the game are discussed, the interpretations of a stage and a subgame are 
slightly different from the formal definitions of a stage and a subgame in Fudenberg and Tirole (1992). 
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plan to develop. SLAPP can be thought of as a firm's private consultation with an attomey 
which is then followed by a strategic commitment of effort in the second-stage of the game. 
NASH can be thought of as a costless public display by the firm expressing its desire to 
proceed with its development plans which is then immediately followed by a simultaneous 
commitment of effort by the firm and homeowner in the second-stage of the game. 
In the second-stage, the firm and homeowner determine how much effort to invest in a 
contest that yields 100 to the firm and 0 to the homeowner given the firm prevails, or 0 to the 
firm and 120 to the strong type homeowner or 20 to the weak type homeowner given the 
homeowner prevails. The second-stage is not explicitly diagrammed in Figure 1, but the 
results of the second-stage are captured by the assumed expected payoffs where the first 
expected payoff in parentheses is the homeowner's and the second expected payoff in 
parentheses is the firm's. The magnitude of these expected payoffs are indicative of one 
possible type of outcome for the second-stage of the game in the formal model presented 
later. 
There are three possible sequences of play for the second-stage of the game depending 
on the actions taken in the first-stage of the game. First, when the homeowner chooses Sue, 
she strategically commits and reveals her effort to the firm before the firm chooses its effort. 
In this case, the second-stage of the game is a sequential move contest of conq)lete 
information which is called the Citizen suit subgame in Figure 1. The e?q)ected payoffs to the 
homeowner and the firm in this case are 36 and 16 given the homeowner's type is strong, and 
1 and 81 given the homeowner's type is weak. Second, when the homeowner chooses 
Squawk and the firm chooses SLAPP, the firm strategically commits and reveals its effort to 
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the homeowner before the homeowner chooses her effort. In this case, the second-stage 
game is a sequential move contest of incomplete information which is called the SLAPP 
subgame in Figure 1 because this sequence of play is interpreted as a SLAPP. This sequence 
of play is interpreted as a SLAPP because it captures the strategic commitment of effort by 
the firm that is characteristic of SLAPPs. The expected payoffs to the homeowner and the 
firm in this case are 40.8 and 20.8 given the homeowner's type is strong, and 0 and 81.2 given 
the homeowner's type is weak. Third, when the homeowner chooses Squawk and the firm 
chooses NASH, the firm and the homeowner choose effort simultaneously with neither agent 
knowing the level of effort of the their opponent before they move. In this case, the game is a 
simultaneous move contest of incomplete information which is called the NASH subgame in 
Figure 1. The expected payoffs to the homeowner and the firm in this case are 35.7 and 20.7 
given the homeowner's type is strong, and 0.3 and 86.5 given the homeowner's type is weak. 
The first-stage of the game is entered only by a homeowner who is williag to contest 
the firm's desire to develop. Which action the homeowner takes in the first-stage of the game 
reveals information to the fiirm If the homeowner chooses Sue then she essentially reveals her 
type to the firm, and the firm can choose its effort knowing the homeowner's type and effort.^ 
If the homeowner chooses Squawk, the firm updates its beliefs regarding the homeowner's 
type such that Q in Figure 1 is the probabiUty that the homeowner's type is strong and 1 - Q is 
the probability that the homeowner's type is weak. 
^ In the formal model, it will become apparent that once the homeowner reveals her effort, the firm is able to 
deduce the homeowner's type fi-om this information. 
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Two comments are in order. First, the payoffs in the second-stage of the game are 
assumed to be independent of the firm's behefs. This does not generalize to the formal model 
because the homeowner's and firm's optimal efforts depend on the firm's updated beUefs 
which in turn depend on the firm's a priori beUefs. Second, while it may not be clear firom the 
diagram, the effort the firm chooses when it chooses SLAPP is the same regardless of the 
homeowner's type. This is also true when the firm chooses NASH. 
Consider the first question, what are the economic mcentives encouraging SLAPPs? 
There are four possible types of pure strategy equihbria that can exist for this game.'' There 
are two types of separating equilibria, one where a weak homeowner chooses Sue and a 
strong homeowner chooses Squawk, and one where a weak homeowner chooses Squawk and 
a strong homeowner chooses Sue. There are two types of pooling equilibria, one where both 
types of homeowners choose Sue, and one where both types choose Squawk. 
Given the assumed expected payofis, the solution to this game is determined by first 
considering the firm's optimal action given the homeowner chooses Squawk. Given the firm's 
updated beliefs, the expected payoff to the firm fi*om choosing SLAPP is 20.8Q + 81.2 (1-Q), 
while choosing NASH yields 20.7Q + 86.5( 1-Q) on average. This implies that the firm 
chooses SLAPP given Q > 0.98, or that the firm will choose SLAPP when it has a strong 
updated beUef that the homeowner's type is strong given the homeowner Squawks. 
Consider a homeowner's best response given the firm chooses SLAPP. If the 
homeowner's type is strong, then the homeowner prefers Squawk because 40.8 > 36. If the 
'* While only pure strategies are considered to keep this example simple, in a model with only two types, there 
are actually nine possible types of equilibria including mixed strategies. 
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homeowner's type is weak, then the homeowner prefers Sue because 1.0 > 0. Given that only 
a strong homeowner will choose Squawk, the firm's updated beliefs according to Bayes rule is 
Q = 1.0. Since Q = 1.0 is consistent with the firm choosing SLAPP given the homeowner 
chooses Squawk, this strategy combination is a perfect Bayesian equiUbrium^ This strategy 
combination leads to a separating equilibriiun where a strong type homeowner's action reveals 
her type to the firm. 
Now consider a homeowner's best response given the firm chooses NASH. In this 
case, both strong and weak homeowners choose to Sue because 36 > 35.7 and 1 > 0.3. Since 
a homeowner never chooses Squawk, the firm's decision is oflFthe equilibrium path. The firm 
is willing to play NASH to support this perfect Bayesian equilibrium provided Q < 0.98. 
However, inspecting a weak homeowner's expected payoffs, the worst possible payoff given 
a weak homeowner Sues dominates the maximiun possible payoff given a weak homeowner 
Squawks. This suggest that it is not reasonable for the firm to believe that a homeowner is 
weak given Squawk is observed. Conversely, a strong homeowner's worst possible payoff 
given she Sues is dommated by her best possible payoff given she Squawks. This suggest that 
it is reasonable for a firm to beheve that a strong homeowner may choose Squawk. Since it is 
never reasonable for a weak homeowner to Squawk, but is reasonable for a strong 
homeowner to Squawk, the only reasonable off the equilibrium path belief for the firm is Q = 
1.0.® Given Q > 0.98, the firm prefers to deviate from NASH to SLAPP. This imphes that 
' The concept of a perfect Bayesian equihbrium is defined explicitly later, but in essence, behavior must be 
sequentially rational, beliefs must be updated by Bayes law where possible, and must be consistent with 
equilibrium behavior when Bayes rule does not apply ofif the equilibrium path. 
^ See Kreps (1990) for a discussion of dominated messages, pp. 436. 
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while the combination of strategies above form a perfect Bayesian eqiiilibriwn these strategies 
can not be supported by reasonable beliefs/ 
Suppose the opportunity for the firm to SLAPP is eliminated as proposed by Pring and 
Canan (1993). This is interpreted in the game as the elimination of the SLAPP action 
available to the firm in Figure 1. In this case, the game reduces to the homeovmer choosing 
whether to play the Citizen suit subgame or the NASH subgame. As discussed above, given a 
choice between the NASH subgame and the Citizen suit subgame, both homeowners' types 
prefer the Citizen suit subgame and choose Sue. This strategy combination is a pooling 
equilibrium 
The result that the type of equilibriiun depends on whether the firm has the option to 
SLAPP is an unportant result that also exists in the formal model and inspires the second 
question. If eliminating SLAPPs fi-om the firm's list of available options changes the type of 
equilibriimi, is a SLAPP-fi-ee equilibrium more or less efficient? In this example, the SLAPP-
fi'ee equilibrium is less efficient. 
In this model, efficiency is defined as the sum of the expected payoffs in equilibrium 
divided by the maximum of the homeovmers' and firm's benefits. This definition is chosen 
assuming expected payoffs can be fi'eely redistributed. If expected payoffs can be fi^eely 
redistributed, utility fimctions are increasing in income and the welfare fimction is increasing in 
^ A refinement of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is resorted to in this case such that the results of the 
simplified model correspond with the formal model. In the formal model, when payoffs are a function of 
beliefs, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept is strong enough to rule out the possibility that a firm will 
ever play the NASH action. However, when payoffs in the second stage of the game are a function of the 
firm's beliefs, as in the formal model, multiple equilibria similar to the multiple equilibria presented here 
reappear. 
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individuals' utilities, then social welfare can be maximized by maximizing the expected payoffs 
and redistributing the income between the homeowner and the firm. If it is possible to settle 
the conflict out of court with no transaction cost, such as a Coasian solution, the maximum 
achievable expected benefit to be redistributed is the maximum of the homeowner's and firm's 
benefits. For exanqile, if the homeowner's type is weak the maximum possible sum of 
expected payoffs is the firm's benefit, 100, given the firm and the homeowner costlessly agree 
to let the firm develop. If the homeowner's type is strong the maximum possible sum of 
e?q)ected payoffs is 120. Dividhig the sum of e?^ected payoffs by the maximiun possible sum 
of expected payoffs makes relative efficiency comparable across homeowners with weak and 
strong types. 
When a homeowner is strong, the efficiencies of the Citizen suit subga^e, the SLAPP 
subgame and the NASH subgame are 43.3%, 51.3%, and 47%, respectively. When a 
homeowner is weak the efficiencies of the Citizen suit subgame, the SLAPP subgame and the 
NASH subgame are 82%, 81.2%, and 86.8%, respectively. In the equilibrium where the 
SLAPP action is available, the most efficient game is played when the homeowner's type is 
strong. However, when the homeowner's type is weak, the Citizen suit subgame is played 
even though the NASH subgame is more efficient. This suggest that the efficiency of the 
contest may be improved by inq)osing a policy that maintains the incentives for a strong 
homeowner and the firm to play the SLAPP subgame while providing an incentive for a weak 
homeowner and the firm to play the NASH subgame. 
The policy suggested by Pring and Canan (1993) is the elimination of the firm's ability 
to SLAPP the homeowner. While this does change the equilibrium, it does not change the 
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equilibrium by maintaining the incentives when a homeowner is strong and changing 
incentives when a homeowner is weak. Instead, it changes the incentives when a homeowner 
is strong, and does not alter the incentives when a homeowner is weak. This leads to a 
contest that is less efScient when a homeowner is strong, and has no effect on efficiency when 
a homeowner is weak. 
This exanq)le illustrates two in^ortant points. First, eUminating SLAPPs can 
significantly alter the economic incentives of agents involved in a dispute over an extemaUty. 
Second, eliminating SLAPPs can alter the efficiency of a conflict. In the exanq)le presented 
here, efficiency is unambiguously reduced. These results are echoed throughout formal 
analysis with the exception that beliefs take an even more prominent role in the formal model. 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: The Formal Model 
The formal model extends the sin^lified model in two ways. First, a continuum of 
homeowner's types is considered. Second, the homeowner's and firm's choices of effiirt are 
exphcitly modeled. 
Define Vf to be the firm's benefit from developing the shopping mall measured in 
thousands of dollars. Let toh be the proportion of the homeowner's realized benefit relative to 
the firm's benefit if the firm is not allowed to develop. That is, if Vh is the homeowner's 
benefit, then tUh = Vh / Vf. Vf is common knowledge, while xiih is known only to the 
homeowner. Also, for future use, define tUf = Vf / Vh which is the firm's benefit relative to the 
homeowner's benefit. 
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Define Xj to be the ith agent's observable and irreversible level of effort where i = h for 
the homeowner and i = f for the firm. Let Ai(xi) be the ith agent's cost of effort applying the 
standard assunq)tions of non-decreasing marginal cost such that A/(x,) > 0, and A,"(x,) > 0 
for i = {h, f} where the prime and double prime 'denote the first and second derivative of the 
ith agent's cost fimction with respect to effort. Aj(xj) is common knowledge. 
P(j^,Xh) is the probability that the firm is allowed to develop and receives VF given the 
firm's and homeowner's levels of eflfort Xf and Xh. 1 - P(xf,xh) is the probability that the firm is 
not allowed to develop and the homeowner receives Vh given Xf and Xh. From this point on, 
P(xf,xh) is referred to as the contest success fimction following Hirshleifer (1989). Assuming 
diminishingmargmalreturns, P^^(xj,x^)<0, 
{Xj, Xft) > 0 and 0 < P(?Qi Xh) ^ 1 where {x^, x^) and P, (Xy, x^) represent the first 
and second partial derivatives of the contest success fimction with respect to the ith agent's 
level of eflfort. P(xf,xh) is common knowledge. 
Since the firm does not know tUh, its information is incomplete. Harsanyi (1967-1968) 
suggests the introduction of an additional player, Nature, to transform a game of incomplete 
information into a game of inq)erfect information. Let v be a random variable fi-om the 
cumulative distribution G(V,T) with density g(v,T) such that v is defined over the entire real 
line. The random variable v represents the homeowner's type defined in terms of the 
homeowner's benefit relative to the fineu The cumulative distribution G(V,T) represents the 
firm's a priori beliefs regarding the probabiUty that the homeowner is type v. G(V,T) is 
common knowledge. 
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Recall from the sin^lified model that when the homeowner chooses to Sue or Squawk 
information is revealed to the firm. The firm uses this information to update its beUefs such 
that r(v,T) is the cumulative distribution of the firm's updated behefs. The firm's updated 
beliefs given Sue are r(v,T) = 0 for v < TOH and r(v,t) = 1 otherwise.® The firm's updated 
beliefs given Squawk are more involved and depend on whether the Squawk action is on the 
equilibrium path. Generally, define the firm's updated beliefs given Squawk as r(v,T) = 
0(V,T). ^>(V,T) is assumed to be common knowledge. 
Assuming risk neutrahty, a homeowner's expected payoff given her type is 
The firm's expected payoflf given its updated beliefs about the homeowner's type is 
E7tj{x^,x^) = ^J^P{Xj,x^iy))Vj-Kj{x^))dr{v,T). (2) 
What information is available when the homeowner and the firm choose their optimal 
levels of effort depends on the sequence of moves in the first-stage of the game. For instance, 
if the homeowner chooses Squawk and the firm chooses SLAPP, then the firm must choose 
its level of effort only knowing <I>(v,x), and the homeowner chooses her level of effort 
knowing the firm's choice of effort. If the homeowner chooses Squawk and the firm chooses 
® When the homeowner chooses Sue, she reveals her level of effort to the firm before the firm chooses its level 
of effort. It will become clear below that this action essentially reveals the homeowner's type to the firm or the 
set of types that employ the same equilibrium effort. Technic^ly, the firm only knows the set of types that 
employ the same equilibrium effort. However, the innocuous assumption that the firm knows the actual type 
does not alter the firm's choice of effort since all homeowner's types in this set employ the same equilibrium 
effort, and the firm's equilibrium effort depends only on the homeowner's choice of effort. 
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NASH, then the firm must choose its level of effort only knowing <I)(v, T), and the homeowner 
chooses her level of effort only knowing that the firm will choose its level of effort based on 
0(V,T). If the homeowner chooses Sue, she chooses her level of effort and reveals this level 
of effort to the firm The firm then chooses its level of effort knowing the homeowner's level 
of effort. 
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THE PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM IN THE SECOND-STAGE SUBGAMES 
Before detenniiiing the equilibriiun for the game as a whole, solutions for the three 
alternative second-stage subgames must be derived. First, the conditions needed for an 
equihbrium to exist in the three second-stage subgames are outlined. Second, the general 
nature of these three second-stage subgame eqiiihbria is discussed. Third, assuming the 
contest success function is of a commonly used ratio form, analytic solutions are derived along 
wdth con:g)arative static results for in^ortant model parameters. 
General Existence Conditions for an Equilibrium in the Second-Stage Subgames 
Proposition 1: A unique, pure strategy, perfect Bayesian equihbrium exists for each of the 
three second-stage subgames provided second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied. 
The proof proceeds in three steps. The first step establishes the existence of a unique 
perfect Bayesian equihbrium in the NASH subgame under the present assumptions of the 
model. The second step estabUshes the existence of a unique perfect Bayesian equihbrium in 
the SLAPP subgame provided that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied. 
The third step estabhshes the existence of a unique perfect Bayesian equihbrium m the Citizen 
suit subgame provided that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied. 
Proof; A perfect Bayesian equihbrium extends the concept of subgame perfection to games 
with incomplete information (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, pp. 321-322). Rasmusen 
(1989, p. 110) defines a perfect Bayesian equihbrium for a general game as "strategy 
combinations and a set of behefs ^ such that at each node of the game: 
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(1) The strategies for the remainder of the game are Nash given the beliefs and strategies of 
other players. 
(2) The behefs at each information set are rational given the evidence appearing that far in the 
game (meaning that they are based, if possible, on priors updated by Bayes's Rule given the 
observed actions of the other players under the hypothesis that they are in equilibrium)." 
Step 1: In the NASH subgame, the homeowner and the firm choose their eflFort 
unaware of their opponent's choice of effort and given the firm's updated beliefs fi-om the 
first-stage of the game. A strategy for the firm is to choose a level of effort Xf such that Xf > 0. 
A strategy for the homeowner is to choose a level of effort Xh such that Xh > 0. Since no new 
information is revealed through the play of the NASH subgame, there is no opportunity for 
the firm to update its behefs fiirther. Tliis inches that the homeowner's and firm's equilibrium 
strategies must only satisfy condition (1) for a perfect Bayesian equiUbrium 
The firm's objective is Max Enj ( x . , )  s u c h  t h a t  x f  >  0 .  T h e  f i r s t - o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  
for the firm are 
dEn  J  
lefi r) < 0 and (3) 
0EK f X ,  ^ = 0  (4) 
The second-order condition for the firm is 
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Equation (5) is satisfied by assumption. Therefore, the firm's best response, x((xh), that 
satisfies equations (3) and (4) for a given Xh(v) exists and is unique. 
The homeowners' objective is Max En^, {Xj,Xf,) such that Xh > 0. The first-order 
conditions for the homeovsner are 
dx^  
The second-order condition for the homeowner is 
D"^  EKU 
dx l  
<0.  (8)  
Equation (8) is satisfied by assumption. Therefore, the homeovmer's best response, xh(xfttijh) 
that satisfies equations (6) and (7) for a given Xf and tUh exists and is unique. 
Substituting Xh(xf,T!Jh) satisfying equations (6) and (7) into equations (3) and (4) yields 
the firm's unique equiUbriimi level of effort for the NASH subgame, x/^. Substituting x/* and 
TOh into Equations (6) and (7) yields the homeowner's unique equilibrium level of eflfort in the 
NASH subgame, Xh^. By construction, Tif and Xt,^ satisfy condition (1) above. Therefore, 
these unique equiUbrium levels of eflfort form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the NASH 
subgame. 
Step 2: In the SLAPP subgame, the firm chooses its level of eflfort and reveals its 
choice to the homeowner before the homeowner chooses her level of eflfort. With this 
sequence of play, after the homeowner has chosen Squawk, no new information is revealed to 
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the firm in the SLAPP subgame. Therefore, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this subgame 
only requires that condition (1) is satisfied. A strategy for the firm is to choose a level of 
eflFort such that Xf > 0. A strategy for the homeowner is to choose a fimction Xh(xf,TOh) such 
that Xh(xf,TOh) > 0. 
In this case, the homeowner's objective is imchanged with the exception that the 
homeowner knows the firm's level of eflFort when she chooses her level of eflFort. The 
homeowner chooses her best response xh(xf,tijh) = .^r^max (X^,X^) such that equations 
(6) and (7) are satisfied given Xf. Since equation (8) is satisfied by assumption Xh(xf,Tiih) exists 
and is unique given Xf and toh. 
Since the firm moves first and realizes that the homeowner will respond according to 
Xh(xf,TiJh), the firm's objective becomes Max E/ry(^x^,x^(Xy,v)j such that Xf > 0. The firm's 
first-order conditions suppressing fimctional arguments to ease exposition are now 
—^ = f p F + P d^iv,T) < 0 and (9) 
dEn 
Xj. ^ ^ = 0. (10) 
d X j  
The second-order condition for the firm is 
En 
d x ^ j  =J 
r 
p.. + 
XJ.J J f ^ dx] ^ ^ d<i>{y,T). (11) 
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Given the present assumptions of the model, equation (11) is not guaranteed to be negative. 
However, assuming equation (11) is negative, a unique maximum exists and is defined by 
equations (9) and (10) given xh(xf,v). 
Define x/ to be the unique maximum satisfying equations (9) and (10) given xh(xf,v). 
Substituting x/ into X£(j^,tijh) yields the homeowner's unique equilibrium level of effort, Xh®. 
By construction x/ and Xh® satisfy condition (1). Therefore, these equilibrium levels of effort 
form a unique, perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
Step 3: In the Citizen suit subgame, the homeowner chooses a level of effort and 
reveals this effort to the firm before the firm chooses its level of effort. Notice that the firm's 
objective fimction in equation (2) depends on the homeowner's type only to the extent that 
the homeowner's type influences the homeowner's level of effort. Given Xh(iiJh) is assumed to 
be irreversible, the only consistent way the firm can update its beliefs is to place a probability 
of 1.0 on the tHh type homeowner. This belief satisfies condition (2) for a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. A strategy for the firm is to choose a fimction x{(xh) such that xf(xh) > 0. A 
strategy for the homeowner is to choose Xh given xf(xh) such that Xh > 0. 
The firm's objective reduces to 
(12) 




Xf ^=0.  (14) 
^  d x j  ^  '  
The firm's second-order condition is 
En V 
= -Ay"(x^)<0.  (15) 
Equation (15) is satisfied by assiunption. Therefore, the firm's best response, >Q(xh), that 
satisfies equations (13) and (14) exists and is imique for a given Xh. 
Since the homeowner moves first and realizes that the firm will respond according to 
jQ(xh), the homeowner's objective becomes Max EnJxJx-XxA such that Xh > 0. The 
homeowner's first-order conditions suppressing fimctional arguments to ease exposition are 
dEn. dXf 
—^ = —^-A'<Oand (16) 
dx^ " dx, " ^ ^ 
dEnh - (17) 
dx^ 
The second-order condition for the homeowner is 
En. dXf x, 
T^ = -P..V.-lP,,Vy,—^—P,V f-Afc". (18) 
d x l  "  d x ^  d x l  "  
Given the present assun^tions of the model, equation (18) is not guaranteed to be negative. 
However, assuming equation (18) is negative, a imique maximum exists and is defined by 
equations (16) and (17) given >^Xh). 
Define Xh'^ to be the unique maximum satisfying equations (16) and (17) given x((xh). 
Substituting Xh^ into x^xh) yields the firm's unique equilibrium level of effort, xf. By 
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construction and xf satisfy condition (1) and beliefs satisfy condition (2). Therefore, these 
equiUbrium levels of eflFort form a unique, perfect Bayesian equilibriiun. Q.E.D. 
An Illustration of the Three Second-Stage Subgames 
To illustrate the NASH subgame equihbrium, consider Figure 2. The firm's best 
response function, F, is denoted as a flmction of the homeowner's level of effort assuming 
linear cost and a ratio contest success function such that P(xf, Xh) = xf / (xf + Xh). For each 
homeowner's type tUh, there is an alternative best response function implying a family of best 
response functions. A subset of this family of best response functions is denoted by Hi, H2 
and H3 for a homeowner with benefits Vhi, Vh2 or Vhs where Vhi < Vh2 < Vhs and Vh2 = Vf. 
The homeowner knows her type, and, therefore, knows her actual best response fiinction in 
the family of best response functions. The firm knows the homeowner's best response 
function given the homeowner's type. If the homeowner's type corresponds to Hi, H2 or H3, 
then the firm's and homeowner's equiUbrium levels of effort given the firm knows the 
homeowner's type are (xfl'^,Xhi^), (xf2^,xh2'^) or (xo'^,Xh3'^). However, the firm must choose its 
equiUbriiun level of effort without the knowing the homeowner's type. 0(V,T) places a 
probability weight on each type of homeowner's best response function. The firm chooses a 
level of effort that is the best response to the family of best response flmctions given <5(V,T), 
for mstance The homeowner responds by choosmg a level of effort that is a best 
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Figure 2: Exainple of the NASH subgame equilibriiun 
24 
H], H2 or H3. These levels of effort represent the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the 
alternative homeowner's types in the NASH subgame. 
When the firm moves first in the SLAPP subgame, the firm chooses a level of effort 
knowing that the homeowner will respond according to her best response fimction. Figure 3 
characterizes these equilibria for the three alternative homeowners' types. That is, if the firm 
knew the homeowner's type corresponded to Vhi, Vh2, or Vh3, then the firm's equilibrium 
level of effort would be or and the homeowner would respond with Xhi^ Xh2® or 
Xh3^. ^ However, since the firm only knows the probability of each type of homeowner, the 
firm must choose a level of effort that is a best response to all homeowners' types given 
<1)(V,T). For instance, xf*, to which a homeowner with benefit Vhi, Vh2, or Vhs responds with 
Xhl®, Xh2® or Xh3^. 
Figure 4 illustrates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the Citizen suit subgame. 
When the homeowner moves first in the Citizen suit subgame, the homeowner chooses a level 
of effort knowmg that the firm will respond according to F. Given the homeowner's benefit is 
Vhi, Vh2, or Vh3, the homeowner chooses an equiUbrium level of effort Xhi^, Xh2'^ or Xhs*^, to 
which the firm responds with xn'^, or 
Selection of a Contest Success Function 
Proposition 1 establishes the existence of an equilibrium for each of the three 
alternative second-stage subgames. By mq}osing additional structure on the model, interesting 
^ Qualitatively, the positions of these equilibrium points are correct (see Baik and Shogren 1992). 
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Figure 4; Exaiiq)le of the Citizen suit subgame equilibrium 
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insights are gained regarding the nature of equilibrium efforts in each of the three ahemative 
subgames. 
Previous investigations of contests have made interestiag insights by assuming linear 
cost and one of three alternative contest success iimctions." The first, is the perfectly 
discriminating contest success iunction which has been recently used by Hilhnan and Riley 
(1989), among others, to analyze a contest of asymmetric valuation vsith complete and two-
sided incomplete information. A simple form of the perfectly discriminating contest success 
fimctionis P { X j , x ^ )  =  
\,for 
for Xj = x^. This contest success fimction inqilies that the 
0, for XJ < X,, 
agent investing the largest amoimt of effort guarantees victory. This contest success fimction 
also generally leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium. However, since it is common for agents 
to win environmental conflicts even when their effort is surpassed by their opponent's effort, 
this contest success function seems inappropriate for the conflict being analyzed here. 
One alternative to the perfectly discriminating contest success fimction is Hirshleifer's 
(1989) difference contest success fimction where a sin^Med form is 
P{xf,x^)  = ^ .  Hirshleifer  developed this  contest  success function to analyze 
l  + exp(x^-x^) 
a contest where both agents invest no effort in equilibriimi. Even though an agent invest no 
equilibrium effort, the agent still has a positive probability of success. This characteristic 
" Linear cost need not be assumed with a suitable transformation of the contest success fimction. However, 
specifying a particular contest success function does have implications regarding the cost structure if cost are 
transformed before the contest success function is specified. 
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seems inappropriate given the context of the contest presented here because a homeowner 
must expend some positive level of effort or forfeit all rights to the firm. 
A second alternative to the perfectly discriminating contest success fimction is 
TuUock's (1980) lottery ticket contest success fimction where each agent can buy as many 
lottery tickets as he/she v^shes for one dollar a ticket. A ticket is then drawn at random and 
the agent who purchased the ticket wins the contest. This contest success fimction has been 
used extensively throughout the literature and recently by Hillman and Riley (1989), Baik 
(1994), and Baik and Shogren (1994a), among others, to analyze a contest with asymmetric 
valuation, asymmetric abihty, and asymmetric rennbursement of effort. A simple form of the 
ratio contest success fimction is P(xf,x^) = 
, for Xj>0 and > 0 
If neither 
A, for Xj =0 and = 0 
agent buys tickets, then the probability that the firm wins is k which is usually set equal to 1/2 
for convenience. While this single ratio contest success fimction can be generalized as in 
Baik (1994), the implications of this type of contest success fimction are that best response 
fimctions are non-monotonic, and that an equiUbrium generally requires at least one agent to 
expend a minimal amoimt of effort. Since the ratio contest success function fits the context of 
the model presented here the best and the snnplified form has tractable analytic solutions, it is 
the specification employed to develop a better understanding of the general model. 
Hillman and Riley (1989) also note that a modified perfectly discriminating contest success function with 
errors can in some case be reduced to a ratio form. 
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In its simplest form, Tullock's (1980) ratio contest success fimction implies that 
agent's are equally productive at inJQuenciag probabilities. However, this assun^tion may be 
too restrictive as discussed by Baik (1994) and Baik and Shogren (1994a). Define Aj as the 
ith agent's productivity of eflfort, and a; = Ai / Aj as the ith agent's relative productivity of 
effort. Tullock's (1980) ratio contest success fimction can now be modified and rewritten as 
productive. If an > 1, the homeowner's eflfort is relatively more productive. If ah = 1, the 
homeowner's and firm's efforts are equally productive. 
Given this specification of the contest success fimction, the firm's and homeowner's 
best response fimctions in Figures 2, 3 and 4 are exphcitly characterized. The firm's best 
P { X f , X H )  =  
A J Xj + Af^ Xf^ 
If 0 < ah < 1, the firm's effort is relatively more 
X f  + o c , x ^  
Analytic Solutions for the Ratio Contest Success Function 
response fimction is Xy = which reaches a maximum at 
0, 
. For 0 < X, < Vf ——, the firm's  best  response f imction is  increasing in the 
4a, 
V V 
homeowner's effort. For —— < x, < —, the firm's best response fimction is decreasing in 
4 a ,  a .  
" Since the homeowner never enters this contest unless she is willing to expend some positive level of effort, 
without loss of generality, the case where both agents employ 0 effort is not considered. 
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Vf 
the homeowner's effort. For > —, the firm no longer invests any effort. The 
CCu 
homeowner's best response fimction is = 
\V,x^ x^ 
"A 
- - ^ , f o r a ^ V ^ > x ^  
which reaches a 
0, for a„F, <Xj 
cx V cc V 
maximxmi at Xj = ^ * . For Q<Xj < ^ ' '  , the homeowner's best response function is 
a V increasing in the firm's effort. For ^ * < x, < a. K , the homeowner's best response 
4 
fimction is decreasing in the firm's effort. For Xj > athe homeowner no longer invests 
any effort. 
These best response fimctions imply that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium levels of 
effort for an interior solution to the NASH subgame are 
[^/ X ] =  ^ / / ^ N { ^ h , o c ^ , T Yr))'| 
/ N-'/ 
where Pj ={m„a,) and 
PN[^H>(^H'V= W = 7—• ^ N(V, T) represents the firm's 
1 + IC (V, r) 1 + (p^ (v) j 
updated beUefs given the NASH subgame is played in the second-stage of the game. The 
perfect Bayesian equiUbrium levels of effort for an interior solution to the SLAPP subgame 
are 
The limits of integration and «I>N(V, T) are explicitly defined below. 
where = 
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V f P s { ^ h ^ c i h ^ T ) \  K [ p f P s ( ^ h ^ c C h ^ - ^ ) - { P s P s { ^ h ^ ( ^ h ^ ' ^ ) y )  
...w. » / „  „  _ ,  g ( ' ' g . ) " ' ^ ' » . ( ' ' . ^ )  
. Os(v, T) represents the firm's 
2 2 
updated behefs given the SLAPP subgame is played in the second-stage of the game. The 
perfect Bayesian equiUbrium levels of effort for an interior solution to the Citizen suit 
subgame are 
Define the leader as the agent who strategically commits effort. P  a  f ^ z Y ,  f o r  V .  
= S and C, denotes the proportion of the leader's benefit that the leader dissipates in 
the leader's equilibriimi choice of effort. Notice that the proportion of the leader's benefit 
dissipated by the leader depends crucially on pk which is denoted as the leader's relative 
resolve. The exact specification of the leader's relative resolve is selected to facilitate the 
interpretation of the equilibriimi efforts in terms of the mean and variance of the leader's 
relative resolve. 
Notice that for the NASH subgame the structure of the solution is similar to the 
structure of the solution in the SLAPP subgame. This result occurs because while the firm's 
where and Pc(m„a„T)=^^^^'' 
equihbrium, while -yf^P^ {rUf, ,a^,T)- {^p^P^ is the follower's best response to A 
The limits of integration and <I>s(v, T) are explicitly defined below. 
32 
and homeowner's equilibrium efforts always fall on the homeowner's best response fimction 
they generally fall off the firm's best response fimction. This result is important because it 
indicates that the firm's incoitq)lete information places the firm in a leadership role even 
though the firm is technically not a leader. While the firm's decision is influenced by the 
general shape of homeowner's best response fimction, the firm's decision is unaffected by any 
particular type of homeowner's best response fimction. Given the homeowner's realized type, 
the firm's equiUbrium choice of effort may be inappropriate ex post. In fact, if the firm knew 
the homeowner's type ex ante, this choice of effort would likely be incredible. However, the 
firm's incomplete information and the homeowner's knowledge of the firm's incomplete 
information make the firm's equilibrium choice of effort credible even if it is inappropriate ex 
post. 
Comparative Static Analysis 
Relative resolve which is a composition of both agents' benefits and abilities is an 
m^ortant determinate of each agent's equilibrium behavior. Proposition 2 summarizes the 
relationships between the agents' relative resolves and the agents' relative benefits and 
abiUties. Proposition 3 and 4 summarize the relationship between the mean and variance of 
the firm's expected relative resolve and the agents' equilibrium levels of effort. Proposition 5 
considers the relationship between the homeowner's realized relative benefit and the agents' 
equilibrium levels of effort. Proposition 6 considers the relationship between the 
homeowner's relative ability and the agents' equilibrium levels of effort. These results are 
derived maintaining the assurD])tions of linear cost and the ratio form of the contest success 
fimction. 
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Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) define an agent's action as a strategic 
conqilement (substitute) to another agent if an agent's action increases the marginal payoff of 
the other agent. The primary result of this section is that while many of the comparative static 
results are ambiguous in general, these ambiguities are usually resolved based on whether or 
not the leader's equihbrium effort is a strategic complement or substitute to the follower. 
Given the ratio form of the contest success fimction, the intersection of the firm's and 
a homeowner's best response fimctions has specific strategic properties that may not 
generalize to other specifications of the contest success function.'^ When PF = Pc = 1, the 
firm's and homeowner's best response fimctions intersect at the maximum of both best 
response fimctions. For example, consider the intersection of F and H2 in Figures 2, 3 and 4. 
When pF > 1 > pc, the firm's best response fimction intersects the homeowner's best response 
fimction where the firm's best response fimction is increasing and the homeowner's best 
response fimction is decreasing. For example, consider the intersection of F and Hi in Figures 
2, 3 and 4. When pc > 1 > PF, the firm's best response fimction intersects the homeowner's 
best response fimction where the firm's best response fimction is decreasing and the 
homeowners best response fimction is increasing. For example, consider the intersection of F 
and H3 in Figures 2, 3 and 4. This inches that the homeowner's relative resolve is increasing 
fi'om Hi to H3 and that when one agent's equilibrium effort is a strategic conq>lement in the 
NASH subgame the other agent's equilibrium effort must be a strategic substitute. 
These properties can be verified by examining the solution to the firm's and the a homeowner's best 
response fimctions. 
34 
Proposition 2: The ith agent's relative resolve is increasing in the ith agent's relative ability 
and relative benefit.'^ 
An agent's relative resolve is best interpreted as a measure of an agent's relative 
strength. This relative strength is con^osed of two distinct elements. The first element 
represents how "bad" an agents wants to win the contest relative to her opponent, while the 
second element represents the agent's natural ability to win the contest relative to her 
opponent. Together both elements determine how much eflFort an agent invest to win the 
contest. As an agent's relative benefit or relative ability increase, the agent's relative strength 
increases and relative resolve increases. 
Proposition 3: Assume that increasing T increases the mean of the firm's expected resolve 
while maintaining the variance. If the firm's equilibrium effort is a strategic complement 
(substitute) to the homeovmer 
a) in the SLAPP subgame, the firm's equilibriimi eflFort is increasing in T, 
while the homeowner's equilibrium eflfort is mcreasing (decreasing) in T. 
b) in the NASH subgame, the firm's equilibrium effort is increasing in T as 
1  >  ( c r r )  a n d  d e c r e a s i n g  i n  x  a s  
When the firm's equilibrium eflFort is 
" For the proof of proposition 2, see Appendix A. 
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increasing, the homeowner's equilibrium effort is increasing (decreasing), 
while when the firm's equilibriimi efiFort is decreasing, the homeowner's 
equiUbriun eflfort is decreasing (increasing).'® 
Recall that in Figures 2 and 3 the firm's beliefs place a probability weight on each type 
of homeowner's best response fimction. The direct eflFect of a variance preserving mean 
increase in the firm's expected resolve is to increase the likelihood of homeowners' types with 
low relative resolve. For instance, the likelihood of Hi and H2 increases, while the likelihood 
of H3 decreases. Increasing x does not directly alter either the firm's or homeowner's best 
response fimctions. However, the increase in T indirectly aflfects the firm's equihbrium effort 
by making homeowners' types with lower relative resolve more likely. This indirect effect on 
the firm's equilibrium effort then spiUs over to the homeowner as the homeowner chooses her 
best response to the firm's equilibriiun eflfort. 
In Figure 3, notice that when the firm's information is conq)lete the lower the 
homeowner's relative resolve the greater the firm's equilibrium eflfort, > xo®. 
Therefore, when the firm's iaformation is incomplete and homeowners' types with low 
relative resolve become more likely, the firm's equilibrium eflfort, Xf®*, increases. If the firm's 
equilibrium eflfort falls on an increasing (decreasing) portion of the homeovmer's actual best 
response fimction, H3 (Hi and H2), then the homeowner increases (decreases) her equihbrium 
eflfort in response to the firm's increased equilibrium eflfort. 
" For the proof of proposition 3, see Appendix A. 
36 
Notice in Figure 2 that when the firm's information is complete the firm's equiUbrium 
effort is increasing (decreasing) in the firm's relative resolve as the homeowner's best 
response function intersects a decreasing (increasing) portion of the firm's best response 
fimction, (xo^ > xn^). Therefore, when information is incomplete and homeowners' 
types with low relative resolve become more likely, the firm has the incentive to increase its 
equiUbrium effort as homeowners' types like H2 become more likely, and to decrease its 
equiUbrium effort as homeowners' types like Hi become more Ukely. The net effect is that the 
filrm's equiUbrium effort increases (decreases) as the firm expects that the homeowner's 
equUibrium effort is on an increasing (decreasing) portion of the firm's best response fimction 
or as l>i<)2E^^{pp)/3f,{ Wq,ccc,t). When the firm's expectations lead to an increase in 
the firm's equiUbrium effort, the homeowner decreases (increases) her equiUbrium effort if the 
firm's equiUbriiun effort falls on a decreasing (increasing) portion of the homeowner's best 
response fimction. Hi (H2 and H3). When the firm's expectations lead to a decrease in the 
firm's equiUbrium effort, the homeowner increases (decreases) her equiUbrium effort if the 
firm's equiUbriiim effort faUs on a decreasing (increasing) portion of the homeowner's best 
response fimction. 
Proposition 4: Assume that increasing T increases the variance of the firm's ejq)ected relative 
resolve while maintaining the mean. In the NASH subgame, the firm's equiUbrium effort is 
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decreasing in T, and the homeowner's equiUbrium effort is increasing (decreasing) in T as the 
firm's equihbrium effort is a strategic substitute (complement) to the homeowner.'® 
In this instance, an increase in T redistributes probabihty weights towards 
homeowners' types with relatively low and relatively high relative resolve. For example, in 
Figures 2 and 3, Hi and H3 become more likely, while H2 becomes less likely. Otherwise, the 
firm's and homeowner's best response fimctions are unchanged. 
In the SLAPP subgame, as homeowners' types vsdth low relative resolve become more 
likely, the firm has the incentive to increase its equiUbrium effort, while, as homeowners' types 
with high relative resolve become more likely, the firm has the mcentive to decrease its 
equJlibriiun effort. Given the specific definition of the firm's relative resolve, the firm's 
incentives exactly offset one another and there is no net change in the firm's equilibrium 
effort. Since the firm's equilibrium effort is imaffected, the homeowner has no incentive to 
alter her equilibrium effort. 
In the NASH subgame, the firm has the incentive to decrease its equiUbrium effort as 
homeowners' type with high and low relative resolve become more likely. Therefore, the 
firm's equiUbrium effort unambiguously decreases. Since the firm decreases its equiUbrium 
effort, the homeowner increases (decreases) her equiUbriimi effort if the firm's equiUbrium 
effort falls on a decreasing (increasing) portion of the homeowner's best response fimction. 
" For the proof of proposition 4, see Appendix A, 
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Proposition 5; In any of the three akemative subgames, the homeowner's equihbriimi effort is 
increasing in the homeowner's relative benefit. In the Citizen suit subgame, the firm's 
equilibrium effort is increasing (decreasing) in the homeowner's relative benefit as the 
homeowner's equilibrium eflfort is a strategic complement (substitute) to the firm. In the 
SLAPP and NASH subgames, the firm's equilibrium effort is independent of the homeowner's 
relative benefit.^" 
The larger the homeowner's realized relative benefit, the higher the homeowner's best 
response fimction. As seen in Figures 2, 3 and 4, the higher the homeowner's best response 
fimction the greater the homeowner's equilibrium effort for any given level of firm eflfort. 
When the firm does not know the homeowner's type as in the SLAPP and NASH subgames, 
the firm's equilibriiun eflfort is independent of the homeowner's reahzed relative benefit. 
When the firm does not know the homeowner's type, but does know the homeowner's 
equihbrium effort as in the Citizen suit subgame, the furm's equilibrium effort increases 
(decreases) as the homeovmer's equilibrium effort falls on an increasmg (decreasing) portion 
of the firm's best response function. 
Proposition 6; As the homeowner's relative ability increases, if the leader's equilibrium eflfort 
is a strategic complement (substitute) to the follower 
For the proof of proposition 5, see Appendix A. 
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a) in the SLAPP subgame, the firm's equiUbrium effort is decreasing, while 
the homeowner's equilibriimi effort is decreasmg (increasing). 
b) in the NASH subgame where the firm is defined as the leader, the firm's 
equilibrium effort is increasing as {p/^ ^  ^ decreasing as 
(/Oy^) < 1. The homeowner's equihbrium effort is decreasmg 
(increasing). 
c) in the Citizen suit subgame, the homeowner's equihbrium effort is 
increasing, while the fiurm's equihbriimi effort is increasing (decreasing).^' 
The direct effect of increasing the homeowner's relative abihty is to lower the firm's 
best response fimction and to fan the femily of homeowners' best response fimctions upward. 
While the likelihood of each homeowner's best response fimction is unchanged, the increase in 
the homeowner's relative resolve indirectly decreases the mean and variance of the firm's 
expected relative resolve. 
In the SLAPP subgame, the direct and indirect effect unambiguously decrease the 
firm's equiUbrium effort. While both the direct and indirect effects on the homeowner's 
equihbrium effort are ambiguous in general, both effects depend on whether the firm's 
equihbrium effort falls on an increasing or decreasing portion of the homeowner's best 
response fimction. If the firm's equihbrium effort falls on an increasing (decreasmg) portion 
For the proof of proposition 6, see Appendix A. 
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of the homeowner's best response function, the homeowner decreases (increases) her 
equilibrium effort as the firm's equilibrium effort decreases. 
In the NASH subgame, the direct and indirect mean effect tend to increase (decrease) 
the firm's equilibrium effort as the firm expects that the homeowner's equilibriiun effort falls 
on an increasing (decreasmg) portion of the firm's best response fimction. The indirect 
variance effect tends to increase the firm's equilibrium effort. The net effect on the firm's 
equihbrium effort is positive (negative) as ^ direct effect on the 
homeowner's equilibriimi effort is negative (positive) as the firm's equihbrium effort falls on 
an increasing (decreasmg) portion of the homeowner's best response function. The indirect 
effect on the homeowner's equihbrium effort depends on whether the net effect on the firm's 
equihbrium effort is positive or negative and whether the firm's equihbrium effort falls on an 
increasing or decreasing portion on the homeovmer's best response function. Since the direct 
effect always dominates the indirect effect, the net effect on the homeowner's equihbrium 
effort is negative (positive) as the firm's equUibriimi effort falls on an increasing (decreasing) 
portion of the homeowner's best response function. 
As the increase ki the homeowner's relative abihty increases the homeowner's relative 
resolve, the homeowner increases her equihbriiun effort in the Citizen suit subgame. If the 
homeowner's equihbrium level of effort &lls on an mcreasing (decreasing) portion of the 
firm's best response function, the firm responds by increasing (decreasmg) its equihbrium 
effort. 
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THE PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM IN THE FORMAL MODEL FOR THE 
RATIO CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTION 
The previous chapter derived the perfect Bayesian equiUbrium for the three alternative 
subgames assuming linear cost and a ratio contest success function. In this section, the 
assunq)tions of linear cost and the ratio contest success fiinction are maintained and tw^o 
classes of perfect Bayesian equilibria for the SLAPP game with and without the SLAP? action 
are characterized. Below, the SLAPP game without the SLAPP action is referred to as the 
SLAPP-free game. The first class considers equilibria where there is 0 probability that the 
firm will ever witness the homeowner Squawk. In this class, Bayes rule can not be applied to 
update the firm's behefe. The second class of equilibria considers cases where there is a 
positive probability that the homeowner chooses Squawk. In this class, Bayes rule is used to 
update the firm's beliefs. Proposition 7 shows that the firm always prefers the SLAPP 
subgame to the NASH subgame. Proposition 8 characterizes the first class of equilibria when 
the SLAPP or NASH subgame is played given the homeowner chooses Squawk. Proposition 
9 characterizes the second class of equilibria when the SLAPP or NASH subgame is played 
given the homeowner chooses Squawk. The primary result of this section is that agents' 
equilibrium behaviors are driven by relative resolve. For a given relative resolve, the 
proportion of relative resolve attributable to the agent's relative benefit or ability is irrelevant. 
Proposition 7: For any set of updated beliefs given the homeowner chooses Squawk, the 
firm always, at least weakly, prefers the SLAPP action to the NASH action. 
^ For the proof of proposition 7, see Appendix A. 
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The only diflference for the jBrm between the SLAPP and NASH subgames is that the 
firm moves first in the SLAPP subgame. Since the firm can always choose an equilibriimi 
level of eflfort in the SLAPP subgame that will lead to an equiUbrium identical to the NASH 
subgame, the firm is always able to guarantee a payoff in the SLAPP subgame that is at least 
as large as its payoff in the NASH subgame. Proposition 7 is a strong result that implies that a 
firm will always choose SLAPP given the homeowner chooses Squawk. Therefore, 
eliminating the SLAPP action will have a significant impact on equiUbrium behavior because 
the firm will no longer be able to exercise its preferred action. 
Proposition 8: Assume that the kth subgame is played for k = S or N, and that the firm's off 
the equilibrium path, updated behefs, Ok(v, x), are such that , r) > ^ given the 
homeowner chooses Squawk. The following sequence of play is a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium for the game; 
- the homeowner chooses Sue and strategically commits a level of effort Xh^, 
- the firm responds with a level of effort x/^ given 
Proposition 7 inches that in the SLAPP game the firm always chooses SLAPP given 
the homeowner chooses Squawk. When the SLAPP action is eUminated in the SLAPP-fi^ee 
game, the filrm is constrained to choose NASH given the homeowner chooses Squawk. 
Proposition 8 summarizes the necessary and sufficient condition for a pooUng equilibrium 
For the proof of proposition 8, see Appendix A. 
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where all homeowners' types choose Sue for either the SLAPP or SLAPP-free game. 
Technically, this equilibrium is not unique because any 0(v, x) that can be defined to satisfy 
(cT;,, , r) > ^ represents a different off the equilibrium path beUef that supports this class 
of pooling equilibriimL However, since both agents' equilibrium efforts are independent of 
(cT^, , t) , any two alternative equilibrium beliefs satisfying lead to 
identical equilibriimi efforts.^'* Given the uniqueness of equilibriimi behavior under a multitude 
of possible equilibriiun beliefs, this equilibriimi is loosely referred to as unique. 
Proposition 9: Assume that the kth subgame is played for k = S or N and that the firm's 
updated beliefs, <^k(v, t), are such that ^ given the homeowner chooses 
Squawk. The following sequence of play is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the game: 
- If 0 < or , the homeowner chooses Sue and strategically 
commits a level of eflFort Xh^. The firm responds by selecting a level of eflfort 
given Xh^. 
- If < GT^ < V;^, the homeowner chooses Squawk. The firm updates its beliefs 
A unique equilibrium belief can be established refining the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept. One 
such refinement that would imply a unique equilibrium belief such that Pk(t!ii„ a^, T) = 1/2 is the concept of 
universal divinity [see Banks, Camerer and Porter (1994) for a brief and intuitive primer on equilibrium 
refinements for games of incomplete information]. This belief implies that all homeowners' types choose Sue 
except for the type whose relative resolve is equal to 1. This type is indifiTerent between Sue and Squawlc. If 
this type chooses Sue, then a unique universally divine equilibrium exists. However, since this type is assumed 
to choose Squawk, no universally divine equilibrium exists. 
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such that <I>^(v,r)s 
0, for (u, < Vj 
G(v,r)-G(v„r)  
<^(v*,7)-G(V,,7-)' 
1, for V, < 
for <v^ . The firm chooses a 
level of effort Xf^, and the homeowner chooses a level of effort Xh''.^^ 
Proposition 9 summarizes behavior for a partially separating equihbrium in the SLAPP 
and SLAPP-fi-ee games where one set of homeowners' types chooses Sue, and the 
complementary set chooses Squawk. For a partially separating equilibrium to exist, Bayes 
rule must define the firm's updated beliefs such that Given the possible 
nonlinear natiu'e of 0(v, T) and there is no guarantee that a solution exists. 
Assuming a solution does exist, there is no a priori reason to suspect that the solution is 
unique. Multiple equilibria in this case are more troublesome because both agents' equilibriiun 
efforts may depend on the firm's updated beliefs in[q)lying that different equilibriimi beliefs 
may lead to different equilibrium levels of effort. 
In Figures 5 (a) and 6 (a), As and AN represent the difference in the homeowner's 
expected payoffs fi-om choosing Squawk as opposed to Sue for the SLAPP and SLAPP-fi-ee 
games. The general form of As and AN is summarized by A ^ fi-om equation A3 in 
Appendix A. In the SLAPP game, when As is positive for a given homeowner's type, the 
homeowner chooses Squawk and the firm responds with SLAPP. If As is negative, the 
For the proof of proposition 9, see Appendix A. 
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homeowner chooses Sue. In the SLAPP-free game, when AN is positive for a given 
homeowner's type, the homeowner chooses Squawk and the firm is constramed to choose 
NASH. If AN is negative, the homeowner chooses Sue. 
As and AN are identical quadratic forms with the exception of the constant term For 
As, the constant term is while for AN, the constant term is 
When , t) > , r), An is above As for all homeowners' types. The set of 
homeowners' types that choose Squawk in the SLAPP game is contained by the set of 
homeowners' types that choose Squawk in the SLAPP-fi-ee game. This in:q)lies that the 
availabihty of the SLAPP action encourages a larger set of homeowners' types to reveal 
themselves to the firm by strategically committing effort. When 
(c7^, , r) > , r), As is above AN for all homeovwiers' types. The set of 
homeowners' types that choose Squawk in the SLAPP-fi-ee game is contained by the set of 
homeowners' types that choose Squawk in the SLAPP game. In this event, the availabiUty of 
the SLAPP action encourages a smaller set of homeowners' types to reveal themselves to the 
firm by strategically committing effort. When (cT;,,, r) = (cr^,, r), As is identical 
to AN and the elimination of the SLAPP action has no effect on the set of homeowners' types 
that choose to reveal themselves to the firm by strategically committing effort. 
EHxit (1987) defined an agent as a favorite (underdog) if the agent had a probability of 
wanning greater (less) than 1/2 m the Nash equiUbriimL^® Baik and Shogren (1992) 
demonstrate that ia a general contest with complete information and endogenous timing 
In its original context, the Nash equilibrium is synonymous with the NASH subgame equilibrium. 
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Figure 5: (a) The homeowner's ejq)ected payofiF from choosing Squawk minus the 
homeowner's expected payoflffrom choosing Sue in the SLAPP game 













Figure 6: (a) The homeowner's expected payoff from choosing Squawk minus the 
homeowner's expected payoff from choosing Sue in the SLAPP-free game 
(b) Mbrmation and timing effects in the SLAPP-free game 
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underdogs choose to lead and strategically commit effort, while the favorites choose to 
follow. An in^ortant inq)hcation of propositions 7, 8, and 9 is that some con^lete 
information favorites (underdogs) may choose to lead (follow) when information is incomplete 
and asymmetric." 
To obtain a better imderstanding of the effect of asymmetric incomplete information 
on the homeowner's timing decision in this contest, it is usefiil to decon^ose the 
homeowner's decision into an information effect and a timing effect. Assume that the kth 
subgame is played given the homeowner chooses Squawk where k = S or N. Define Ik as the 
homeowner's ejq)ected payoff in the kth subgame assuming incon^lete information minus the 
homeowner's expected payoff in the kth subgame assuming conq)lete information. Define Tk 
as the homeovmer's expected payoff in the kth subgame assuming information is con:q)lete 
mmus the homeowner's expected payoff in the Citizen suit subgame. Ik is the information 
effect and represents difference in the homeowner's expected payoff in the kth subgame due 
to the firm's incomplete information. Tk is the timing effect and represents the difference in 
the homeowner's e7q)ected payoff due to choosing Squawk iastead of Sue assummg the firm's 
information is complete. By construction Ak = Ik + Tk. 
First, consider the SLAPP game where k = S. Figure 5 (b) depicts a qualitatively 
accurate graphical representation of Is and Ts over the interestmg range. By allowing the 
firm's beliefs to degenerate it can be shown that 
Baik and Shogren's (1992) timing decisions were modeled more generally, so their result certainly applies 
to the model presented here. 
The interesting range is the range where an interior solution exist for both the Citizen suit and SLAPP 
subgames with both complete and incomplete information. 
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and 
P  f  
where functional arguments have been omitted to ease exposition and Ps= . 
Rearranging term's and substituting, it can be shown that Is >(<) 0 as Ps'> {<)Ps ^s 
Pj > (v)^, and Ts >(<) 0 as ph >(<) 1 over the relevant range. Furthermore, it can 
be shovm that when information is assumed to be complete the homeowner is a favorite 
(underdog) as ph >(<) 1. 
In Figure 5(a), Region I, pj > (p/(v)), Ph < 1 and As < 0. Since 
Pj > J (v)), the information effect is positive and the firm's actual relative resolve is 
higher than expected. Since ph < 1, the timing effect is negative and the homeowner is an 
imderdog. As < 0 implies that the positive information effect is dominated by the negative 
timing effect. Intuitively, given that the homeowner has low relative resolve, the 
homeowner's initial inclination is to Sue and strategically commit a low level of effort to 
minimize the firm's commitment of effort. However, if the homeowner chooses Squawk 
instead, the firm expects that the homeowner's relative resolve is higher than it actually is. 
The firm commits less effort in the SLAPP subgame than if it knew the homeowner's actual 
relative resolve making the SLAPP subgame more attractive to the homeowner. In this 
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region, while the SLAPP subgame is more attractive, the homeowner's payofiFis still higher m 
the Citizen suit subgame so the homeowner chooses Sue. 
In Region n, {JDj (v)) , ph < 1, and As > 0. As before, the firm's actual 
relative resolve is higher than expected, and the homeowner is an underdog. However, since 
As > 0, the positive information effect now dominates the negative tuning eflFect. As before, 
the homeowner's initial inclination is to Sue. But again, if the homeowner chooses Squawk 
instead, the firm will use less effort in the SLAPP subgame than if it knew the homeowner's 
true resolve. In this region, the firm's ex ante behef that the homeowner's relative resolve is 
higher than it actually is makes the SLAPP subgame more attractive to the homeowner than 
the Citizen suit subgame such that the homeowner chooses Squawk. 
In Region HI, {jjj (v)), ph > 1, and As > 0. The firm's actual relative 
resolve is still higher than expected, but since ph > 1, the homeowner is a favorite instead of an 
underdog. As is imambiguously greater than 0 because both the information and timing effects 
are positive. The information effect is positive because the firm uses less effort in the SLAPP 
subgame than if it knew the homeowner's actual relative resolve. The timing effect is positive 
because the homeowner has the incentive to allow the firm to strategically commit a low level 
of eflFort to minimize the homeowner's commitment of eflfort. Together, the two effects 
complement each other and the homeowner chooses Squawk. 
In Region V < J ,  p j  <  E ^ ^  ( p j  (v)), ph > 1, and As > 0. Now, since p j  < E ^ ^  [ p j  (v)), 
the firm's actual relative resolve is lower than expected. This leads to a negative information 
effect as the firm invest more effort in the SLAPP subgame than if it knew the homeowner's 
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actual relative resolve. Since the homeowner is still a favorite, the timing eflfect is positive. 
As > 0 implies that the positive timing effect dominates the negative information effect. 
Intiiitively, the homeowner's initial inclination is to let the firm strategically commit effort. 
However, the firm's incon^lete information leads the firm to invest more effort than it would 
otherwise. While this discourages the homeowner fi^om choosing Squawk, it is still preferable 
for the homeowner to choose Squawk and adjust to the firm's excess effort. 
In Region V, ^Pj-  (v ) j , ph > 1, and As < 0. The information effect is 
negative and the timing effect is positive. As < 0 ittq)Ues that the negative information effect 
dominates the positive timing effect. Now, as the firm grossly over estimates its actual 
relative resolve, the additional effort en:q)loyed by the firm due to this over estimate is enough 
to convince the homeowner to give up any benefit fi-om allowing the firm to strategically 
commit effort. The homeowner chooses to immediately reveal her actual relative resolve to 
the firm by strategically committing her own effort. 
Now, consider the SLAPP-fi-ee game where k = N. Figure 6 (b) depicts a qualitatively 
accurate graphical representation of IN and TN over the interesting range. By allowing the 
firm's beliefs to degenerate it can be shown that 
and 
The interesting range is the range where an interior solution exist for both the Citizen suit and NASH 
subgames with both complete and incomplete information. 
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t„^v ,^ i -p ,p4-{PfPc-Pc") \  
P f  
where P^'= . Rearranging term's and substituting, it can be shown that IN >(<) 0 as 
l  +  P f  
PN {<)PN 3iid Ts < 0. Furthermore, it can be shown that when 
{^P N )"' - - I  <P H< {^P N - I  and that P/<P^ when 
p,  <{2p, ) - '  - ^ ( ip^y ' - i  or p,  >{2p,y+yl (2p^y ' - i . 
In Figure 6 (a), Regions I and V, TN < 0, IN < 0 and AN < 0. Ts is always less than or 
equal to 0 because when information is con^lete, the homeowner can always strategically 
commit a level of effort that will lead to an equihbriiun identical to the NASH subgame 
equilibrium. Therefore, the homeowner can guarantee a payoff in the Citizen suit subgame 
that is at least as great as her payoff in the con^lete information NASH subgame. IN < 0 
inches P^'<Pi^. P^'kP^^ inq)lies that the firm invest more equiUbrium effort in the NASH 
subgame when information is incomplete than if it knew the homeowner's actual relative 
resolve. Since the timing effect is less than or equal to 0, the homeowner's initial inclination is 
to choose Sue. If the homeowner were to choose Squawk instead, the firm's incon^lete 
information causes the firm to fight harder which discourages the homeowner firom choosing 
Squawk. AN is unambiguously less than 0 since both the timing and information effects 
discourage the homeowner fi^om choosing Squawk. 
In Regions n and IV, TN < 0, IN > 0 and AN < 0. The timing effect is negative, while 
the information effect is positive. The information effect is positive because IN > 0 iixphes 
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f i i j .  impl ies  tha t  the  f i rm inves t  l e ss  equ i l ib r ium ef lFor t  i a  the  NASH 
subgame when infonnation is incomplete than if it knew the homeowner's actual relative 
resolve. The homeowner's initial inclination is to Sue because of the negative timing efiFect. 
However, if the homeowner chooses Squawk instead, the firm does not fight as hard as if it 
knew the homeowner's actual relative resolve. AN < 0 imphes the negative timing effect 
dominates the positive information effect, and even though the firm does not fight as hard in 
the incomplete information NASH subgame, the firm's reduced equilibriimi effort is not 
enough to outweigh the homeowner's initial inclination to Sue. 
In Region HI, TN < 0, IN > 0 and AN >0. As in Region n and IV, the timing effect and 
the information effect work against each other. AN > 0 inq)Iies that the information effect 
dominates the timing effect. The homeowner's initial inclination to Sue is more than offset by 
the reduction in the firm's equilibrium effort in NASH subgame when information is 
incoitqjiete. This leads to the homeowner to choose Squawk instead of Sue. 
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EFFICIENCY AND THE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION FOR THE RATIO CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTION 
Equilibrium behavior is determined by relative resolve and the accuracy of the firm's 
assessment of relative resolve given its incomplete information.^® In this chapter, the 
efficiency consequences of asymmetric inconq)lete information and the elimination of SLAPPs 
is investigated. First, ex post efficiency is considered, followed by ex ante efficiency. The 
primary result of this chapter is that the difference in efficiency between the SLAPP and 
SLAPP-fi-ee games is in general ambiguous. However, this difference depends crucially on 
expected relative resolve, actual relative resolve and the con^osition of relative resolve in 
terms of relative benefits and abilities. Parameteiizations of the SLAPP and SLAPP-fi-ee 
game assuming the homeowners' types are uniformly and normally distributed suggest that the 
SLAPP game is always at least as efficient as the SLAPP-fi-ee game. 
Efficiency Defined 
The traditional measure of efficiency in a contest is rent dissipation which is defined as 
the value of resources spent contesting the prize. However, rent dissipation may be a 
misleading measure of efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuation (see Appendix B). 
Given that the SLAPP and SLAPP-fiee games are contests with asymmetric valuation, contest 
efficiency is used, as defined in Appendk B, as the primitive measure of efficiency. 
Relative resolve is referred to as being unique because the homeowner's relative resolve is the inverse of the 
firm's relative resolve. 
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Def ine{zUc,c icyP J) the ith agent's expected payoflFin the jth subgame where i = 
f or h and j = S, N or C. Contest eflBciency fijr the jth subgame given the homeowner's type is 
then 
S j{m„a„Pj )  =  -^  / r  ,  (19) 
Substituting and 7tl(m^,a^,/3j) for the alternative subgames equation (19) 
can be rewritten generally as 
(20) 
Max[m;^,l\ 
where fimctional arguments are suppressed, the subscript X denotes the leader and denotes 
the proportion of the leader's benefit that the leader dissipates in equilibriiun. In the Citizen 
suit subgame, the homeowner is the leader so X = h and P = Pc- In the SLAPP subgame, the 
firm is the leader so A, = f and P = Ps. Recall that while there is technically no leader in the 
NASH subgame the solution to the NASH subgame can be written in the firm leader form. 
Therefore, in the NASH subgame, X = f and P = pN. 
Equation (20) highhghts the effect of asymmetric benefits and abiUties on contest 
efficiency. The numerator of equation (20) represents absolute efficiency. The denominator 
of equation (20) converts absolute efficiency to relative efficiency so that efficiency is 
comparable across different types of homeovmers. The first conqionent of absolute efficiency, 
1 - >5yd, is the symmetric contest baseline and is always non-negative. When tUx = 1 and 
= 1, sx = 1 - R where R = 1/2. This is the traditional rent dissipated in a perfectly symmetric 
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contest with a ratio contest success fimction. The second and third expressions in the 
niunerator, ~ l) -1), adjust the symmetric baseUne for the effects of 
asymmetric benefits and abihties and are referred to as the benefit and abiUty effects. 
Since the relative benefit inqjacts contest efficiency directly through its influence on 
the expected value and the maximum obtainable benefit of the contest and indirectly through 
its influence on the agents' equilibrium efforts, the benefit effect is a positive (negative) first-
order effect as tox >(<) 1. That is, baseline contest efficiency is increased when the leader's 
benefit is more than the follower's benefit. The magnitude of this increase or decrease 
depends on the absolute difference between benefits, and is magnified by the proportion of the 
leader's benefit that the leader dissipates in equilibrium and the leader's relative resolve. Note 
that since the impact of asymmetric benefits is a first order effect, the difference in agents' 
benefits is magnified by P instead of where P > P^ since P^ < 1 for the leader to be willing 
to participate in this contest. 
Since relative ability only impacts contest efficiency dhectly through its influence on 
the expected value of the contest and indirectly through its influence on the agents' 
equihbrium efforts, the abiUty effect is a positive (negative) second-order effect as ax >(<) 1. 
That is, baseline efficiency is increased when the leader's abihty exceeds the follower's ability. 
The magnitude of this increase or decrease m contest efficiency due to the ability effect 
depends on the absolute difference in abihties, and is magnifled by the proportion of the 
leader's benefit that the leader dissipates in equihbrium and the leader's relative benefit. 
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Equation (20) suggest that eflBciency is higher when the leader's benefit and ability 
exceed the follower's benefit and abihty. While this result may at first appear to contradict 
Baik and Shogren's (1992) result that argues that it is eflBcient for underdogs to lead, this 
contradiction can be resolved by noticing that the symmetric baseline is dependent on the 
leader's equilibrium eflfort. When the favorite leads, P will be higher than when the imderdog 
leads. This implies that baseline eflBciency will start oflFhigher when the underdog leads. It 
follows fi'om Baik and Shogren (1992) that the high commitment of eflfort by a favorite when 
the favorite leads in a complete information contest is never fiiUy oflFset by the eflBciency gains 
due to the favorite having a higher benefit and/or abiUty. 
Consider the diflference in ex post eflBciency between two general subgames that have 
the same solution structure,where and equal 
the proportion of the leader's benefit that the leader dissipates in equilibrium for the two 
alternative subgames imder con^arison. Simplifying, 
{ P  -  - P x + P x  ( ^ x  - 1 )  +  A  - 1 ) ]  >  •  ( 2 1 )  
P - P', which is referred to as the eflfort eflfect, is positive (negative) as the leader's 
equilibriiun effort in the first subgame is greater (less) than the leader's equilibrium eflfort in 
the  a l te rna t ive  subgame.  Def ine  =  ~ P x  +  P x  ( ^ x  ~  0  J ^ ) ( ^ x  ~  0  
the net asymmetry eflfect. The first term in H['x(P, P')' accounts for the change in the 
symmetric baseline due to a different equilibrium eflfort on the part of the leader in the 
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alternative subgame. The second and third terms, -1) and + /^)(«A ~ 0' 
account for the change in the benefit and ability effects due to a different equilibriiun effort on 
the part of the leader in the altemative subgame. 
Table 1 summarizes the sign of the asymmetry effect for a general comparison between 
two subgames that can be written in the same leader form Define the leader as benefit-strong 
(weak) when vs\ >(<) 2 and ability-strong (weak) when >(<) 1. Also, define the leader to 
be a strong favorite when px > 2 and weak favorite 1 < px 2. The sign of the asymmetry 
effect is unambiguously positive when the leader is both benefit-strong and ability-strong and 
therefore, imambiguously a strong favorite. The sign of the asymmetry effect is 
unambiguously negative when the leader is both benefit-weak and ability-weak. When the 
leader is both benefit-weak and ability-weak, the leader is a weak favorite or underdog. The 
sign of the asymmetry effect is ambiguous when the leader is benefit-strong and abihty-weak, 
or benefit-weak and ability-strong. 
Given Table 1, net efficiency conq)arisons can be summarized by of effort and 
Table 1: Sign of asymmetry effect for ex post efficiency conq)arisons between two subgames 
with the same leader 
ax>  1  ax= 1  ax< 1  
T O X > 2  ^X(P, 3')>o ^X(P, P')>0 ^X(P, P')>(<)0'' 
TOX = 2 ^X(P, P')>0 ^X(P, P') = 0 ^X(P ,P ' )<0  
T O X < 2  3')>{<)0'' ^X(3, 3')<0 ^X(P, 3')<o 
' As (c7^ - 2) + (/? + p\a^ -1) > (<)0. 
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asymmetry effects. When the sign of the asymmetiy effect is positive, eflSciency in the 
alternative subgame is higher (lower) if the effort effect is negative (positive). When the sign 
of the asymmetry effect is negative, ejBBciency in the alternative subgame is higher (lower) if 
the effort effect is positive (negative). 
Since contest efficiency is derived for a contest of complete information, the concept 
must be modified before it can be applied to a contest of incomplete information. Myerson 
(1991) offers two akemative concepts when considering Pareto efficiency under uncertainty. 
The first altemative is to consider ex post efficiency. The second altemative is to consider ex 
ante efficiency. 
Ex post Efficiency: An Analytic Perspective 
Consider the difference in ex post efficiency in the SLAPP and SLAPP-fi'ee games for 
a given homeowner's type. Let rj^ (v) = 1 if the v type homeowner chooses Squawk and 
rfk (v) = 0 if the V type homeovwier chooses Sue when the kth subgame is played given the 
homeowner chooses Squawk. For any given homeowner type, there are four possible ways 
that eliminating the SLAPP action may effect the homeowner's timing decision. If T]S = TIN = 
0, the homeowner always prefers Sue and plays the Citizen suit subgame regardless of 
whether the SLAPP action is available. IfTis = TiN=l, the homeowner always prefers 
Squawk regardless of whether SLAPP action is available, ff t|s = 0 and t|n = 1, the 
homeowner prefers Sue in the SLAPP game and Squawk in the SLAPP-free game, ff TIS = 1 
and t|n = 0, the homeowner prefers Squawk in the SLAPP game and Sue in the SLAPP-free 
game. 
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First, consider which game is more efficient when TIS = TIN = 0. In this case, the 
Citizen suit subgame is played in both the SLAPP and SLAPP-free games. Therefore, >1, = C, 
P = Pc and P' = Pc- Since P = P', the eflfort eflFect is equal to 0 and equation (21) is equal to 0 
regardless of asymmetry eflfect. Equilibrium behavior in the Citizen suit subgame is 
independent of whether or not the SLAPP action is available. Therefore, the eflfort eflFect is 0 
and ex post eflficiency is the same in the SLAPP and SLAPP-free games. 
Second, consider which game is more eflficient when T|S = TIN = 1. In this case, the 
SLAPP subgame is played in the SLAPP game and the NASH subgame is played in the 
SLAPP-free game. P = Ps and P' = PN. Since the SLAPP and NASH subgames are both in 
the firm leader form, eflficiency can be con^ared directly usmg equation (21). However, it is 
instructive to decompose this con:q)arison into information and timing eflFects. ES - BN = (ES -
£s') + (ss' - SN') + (EN' - SN) where ES' and EN' are ex post eflficiency in the complete 
information SLAPP and NASH subgames. Using equation (21), 
~ ~ {/^S ~ Ps'Y^jiPSi 
+ • ) ' P ^  ( A ' + ( y 9 , ' - / S ,  ( ; 8 ,  • ,  )  •  
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (22) is an information eflFect from the SLAPP 
game. The eflFort eflFect within this information eflFect is positive (negative) as 
> (<)Py or as the firm's expected relative resolve in the SLAPP game is greater 
(less) than the firm's actual relative resolve. The second term on the right-hand side of 
equation (22) is a timing eflFect. The eflFort eflFect within this timing eflFect is positive 
(negative) as pj > (<)1 or as the firm is a complete information favorite (underdog). The 
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third term on the right-hand side of equation (22) is an mformation effect from the SLAPP-
free game. The effort effect within this information effect is positive (negative) when the 
firm's equilibrium effort in the con^lete information NASH subgame is greater (less) than the 
firm's equUibriujn effort in the incomplete information NASH subgame. When the firm is 
benefit-strong and ability-strong, the asymmetry effects are all positive. When the firm is 
benefit-weak and ability-weak, the asymmetry effects are all negative. Otherwise, the 
asymmetry effects are ambiguous. 
Third, consider which game is more efficient when TIS = 0 and t^N = 1. In this case, the 
Citizen suit subgame is played in the SLAP? game and the NASH subgame is played in the 
SLAPP-free game. P = Pc and P' = PN- Since the solution to the Citizen suit subgame is in 
the homeowner leader form and the solution to the NASH subgame is in the firm leader form, 
a direct comparison using equation (21) is not possible. However, since the complete 
information NASH subgame can be written m either form, the comparison can be decomposed 
into timing and information effects which allow the application of equation (21), Sc - Sn = (sc 
- EN') + (SN' - EN). Usmg equation (21), 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (23) is a timing effect that is positive 
(negative) as > (<)1 or as the homeowner is a complete information favorite (underdog). 
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (23) is an information effect from the 
SLAPP game similar to the information effect in equation (22). When the homeowner is 
benefit-strong and abihty-strong, the homeowner's asymmetry effect is positive, while the 
62 
jfirm's asymmetry efifect is negative. When the firm is benefit-strong and ability-strong, the 
firm's asymmetry efifect is positive, while the homeowner's asymmetry efifect is negative. 
Otherwise, the asymmetry efifects are ambiguous. 
Finally, consider which game is more efficient when TIS = 1 and TIN = 0. In this case, 
the SLAPP subgame is played in the SLAP? game and the Citizen suit subgame is played in 
the SLAPP-fi-ee game. P = Ps and P' = Pc- As before, the solutions to the two subgames are 
not immediately con^arable given equation (21). Therefore, the difiference in efificiency is 
decomposed using timiag and information effects. Since Ss - EC = (es - ss') + (ss' - EN') + (EN' 
- Ec), equation (21) implies, 
+ ( A ' - A » A ' ) + ' . A c )  •  
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (24) is an information effect fi-om the SLAPP 
game similar to the first information efifect in equation (22). The second term on the right-
hand side of equation (24) is a timing efifect similar to the timing efifect in equation (22). The 
third term on the right-hand side of equation (22) is a timing efifect similar to the timing efifect 
in equation (23). The effort efifects in the second and third terms have the same sign. As 
before, when the homeowner is benefit-strong and ability-strong, the homeowner's asymmetry 
efifect is positive, while the firm's asymmetry efifects are negative for both the timing and 
information efifects. When the firm is benefit-strong and ability-strong, the firm's asymmetry 
efifects are positive for both the timing and information efifects, while the homeowner's 
asymmetry efifect is negative. 
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Ex ante Efficiency: An Analytic Perspective 
When the kth subgame is played given the homeowner chooses Squawk, ex ante 
contest efficiency is 
E* = {(1 - ^7* (v))£c(v) + 7a (v)£* (v)}f/G(v, r). (25) 
Comparing ex ante efficiency in the SLAPP game to ex ante efficiency in the SLAPP-free 
game yields 
{{Vn (V) - 7^(V))FC(V) + 7S(V)F5(V) - (V)F(V)}</G(V, r ) .  (26) 
There are three possibilities depending on the firm's updated beUefs in the two alternative 
games. 
First, if Ps = PN, the firm's equilibrium effort in the SLAPP subgame equals the firm's 
equiUbriimi effort in the NASH subgame. Proposition 9 implies that the set of homeowner's 
types that choose Squawk in the SLAPP game equals the set of homeowner's types that 
choose Squawk in the SLAPP-fi-ee game. Since homeowners' types wdth benefits less than 0 
will not enter this contest and since ex post contest efficiency is the same for the SLAPP and 
SLAPP-fi-ee games when homeowner's types choose lis = tin = 0, 
Es-E,' .  >«5(v, t) . <27) 
Given Ps = PN, SS - EN = 0 for all v such that < v < . Therefore, ES - EN = 0 and the 
SLAPP and SLAPP-fi-ee games are equally efficient. Since the firm's equilibriimi effort in the 
SLAPP subgame is equal to the firm's equihbrium effort in the NASH subgame and since the 
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homeowner's best response function is independent of the subgame, equilibriimi behavior and 
efiBciency is the same regardless of whether the SLAPP or SLAPP-free game is played. 
Second, if PS > PN, the firm's equihbrium eflFort in the SLAPP subgame is greater than 
the firm's equilibrium eflFort in the NASH subgame. Proposition 9 imphes that the set of 
homeowner's types that choose Squawk in the SLAPP-fi-ee game contains the set of 
homeowner's types that choose Squawk in the SLAPP game such that 
^ s - ^ N =  j/)dG{v, t )  +  £'(£5 - )dG(v, t )  +  JT" { s c  -  £ n  YG{v ,  t )  .  (28) 
In this instance, the elimination of the SLAPP action causes a set of homeowners' types to 
change their equilibrium timing decisions fi-om Squawk to Sue. The net eflFect of this change 
in timing decisions on eflficiency is captured by the first and third integrals on the right-hand 
side of equation (28). The proof of claim 4 in Appendix A and equation (23) iiiq)ly that the 
timing effect is negative for the first integral and positive for the third integral in equation 
(28). The second integral on the right-hand side of equation (28) captures the diflference in 
eflficiency due to homeowner's types that choose Squawk regardless of whether the SLAPP 
action is available. Ps > PN implies that for a given homeowner's type within the second 
integral the net eflFort eflFect fi-om equation (22) is positive. Given G(v, x) and an, the 
remaining ambiguous ex post eflficiency effects for a given homeowner's type can be 
evaluated. Integrating, over the relevant homeowners' types in equation (28) yields the 
difference in ex ante eflficiency between the SLAPP and SLAPP-fi^ee games. When this 
diflference is negative, eUminating SLAPPs decreases the ex ante eflficiency of the game. 
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Third, if Ps < PN, the firm's equihbrium effort in the SLAPP subgame is less than the 
fiurm's equilibrium effort in the NASH subgame. Proposition 9 implies that the set of 
homeowner's types that choose Squawk in the SLAPP game contains the set of homeowner's 
types that choose Squawk in the SLAPP-free game such that 
(£5 - Be)iG{v, r) + )dG{v, r) + £')dG{v, r). (29) 
The first and third integrals in equation (29) capture the efficiency consequences of 
homeowner's types that change their equilibrium timmg decision fi^om Sue to Squawk when 
the SLAPP action is eliminated. The proof of claim 4 and equation (23) irq)ly that the timing 
effect is positive for the first integral and negative for the third integral in equation (29). The 
second integral on the right-hand side equation (29) captures the difference in efficiency due 
to homeowners' types that choose Squawk regardless of whether the SLAPP action is 
available. PN > Ps inches that for a given homeowner's type within the second integral the 
net effort effect fi-om equation (22) is negative. Given G(v, T) and AN, the remaining 
ambiguous ex post efficiency effects for a given homeowner's type can be evaluated. 
Integrating, over the relevant homeowners' types in equation (29) yields the difference in ex 
ante efficiency between the SLAPP and SLAPP-fi-ee games. When this difference is negative, 
eliminating SLAPPs decreases the ex ante efficiency of the game. 
Except for the special case where PS = PN, the ex post and ex ante efficiency 
consequences of eUminating SLAPPs are ambiguous because of the mteraction of tuuing, 
information and asymmetry effects. While the sign of the timing and asymmetry effects are 
generally determined by the actual relationship between the firm's and homeowner's benefits 
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and abilities, the sign of the information effects are generally determined by the ex post 
accuracy of the firm's beUefs. 
Ex ante Efnciency Comparisons Under Alternative Parameterizations 
Given the general ambiguity of the analytic contest efl5ciency comparisons when Ps > 
PN or PS < PN and the possible existence of multiple equilibria, the model is parameterized to 
gain a better understanding of whether or not multiple equiUbria do exist and which game is 
more efficient. Since policy makers must make decisions ex ante, the analysis is confined to 
ex ante contest efficiency. The parameterizations discussed assume that the firm's a priori 
behefs are normally distributed.^^ Under this assumption, three primary results emerge. First, 
multiple equihbria may exist in the SLAPP game. When multiple equiUbria do exist in the 
SLAP? game, these equiUbria include a unique pooling equiUbriimi where all homeowners' 
types Sue, and a unique partiaUy separating equiUbrium. When the equiUbrium is unique in the 
SLAPP game, the equiUbrium is a pooling equiUbrium where aU homeowners' types Sue. 
Second, the perfect Bayesian equiUbriiun in the SLAPP-fi-ee game is a unique pooling 
equiUbriimi where aU homeowners' types Sue. Third, ex ante contest efficiency is 
unambiguously higher in the SLAPP game when a partiaUy separating equilibrium exists and is 
played. Otherwise, contest efficiency is identical in the SLAPP and SLAPP-fi-ee games. 
Initially, the simplest possible form of the firm's a priori beliefs, the uniform distribution, was considered. 
However, since Pfj{mc,CCc,T)^ — and /0^(nr^,a^,r)< — does not exist for any ac in the range 
considered between 0.5 and 2, proposition 8 implies that all homeowner's types choose Sue and that 
Vs (^) ~ (^) ~ ® • (26) then immediately implies that Es - EH = 0 and that the SLAPP game is always at 
least as eflBcient as the SLAPP-free game. 
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Given the finn's a priori beliefs are normally distributed, the parameterizations allow 
the homeowner's abiUty to vary between 0.5 and 2, the mean of the firm's a priori beUefs to 
vary between 0.05 and 2.5, and the variance of the firm's a priori beliefs to vary between 0.01 
and 1.0. Figm-e 7, where the homeowner's ability is set to 1.2 and the variance of the firm's a 
priori beUefs is set to 0.01, captures the general pattern of the ex ante contest efficiency 
results. 
In Figure 7, efficiency is plotted as a fimction of the mean of the firm's a priori beliefs. 
"Baseline" corresponds to efficiency in the SLAPP game assuming information is complete. 
In this instance, the unique equilibrium is for underdog homeowners' types to choose Sue and 
for favorite homeowners' types to choose Squawk. "Separating" corresponds to efficiency in 
the SLAPP game assuming information is incomplete and that the partially separating 
equilibrium is played when multiple equilibria exist. "Pooling" corresponds to efficiency in the 
SLAPP-fi-ee game and efficiency in the SLAPP game assuming information is incomplete and 
that the pooling equilibrium is played in the SLAPP game when multiple equilibria exist. 
In general, as the mean of the firm's beUefs increases fi'om 0 to 2.5, efficiency declines, 
but then begins to increase. "Pooling" efficiency converges to "Baseline" efficiency fi'om 
below, and "Separating" efficiency converges to "PooUng" efficiency fi'om above as the firm's 
mean beUef becomes relatively small or relatively large. In some instances, "Separating" 
efficiency may actually exceed "Baseline" efficiency as the benefit of a general decrease in 
effort due to the firm's imcertainty outweighs the cost of inefficient timing decisions. This 
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Figure 7: Ex ante efificiency when the homeowner's ability equals 1.2 and the variance of the 
firm's a priori beliefs equals 0.01 
When the equilibrium in the SLAPP model is unique, "Separating" efficiency is equal 
to "Pooling" efficiency. Therefore, when the firm's mean belief is relatively high or relatively 
low, eliminating SLAPPs does not a£fect efficiency. However, when the firm's mean beUef is 
more central, a separating equilibriimi exists m the SLAPP game. For instance, when the 
mean of the firm's beliefs is between about 0.85 and 2.4 in Figure 7. This separating 
equiUbriiun is more efficient than the pooling equilibriimi in the SLAPP and SLAPP-fi-ee 
games. Therefore, eliminating SLAPPs may decrease efficiency. 
This general pattem is consistent across the large set of parameterizations that were 
considered. Figures 8 and 9 provide general comparisons that highlight the consistency of this 
pattem, and the effect of increasing the variance of the firm's beUefs while holding the 
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homeowner's ability constant and of increasing the ability of the homeowner while holding the 
variance of the firm's beliefs constant. 
Figure 8, summarizes the general implications of an increase in the variance of a low-
abihty firm's a priori beliefs. In Figure 8, ah = 1.2, and Low, Medium and High variance 
correspond to 0.01, 0.0625 and 0.25. First, note that the range of efficiency decreases as the 
variance increases. Second, as the mean increases, "Separating" efficiency diverges fi-om and 
converges back to "Poolmg" efficiency sooner as the variance decreases. Third, "Pooling" 
efficiency converges closer to "Baseline" efficiency as the variance decreases. 
Figure 9, summarizes the general iiiq)hcation of an increase in the homeowner's abiUty 
while holding the variance of the firm's a priori beliefs constant at the lowest 
parameterization, 0.01. In Figure 9, the variance of the firm's beliefs is equal to 0.01, and 
Low, Medium and High ability correspond to % equal to 0.8, 1.0 and 1.2. First, note that 
efficiency tends to be higher when the firm's mean belief is relatively low and the 
homeowner's ability is low. When the firm's mean belief is relatively high, efficiency tends to 
be higher as the homeowner's ability is high. Second, as the mean increases, "Separating" 
efficiency diverges fi-om and converges back to "Pooling" efficiency sooner as the 
homeowner's ability increases. Third, as the mean increases, changes in abiUty seem to have 
little effect on how close "Pooling" efficiency converges to "Baseline" efficiency. 
In summary, the SLAPP game is always at least as efficient as the SLAPP-fi^ee game 
such that eliminating SLAPPs may reduce efficiency. The existence of a separating 
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Figure 8: (a) Ex ante efficiency for high ability homeowners and a low variance in 
the firm's a priori belief 
(b) Ex ante efficiency for high ability homeowners and a medium variance in 
the firm's a priori beUefs 
(c) Ex ante efficiency for high ability homeowners and a high variance in 
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Figure 9: (a) Ex ante efficiency for low ability homeowners and a low variance in the firm's a 
priori beliefs 
(b) Ex ante efficiency for medium ability homeowners and a low variance in the 
firm's a priori beliefs 
(c) Ex ante efficiency for high ability homeowners and a low variance in the firm's a 
priori beliefs 
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All types of efficiency ("Baseline," Separating" and "Pooling") tend to be higher when the 
firm's mean belief tends to be low, and the homeowner's abiUty tends to be low. All types of 
efficiency tend to be higher when the firm's mean belief tends to be high, and the 
homeowner's abihty tends to be high. All types of efficiency also tend to be higher when the 
firm's mean behef is relatively high or relatively low and the variance of the firm's behefs is 
low, and when the firm's mean behef is more central and the variance of the firm's behefs is 
high. The degree to which "PooUng" efficiency converges to "Basehne" efficiency is generally 
insensitive to the homeowner's abihty, but quite sensitive to the variance of the firm's behefs. 
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AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND 
THE INTUITIVE REFINEMENT 
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept offers strong predictions regarding an 
agent's equilibriiun behavior in the SLAP? game. While the predicted equilibriiun is unique 
for many parameterizations, multiple equilibria exist for other parameterizations. These 
equilibria include a unique unintuitive pooling equilibrium, and a unique intuitive separating 
equiUbriimi. In an effort to choose which of these two equilibria is more likely, an experiment 
is conducted with a two homeowner type SLAPP game. The results of the experiment 
suggest two irq)ortant conclusions. First, the statistical evidence supports non-random play in 
the direction of both the intuitive and unintuitive equilibria, and differences in subject behavior 
across sessions. Second, the results support Plott's (1995) discovered preference hypothesis 
which suggest that subject behavior evolves through three stages of rationahty. These results 
suggest that future sessions providing subjects with additional time to progress through Plott's 
three stages of rationahty are hkely to produce conclusive evidence to determine whether 
equilibrium behavior is predicted by the intuitive or unintuitive equilibrium^^ 
The Experimental Game 
Figure 10 presents the extensive form game.^^ The game consists of three types of risk 
neutral players, an Al-type player, an A2-type player and a B-type player which are referred 
The time constraints involved in administering this experiment without the benefit of computers restricted 
the feasible number of rounds to 5 which did not provide all subjects with ample time to evolve through Plott's 
three stages of learning. Future experiments aided by computers would make additional rounds feasible and 
provide subjects with enough time to learn. 
The payofis in the experimental game are the result of a transformation of the payofis generated from the 
formal model. This transformation was conducted to improve saliency given the results from the session 0 
pilot experiment and maintained the payoff rankings, the efficiency rankings, the games two equilibria and the 
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Figure 10: Single period experimental game 
to as Al, A2 and B below. A1 represents the first type of homeowner, A2 represents the 
second type of homeowner and B represents the firm The game starts by Nature randomly 
choosing whether B plays Al or A2 with equal probability. Once Nature has selected B's 
opponent, the Al or A2 player chooses between R or L (see Figure 10). The choice R 
corresponds to the homeowner choosing Squawk, while the choice L corresponds to the 
homeowner choosmg Sue. 
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If A1 or A2 choose L, then the game ends. Al's payoflFis 60, A2's payoff is 105 and 
B's payoflF is 45 if he/she is playing A1 and 50 if he/she is playing A2. These payoflFs are 
representative of the equilibrium payoflfs in the Citizen's suit subgame. 
If A1 or A2 choose R, then B must choose U, M or D not knowing whether he/she is 
playing A1 or A2. If B chooses U, Al's or A2's payoflFis 100 and B's payoflFis 50 if he/she is 
playing A1 and 0 ifhe/she is playing A2. If B chooses M, Al's or A2's payoflFis 50 and B's 
payoflF 40 ifhe/she is playing A1 and 30 ifhe/she is playing A2. If B chooses D, A1 's or A2's 
payoflFis 0 and B's payoflF 10 ifhe/she is playing A1 and 40 ifhe/she is playing A2. These 
payoflFs are representative of the equilibrium payofl& given the homeowner chooses Squawk, 
the firm chooses SLAPP and the firm has one of three updated beliefs. First, if A1 chooses R 
and A2 chooses L, then Bayes rule inq)lies the firm's beheves it is playing A1 given R is 
chosen. Second, if A1 chooses R and A2 chooses R, then Bayes rule inqilies the firm's 
believes it is playing A1 with probability 0.5 given R is chosen. Third, if A1 chooses L and 
A2 chooses R, then Bayes rule imphes the firm's beheves it is playing A2 given R is chosen. 
Consider how these three players will play this single period game. Define Pas B's 
initial behef that he/she is matched with A1 and Q as B's updated beUef that he/she is matched 
with A1 given A1 or A2 choose R. 
First, B chooses the action that maximizes his/her expected payoflF given his/her 
updated behefs. B's expected payoflFfi'om choosmg U, M or D is 50Q + 0{l-Q), 
40Q + 30(l - Q) or \QQ + 40(l - 0, respectively. Comparing any of B's two alternative 
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actions given Q, B's decision is summarized by the fimction 
B(Q) = 
U, if Q> 0.75 
U or M, if Q= 0.75 
M, if 0.75>Q> 0.25 . 
M or D, if Q = 0.25 
D, ifQ<025 
A1 chooses the action that maximizes his/her expected payoflFwhere Al's expected 
payoff from choosing R or L is 100Pr(t/|2) + 50Pr(il^|g) + OPr(£>|g) or 60, respectively. 
Al's decision can be summarized by the function 
A1(Q) = 
L, if Q< 0.75, or Q = 0.75 arui Pr(f/|0 = 0.75) < 0.20 
^5 if Q> 0.75, or Q= 0.75 and Pr(£/|0 = 0.75) > 0.20 where 
Lor R, if Q = 0.75 and ^(U\Q = 0.75) = 0.20 
J*r(£/|g = 0.75) is determined by B(Q). 
A2 chooses the action that maxutuzes his/her expected payoff where A2's expected 
payoff from choosing R or L is lOOPr(£/|0 + 50Pr(A/|i2) + OPr(£)|0) or 105, respectively. 
Since 105 exceeds 100Pr(6^|e) + 50Pr(M|2) + OPr(£>|0) for all Q such that 0 < Q < 1, A2's 
expected payoff is maximized by choosing L. 
There are two perfect Bayesian equiUbria for this game. The jSrst is an imintuitive 
pooling equilibrium where both A1 and A2 choose L. This represents an equiUbriiun provided 
Q < 0.75 or Q = 0.75 and Pr([/|0 = 0.75) < 0.6 - 0.5Pr(M|e = 0.75). However, this 
equilibrium is unintuitive because while A1 stands to benefit from deviating from L if B 
chooses U, A2 can never benefit from deviating from L. Therefore, if a deviation occiu-s, B 
77 
should believe that he/she is playing A1 with probability 1 and choose U. If this is the case, 
then Al's best response is to play R and not This is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
because if Q < 0.75, then A1 and A2 best response is to choose L. While this belief seems 
unreasonable, the perfect Bayesian equiUbriimi concept is not strong enough to eliminate this 
belief 
The second equilibrium is an intuitive separating equilibrium such that A1 chooses R, 
A2 chooses L and B chooses U given his/her opponent chooses R. Given these strategies, 
Bayes rule implies Q = 1. If Q = 1, then B's best response is to choose U. If B chooses U 
given either A1 or A2 choose R, A1 's best response is to choose R and A2's best response is 
to choose L thus supporting the firm's beUef 
Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
The experiment was conducted in three sessions during April 1995. The first two 
sessions, sessions 2 and 3, used identical incentive mechanisms, while the third session, 
session 4, used a single elimination tournament as an alternative incentive mechanism as in 
Baik and Shogren (1994b) and Shogren (1994).^® Each session took approximately 2 hows. 
A total of 64 subjects were recruited fi-om microeconomics and macroeconomics principle 
classes at Iowa State University. For the first two sessions, subjects were told that they 
For an excellent concise explanation of intuitive versus unintuitive equilibria see Banks, Camerer and Porter 
(1994). 
Recall that these solutions are derived under the assumption of risk neutrality. Relaxing the assumption of 
risk neutrality does not change the intuitive equilibrium of the game. However the unintuitive equilibrium 
may be slightly different where this difference will affect the critical values in the B's and Al's decision 
functions. If preferences are risk averse, the unintuitive equilibrium is more likely given an unintuitive belief 
If preferences are risk loving, the unintuitive equilibrium is less likely given an unintuitive belief 
Sessions 0 and 1 were pilot experiments that are referred to, but not reported. 
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would earn an average of about $30.00 with maximum possible earnings of up to $60.00. For 
the third session subjects were told that they would earn an average of about $30.00 with 
maximum possible earnings of up to $110.00. 
General procedures 
In the first two sessions, fifteen subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three 
types such that there were five players of each type. In the third session, twenty-four subjects 
were randomly assigned to one of the three types such that there were eight players of each 
type. In all three sessions, each subject was issued a folder which contained a consent form, 
instructions, a quiz, a sheet with two figures, an Exan:q}le Round Strategy Sheet that was type 
specific, an Exanq)le Roimd Earnings Sheet that was type specific and a Practice Roimd 
Strategy Sheet that was type specific.^' 
After the consent form was read and signed by all participants, the instructions were 
read out loud by the monitor to create a common pool of information. Ehuing the reading, the 
sheet with the two figures was shown on an overhead and referred to such that the 
participants would understand how to use the diagrams to determine their payoffs. This 
extensive form representation was used given Schotter, Weigelt and Wilson's (1994) evidence 
that strategic threats are more common in games presented in the normal form as opposed to 
the extensive form Once the instructions were finished subjects completed the quiz. 
After reviewing the quiz, subjects were asked to con^lete their Practice Round 
Strategy Sheet and wait for the results to be determined. The results of the practice round 
Examples of these materials, except for the consent form, are supplied in Appendix C. 
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were returned on the subject's Practice Roimd Earnings Sheet along with a new Strategy 
Sheet. The subjects were asked to review the Practice Round Earnings Sheet, to complete 
their new Strategy Sheet and to wait for the results to be determined. This process continued 
for the four binding roimds. 
A round consisted of five games in the first two sessions and four games in the third 
session. These games were played simultaneously such that subjects did not receive feedback 
regarding the results of these games until the end of the round. This was accomplished by 
having subjects con^lete a Strategy Sheet. The Strategy Sheet consisted of two parts. Part I 
elicited how the subject believed other subjects would choose to play the games by having the 
subjects respond to four statements. For sessions 2 and 3, all subjects circled their best 
guesses to the following: 
(i) I think the (randomly selected) A1 swill choose R in [ 0 1 2 3 4 5 ] of the 
five games. 
(ii) I think the (randomly selected) A2s will choose Rin[0 1 2 3 4 5] of the 
five games. 
(iii) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose Uin[0 1 2 3 4 5] of the five 
games. 
(iv) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose Min[0 1 2 3 4 5] of the 
five games. Note that the sum of your responses in statements 3 and 4 should not 
exceed 
Examples for session 4 are in Appendix C. 
The choice of the randomly selected subjects of each type is explained below. 
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Part n asked the subject to choose how to play each of the games in the round. For sessions 
2 and 3, the Als and A2s circled one choice for each of the following: 
1) For Game 1,1 choose K L. 
2) For Game 2,1 choose K L. 
3) For Game 3,1 choose R. L. 
4) For Game 4,1 choose R. L. 
5) For Game 5,1 choose R. L. 
A subject's round earnings (denominated in tokens) equaled the sum of the subject's payoffs 
for all of the games in that roimd. Between roimds each subject received a Roimd Earnings 
Sheet that provided him/her with feedback on his/her resulting payoffs and the play of 
randomly selected subjects of each type."' 
Specific methodological considerations 
Risk preferences were controlled by two distinct methods. First, instead of 
randomizing B's opponent, B played each game against an A1 and an A2. B's payoff for the 
game was equal to the sum of his/her payoff from playing both A1 and A2. This method 
eliminated any risk involved with a randomizing device, while maintaining a risk neutral 
player's incentives. However, this method does not control for risk attitudes that are 
associated with a subject's uncertainty regarding his/her opponent's choices. The second 
method altered the payoffs by increasing cardinal differences while preserving ordinal 
Examples for the Bs in all sessions and the A1 and A2 subjects in session 4 are in Appendix C. 
Examples for all subjects and all sessions are in Appendix C. 
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rankings. This method was used by Banks, Camerer and Porter (1994), and reduces the 
likelihood that risk attitudes change a subject's equilibrium action."^ 
As mentioned above, the subject's Strategy Sheet asked the subject to report his/her 
subjective beliefe regarding how they thought other subjects would choose to play the game. This 
accoiiq)]ishes two important goals. First, this method provides additional information to detennine 
whether or not a subject has risk neutral, risk loving or risk averse preferences. Second, this 
method provides information on a subject's beUef formation and vshether or not a subject uses this 
information to determine his^er appropriate action. The elicitation of such behe& was suggested 
by Banks, Camerer and Porter (1994). To encowage the thoughtfiil revelation of these beliefe, 
incentive mechanisms were enployed. For instance, subjects were paid $0.25 for each correct 
prediction in sessions 2 and 3, vsdiile the number of correct predictions was used as a tie breaker to 
determine advancement in the tournament in session 4. 
To maintain the one-shot game incentives and to reduce the development of 
cooperative play over repeated trials, subjects were randomly matched with a diflFerent player 
for each game within a round and between rounds. For the first two sessions, each of the five 
players of a given type were randomly ordered. This order was then used to determine which 
player's strategy would be played for each of the five games. Therefore, each round a subject 
received an equally weighted random san:q)le of how his/her five opponents chose to play the 
game. 
Initially, the method set forth by Berg, Daley, Dickhaut and OBrien (1986) was also employed. However, since 
this method added an additional layer of complexity to the experiment and d^efings with subjects in the session 0 
pilot experiment indicated that the method had &iled to accomplish its objective, this method was eliminated from 
the experiments reported here in &vor of the transformed p^of&. 
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In session 4, given the use of the single ehmination tournament, the subject matching 
was more complicated. For the practice round and the first round of the toumament, the eight 
subjects of a given type were randomly ordered and assigned to one of the four games in each 
of these two rounds. This imphed that after the first two roimds subjects had an equally 
weighted random san^le of how his/her eight opponents chose to play the game. After the 
first round of the toumament, four subjects of each type were ehmiaated fi^om the e>q)eriment. 
The strategies of the four remaining subjects of each type were randomly assigned to one of 
the roimd two games. After the second round of the toiunament, two subjects of each type 
were eliminated fi-om the experiment. The strategies for the remaining two subjects of each 
type were randomly assigned to two of the round three games. After the third round of the 
toumament, one subject of each type was eUminated fi^om the experiment. The strategies of 
the remaining three subjects (one of each type) were played for each of the four round four 
games. 
The final methodological consideration controlled the history of the game reported to 
individual subjects. In an efibrt to expedite learning and to maintain a common pool of 
information across different types of subjects, the strategies played by the randomly selected 
players of each type were reported to aU subjects on their Round Earnings Sheet. That is, the 
number of randomly selected Als that chose R, the number of randomly selected A2s that 
chose R, the nmnber of randomly selected Bs that chose U, and the number of randomly 
Note that if these matching procedures are not sufBcient to guarantee that all cooperation is eliminated from 
one round to the next, any collusion is expected to encourage the play of the intuitive equilibrium since the 
intuitive equilibrium is the result of a Pareto dominant set of actions. 
selected Bs that chose M were reported to each subject at the end of each round. This 
provided all subjects with a common history. 
Incentive mechanisms 
In sessions 2 and 3, subjects were paid a $10.00 participation fee in addition to $0.01 
for each token they earned in the final four rounds. The average earnings in the first and 
second sessions were $28.26 and $28.30 with standard deviations of $3.11 and $4.04, and 
ranges of $23.05 to $33.00 and $22.40 to $33.00. 
After sessions 2 and 3, it became apparent that the incentive mechanism encouraged 
learning, but it was rather passive and slow. In order to encoiu-age faster more active 
learning, session 4 was conducted with an alternative incentive mechanism. In session 4, 
subjects competed in a single elimination tournament. For the tournament, subjects were paid 
a $5.00 participation fee plus the value of their tokens in the round that they were ehminated. 
If a subject was eliminated in the first, second, or third round of the tournament, he/she earned 
$0.01, $0.05 or $0.10 for each token earned in that round. If the subject made it to the fourth 
round, he/she earned $0.25 for each token earned in the fourth round. Subjects advanced in 
the tournament by earning more tokens in the round than a randomly selected subject of their 
same type. In the event of a tie, the accuracy of a subject's beliefs about the randomly 
selected opponents' actions in the ciurent round was used as a first tie breaker. In the event 
that two subjects had equally accurate beliefs, a coin toss was used as second tie breaker. On 




The hypotheses tested concern equilibrium behavior and differences in behavior across 
sessions, rounds and incentive mechanisms. First, the null hypothesis that subjects play the 
intuitive equilibriiun, the unintuitive equilibrium or purely random is tested. Second, the null 
hypothesis that subject behavior does not differ by round or session in sessions 2 and 3 is 
tested. Third, the null hypothesis that subject behavior differs only by session in sessions 2 
and 3 is tested. Fourth, the null hypothesis that subject behavior differs only by round in 
session 2 and 3 is tested. Fifth, the null hypothesis that subject behavior in rounds 1 and 2 of 
session 2 and 3 differs from rounds 1 and 2 of session 
Results 
This section reports the results of the three e?q)erimental sessions. First, the data is 
described by round, session and subject type placing particular emphasis on equilibrium 
behavior and experimental efficiency. The data is then aggregated by subject type and 
described by roimd and session also enq)hasizing equilibrium behavior and experimental 
efficiency. Next, nonparametric statistical tests of equilibrium behavior and differences across 
rounds, sessions and incentive mechanisms are discussed and performed. 
Subject play by type, round and session 
Recall that in each round the Als chose R or L for five games in sessions 2 and 3, and 
for four games in session 4. Table 2 reports the number of Als that chose a particular 
Rounds 1 and 2 are the only rounds considered for these comparisons because after round 2 some subjects 
are eliminated from the session 4 experiment. Therefore, in the final three rounds of the session 4 tournament, 
the subject pool is no longer a random sample. 
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Table 2: The A1 subjects' strategies by session and round 
Session Choose R® Round l" Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
2 0.00 1 1 1 0 0 
0.20 1 0 0 1 1 
0.40 0 2 2 1 2 
0.60 2 1 2 3 0 
0.80 1 1 0 0 1 
1.00 0 0 0 0 1 
3 0.00 0 0 1 0 0 
0.20 0 0 1 1 2 
0.40 2 3 1 0 1 
0.60 3 2 1 1 2 
0.80 0 0 0 1 0 
1.00 0 0 1 2 0 
4 0.25 1 2 1 1 0 
0.50 6 5 1 1 0 
0.75 1 1 2 0 1 
® Choose R is the probability that an A1 chose R in any given round. 
'' Round 1 through Round 5 is the number of Als that chose R for a given probability in each 
round. 
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strategy defined in terms of the probability that R was chosen. If an A1 was playing a purely 
intuitive strategy, then the probability that the subject chose R was 1.0. If an A1 was playing 
a purely unintuitive strategy, then the probability that the A1 chose R was 0. On average, 
11.0% of the Als chose a purely intuitive or a purely unintuitive strategy in each round for 
sessions 2, 3 and 4. In session 2, pure strategy play was evenly dispersed across rounds 1, 2, 
3 and 5 with 75.0% of pure strategy play being imintuitive. In session 3, pure strategy play 
occurred exclusively in rounds 3 and 4 with 75.0% of pme strategy play being intuitive. In 
session 4, no pure strategy was chosen in any round. On average, 60.3% of the Als in 
sessions 2, 3 and 4 chose R with a probability between 0.40 and 0.60. 
In each round, the A2s also chose to play either R or L for five games in sessions 2 
and 3 and for four games in session 4. Table 3 reports the number of A2s that chose a 
particular strategy defined in terms of the probability that R was chosen. If an A2 was playing 
a pm^ely intuitive or unintuitive strategy, then the probabiUty that the A2 chose R was 0. On 
average, 74.0% of the A2s in sessions 2, 3 and 4 chose to play a pure equilibrium strategy in 
each round. Also, the percentage of subjects that chose a pure equilibrium strategy is non-
decreasing by round in all three sessions. 
In each round, the Bs chose U, M or D for fiK'e games in sessions 2 and 3, and for four 
games in session 4. Table 4 reports the niunber of Bs that chose a particular strategy defined 
in terms of the probabihty that U was chosen and the probability that M was chosen. If a B 
was playing a purely intuitive strategy, then the probability that the B chose U was 1.0. Since 
a B did not get the opportunity to move when the unintuitive equilibrium was played, any pure 
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Table 3: The A2 subjects' strategies by session and round 
Session Choose R® Round l*" Round 2 Round 3 Roimd 4 Roimd 5 
2 0.00 2 2 4 4 4 
0.20 1 1 0 0 0 
0.40 1 1 1 0 1 
0.60 0 1 0 1 0 
0.80 1 0 0 0 0 
3 0.00 3 3 4 5 5 
0.20 0 1 0 0 0 
0.40 1 0 1 0 0 
0.60 0 1 0 0 0 
0.80 1 0 0 0 0 
4 0.00 4 7 4 2 1 
0.25 2 1 0 0 0 
0.50 1 0 0 0 0 
1.00 1 0 0 0 0 
^ Choose R is the probability an A2 chose R in any given round. 
Round 1 through Round 5 is the number of A2s that chose R for the given probability in 
each roimd. 
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Table 4: The B subjects' strategies by session and round 
Session Choose U® Choose M'' Round T Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 
5 
0.00 0.80 1 0 0 0 0 
0.00 1.00 1 1 1 2 1 
0.20 0.60 1 1 1 1 1 
0.40 0.20 0 1 0 0 0 
0.40 0.40 0 0 1 0 0 
0.80 0.20 0 1 0 0 0 
1.00 0.00 2 1 2 2 3 
0.00 0.00 0 0 0 1 0 
0.00 0.60 0 0 1 0 0 
0.00 0.80 0 0 0 0 1 
0.00 1.00 2 2 2 3 2 
0.20 0.80 0 1 0 0 0 
0.40 0.20 1 0 0 0 0 
0.40 0.40 1 0 0 0 0 
0.60 0.20 0 0 1 0 0 
0.60 0.40 1 2 0 0 0 
0.80 0.00 0 0 0 0 1 
1.00 0.00 0 0 1 1 1 
0.00 0.00 1 0 0 0 0 
0.00 0.25 1 1 0 0 0 
0.00 1.00 1 2 2 0 0 
0.25 0.50 1 3 1 0 0 
0.25 0.75 1 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0.00 0 0 0 1 0 
0.50 0.25 2 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0.50 1 0 0 0 0 
0.75 0.00 0 1 0 0 0 
1.00 0.00 0 1 1 1 1 
" Choose U is the probabiUty that a B subject chose U in any given round. 
Choose M is the probabihty that a B subject chose M in any given round. 
Roimd 1 through Round 5 is the number of Bs that chose U and M for the given probabiUties 
in each round. 
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strategy represented a purely unintuitive equilibrium strategy. Therefore, in Table 4, pure 
unintuitive equilibriimi strategies are denoted by Choose U = 0 and Choose M = 0, Choose U 
= 0 and Choose M = 1.0, and Choose U = 1.0 and Choose M = 0. On average, 56.2% of the 
Bs in sessions 2, 3 and 4 played a pmely intuitive or a purely unintuitive strategy in each 
round. In session 2, 62.5% of pure strategy play was intuitive. In session 3, 20.0% of pure 
strategy play was intuitive. In session 4, 40.0% of pure strategy play was intuitive. 
Pure strategy play was most common for the A2s and least common for the Als. 
When the session 2 Als chose a pure strategy, this strategy was usually unintuitive. When the 
session 3 Als chose a piue strategy, this strategy was usually intuitive. However, the majority 
of Als seemed to choose randomly between R and L with equal probabihty. Almost all A2s 
move quickly to their pure strategy equilibrium With the exception of one subject in session 
2, all subjects are playing in equilibrium after Roimd 3. The Bs are playing pure strategy 
equiUbriiun behavior with much greater frequency than the Als. The Bs pure strategy play is 
much more intuitive in session 2 than it is in either sessions 3 or 4. 
Figure 11 (a) plots the average probabihty that all of the Als chose R by session and 
round. In session 2, the probabihty that the Als chose R increased shghtly by round with the 
exception of Roimd 3 where there was a sUght decrease. In session 3, the probabihty that the 
Als chose R decreased slightly by Round with the exception of Round 4 where there was a 
strong increase. In session 4, the probabihty that the Als chose R did not consistently 
increase or decrease by roimd. In all three session, the marginal changes between rounds 
tended to increase in later rounds. 
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Figure 11: (a) The average probability that the Als chose R by round and session 
(b) The average probability that the A2s chose R by round and session 
(c) The average probability that the Bs chose U by round and session 
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Figure 11 (b) plots the average probability that the A2s chose R by session and round. 
In all three sessions, the probabihty that the A2s chose R decreased with the exception of 
Round 4 in session 2 where there was a slight increase. In session 2, there was always some 
positive probability that the A2s chose R. In sessions 3 and 4, the probabihty that the A2s 
chose R falls to 0 by Roimd 4. This convergence to equilibriimi play was more rapid in 
session 4 where by Round 2 the probabihty that the A2s chose R was less than 0.05 and by 
Round 3 was 0. 
Figure 11 (c) plots the average probabihty that the Bs chose U by session and round. 
In sessions 2 and 3, the probabihty that the Bs chose U generally increased shghtly by round 
with the exception of Roimd 4 where there was a modest decrease. In session 4, the 
probabihty that the Bs chose U was non-decreasing. There were strong iacreases in the 
probabihty that the Bs chose U in session 4 for Rounds 4 and 5. 
Figure 12 shows the average eflficiency of the subjects' choices by type, session and 
round. Efficiency is defined as the proportion of the maxunum obtainable rewards captured 
by the subjects. In Figiu-e 12 (a), "Intuitive" denotes eflBciency for the Als given all of the 
subjects play the intuitive equihbrium, while "Uniatuitive" denotes eflBciency for the Als given 
all of the subjects play the unintuitive equihbriimi. In Figure 12 (b), "(Un)Intuitrve" denotes 
the eflBciency for the A2s given all of the subjects play the intuitive equihbriiun, or given aU of 
the subjects play the unintuitive equihbrium. In Figure 12 (c), "Intuitive" denotes eflficiency 
for the Bs given all of the subjects play the intuitive equihbrium, while "Unintuitive" denotes 
eflficiency for the Bs given all of the subjects play the unintuitive equihbrium. For all three 
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subject types, the maximuiii obtainable reward occius when all subject types play the intuitive 
equilibriiun. 
In Figure 12 (a), (b) and (c), there are three notable points. First, with a few 
exceptions, efficiency increased by round. Second, the A2s efficiency converged rapidly 
toward 1.0 and reaches 1.0 in sessions 3 and 4 by Round 4 which suggest the A2s. Third, 
while Table 2 and Figure 11 (a) suggest that the Als' played randomly, the Als efficiency was 
generally as high as if the Als would have played purely unintuitive. 
Subject play by round and session 
The probability that the subjects played the intuitive equilibrium is equal to the 
probabiUty that the Als chose R, the A2s chose L and the Bs chose U. The probability that 
the subjects played the unintuitive equilibrium is equal to the probability that the Als chose L 
and the A2s chose L. Figure 13 shows the dynamic time path of the probability that the 
subjects played the intuitive equilibriiun and the unintuitive equilibrium. The point (0,1.0) 
represents intuitive play with probabiUty 1.0. The point (1.0,0) represent unintuitive play with 
probability 1.0 and the origin represents non-Nash play with probability 1.0. These three 
points create a simplex where the solid star within the simplex denotes piu"ely random play. 
That is, the probability of intuitive and unintuitive play assuming the Als and A2s chose R 
with a probability equal to 1/2, and the Bs chose U and M with probabilities equal to 1/3. The 
solid dot shows the probability of intuitive and unintuitive play for round 1, session 2 This 
solid dot is followed by a sequence of open dots denoting the probability of intuitive and 
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Figure 12: (a) Average efficiency for the Als by session and round 
(b) Average efficiency for the A2s by session and round 
(c) Average efficiency for the Bs by session and round 
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Figure 13: Experimental game dynamics by session 
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of intuitive and unintuitive play for round 1, session 3. This solid square is followed by a 
sequence of open squares denoting the probability of intuitive and unintuitive play for rounds 
2 through 5 in session 3. The solid diamond shows the probabihty of intuitive and imintuitive 
play for roimd 1, session 4. This solid diamond is followed by a sequence of open diamonds 
denoting the probability of intuitive and unintuitive play for roimds 2 through 5 in session 4. 
With the exception of one observation in each session, the sequence of observations 
for each session tend to move towards the boundary of the sinq)lex connecting (0,1.0) to 
(1.0,0). This suggest a dynamic path moving in the direction of equilibrium behavior. For all 
three session, the dynamic path seems to initially move in the direction of the unintuitive 
equiUbriimi. However, while the final observation for round 5 in session 3 seems to continue 
along this path, the final observations for roimd five in sessions 2 and 4 seem to turn towards 
the intuitive equilibriiun. These paths are more apparent if the observations for roimd 4 in 
sessions 2 and 3 and round 3 in session 4 are regarded as being outliers. 
These outliers are explained by recalling Figure 11. In session 2, the increase in the 
probability that the A2s chose R in Round 4 [see Figure 11 (b)] leads to the decrease in the 
probabilities of the intuitive equilibriimi and unintuitive equilibrium seen in Figure 13. In 
session 3, the strong increase in the probability that the Als chose R in Round 4 [see Figure 
11 (a)] coupled with the slight decrease in the probability that the Bs chose U in Round 4 [see 
Figure 11 (c)] leads to the slight increase in probability of the intuitive equilibrium and the 
strong decrease in probability of the unintuitive equilibrium seen in Figure 13. In session 4, 
the increase in the probability that the Als chose R in Round 3 [see Figure 11 (a)] leads to the 
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increase in the probability of the intuitive equilibriiun and the decrease in the probabiUty of the 
unintuitive equilibriiun seen in Figure 13. 
Figure 14 reports the efficiency for all subjects by session and round. First, with a few 
exceptions, efficiency generally increased by round. Second, in earlier rounds, efficiency was 
lower than if all subjects had played the unintuitive equilibrium. However, by round 4, the 
session 4 subjects' efficiency surpasses the efficiency of the unintuitive equilibrium, and by 
round 5, the session 2 subjects' efficiency surpasses the efficiency of the unintuitive 
equiUbrium. By round 5, the session 3 subjects' efficiency just equals the efficiency of the 
unintuitive equiUbrium. Finally, notice that the outUers in Round 4 for sessions 2 and 3 
correspond to a decrease in efficiency. However, the outUer in Round 3 for session 4 did not 
lead to a similar decrease in efficiency. 
Statistical methods 
Define PAI, PA2 and PB as the probabiUty A1 chooses L, A2 chooses L and B chooses 
U in any given round.Assume that these probabiUties are identical for all players of the 
same type. Define G as the number of games in a round, g as the game number, N as the 
number of players of each type in a round, n as the player's number, and t as the player's type. 
Define x'n,g = 1 if the nth t type player chooses L in game g where t = A1 or A2. Otherwise, 
X n,g = 0. Define x®n,g = 1 if the nth B type player chooses U in game g. Otherwise, x®n,g = 0. 
Assuming x'n,g are independent for all t, n and g impUes that x'n,g has a BemoulU distribution 












Figure 14: Average efficiency for all of the subjects by session and round 
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x' ^ 
with parameter Pt and maximum likelihood estimate P, = where x' = 
„=1 ^=1 
distribution of P, is then Pr(P, = K ,\P,^ = (l ~ ^ ) ^vhere 
Define Tj and Tu to be the probabihty that the imintuitive and intuitive equiUbria are 
played given PAI, PA2 and PB. That is, Tj = (1-PAI)PA2PB and Tu = PAIPA2. Substituting P, for 
t = Al, A2 and B yields the statistics f^={\- and = P^iPa2 • ^ and f„are 
jointly distributed with a non-zero covariance. This distribution can be constructed by 
summing Pr^P, = RT, I ^ for all KAI, KA2 and KB that yield the same values for 7) 
^ 47 
and . This joint distribution is completely specified given the parameters PAI, PA2 and PB 
and is used to test a number of nuU hypotheses regarding f ,  and 7^. 
I also use the paired-sign test and the Mann-Whitney U test to test for differences 
across sessions and rounds. These nonparametric tests are appropriate for the san^le size and 
the imknown error structure assuming independent observations/^ 
A common game theoretic assumption is that when an agent plays a mixed strategy the agent randomizes 
based on the mixing probabilities. This randomization implies that observations for a given subject are 
independent within a round and across rounds provided that the experimental design preserves the one-shot 
game incentives. However, if this is not the case, then dependence of a subject's actions within a round and 
across rounds may reduce the reliability of the statistical tests reported. 
There are (NG)^ distinct combinations of KAI, KA2 and KB that produce a variety of unique combinations of 
t a n d f , .  
As a consistency check, mean effects for rounds and sessions were also estimated using a probit model for 
each subject type where intuitive play in each game was the dependent variable and session dummies and the 
round number were the independent variables. 
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The paired-sign test uses independently drawn paired observations from two 
populations to test if the median difference in the two populations is 0. In addition, the 
paired-sign test assumes continuity around the median such that the probabihty that the 
median occurs is 0. This test counts the number of tunes the difference in the paired 
observations exceeds 0. If the null hypothesis is correct, then the probability that the 
difference in the paired observations is positive is equal to 1/2. Therefore, when the number 
of positive differences is high or low relative to the total number of paired observations, the 
null hypothesis is rejected.''® 
The Mann-Whitney U test uses independent random saD:q)les drawn from two 
populations to determine if the two populations are identical or deviate systematically. 
Besides independence, the Mann-Whitney U statistic assumes that the underlying probability 
distribution is continuous. This statistic orders the observations from both populations by 
magnitude and then considers whether this order is random, or whether the magnitude of the 
observations from first population seem to be in general higher or lower than the magnitude of 
the observations from the second population. If the null hypothesis is correct, the probability 
that any observation from first population exceeds any observation from the second 
population is 1/2. Therefore, when observations from the first population predominantly 
greater than or less than observations from the second population, the null hypothesis is 
rejected.^® 
For a more complete discussion of the paired-sign test, see Gibbons (1985) pp. 100-106. 
For a more complete discussion of the Mann-Whitney U test, see Gibbons (1985) pp. 140-149. 
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Statistical tests 
Consider Ho: T; = 1 versus HA: Tj < 1. This hypothesis states that the subjects played 
the intuitive equihbriiun with probabiUty 1.0. If the null hypothesis is correct, then PAI = 0, 
PA2 = 1, and PB = 1. The null hypothesis is rejected at any level of significance because 
T) < 1.0 for all observations (see Table 5). Under the null hypothesis, the probability that any 
one observation is less than 1.0 is 0. The probability that one or more of the fifteen 
observations is less than 1.0 is also 0. The rejection of the null hypothesis for all observations 
inches that subject play was not intuitive. 
Consider HQ; TU = 1 versus HA: TU < 1. This hypothesis states that subjects play the 
unintuitive equilibrium with probability 1.0. If the null hypothesis is correct, then PAI = 1, and 
Pa2 = 1. The null hypothesis is rejected for aU rounds taken independently or jointly at any 
level of significance because < I for all observations (see Table 5). Under the null 
hypothesis, the probability that any one observation is less than 1.0 is 0. The probability that 
one or more of the fifteen observations is less than 1.0 is also 0. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis for all observations in:q)Ues that subject play was not unintuitive. 
These first two hypotheses provide a stringent test for intuitive and unintuitive 
equilibrium behavior. In fact, the null hypothesis is accepted only if all subjects choose to play 
the same equilibriiun in any given round. If any subject errors or different subjects play a 
different equilibrium, then the Ho: Tj = 1, and Ho: Tu = 1 are rejected. 
A weaker test that can be constructed is a test for random play. For instance, assume 
that subjects choose randomly between actions with equal probability (i.e. Pai = 1/2, Pa2 = 
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Table 5: Ciunulative probabilities under the null hypothesis that subjects choose actions 
randomly 
Session Round T, Tu Column r Column 2*' Column 3'' 
2 1 0.139 0.403 0.9352* 0.9698** 0.9061*** 
2 2 0.161 0.426 0.9724 0.9842** 0.9568** 
2 3 0.191 0.552 0.9934 0.9998* 0.9933* 
2 4 0.186 0.458 0.9915* 0.9939* 0.9854** 
2 5 0.330 0.405 1.0000* 0.9737** 0.9737** 
3 1 0.111 0.365 0.8102 0.9411*** 0.7599 
3 2 0.113 0.437 0.8189 0.9924* 0.8121 
3 3 0.130 0.515 0.9043*** 0.9990* 0.9033*** 
3 4 0.144 0.28 0.9452*** 0.6733 0.6334 
3 5 0.144 0.6 0.9452*** 1.0000* 0.9452*** 
4 1 0.094 0.375 0.6742 0.9703** 0.6523 
4 2 0.142 0.515 0.9600** 0.9998* 0.9598** 
4 3 0.176 0.438 0.9615** 0.9750** 0.9370*** 
4 4 0.281 0.625 .9854** 0.9894** 0.9748** 
4 5 0.75 0.25 0.9992* 0.4961 0.4955 
^ Column 1 reports the joint cumulative probability that an observation for Ti is less than ^ 
under the null hypothesis that PAI = 1/2, PA2 = 1/2 and PB = 1/3. 
^ Column 2 reports the joint cumulative probability that an observation for Tu is less than 
under the null hypothesis that Pai = 1/2, Pa2 = 1/2 and Pb = 1/3. 
" Column 3 reports the joint cumulative probability that an observation for Tu and Tj is less 
than and f, under the null hypothesis that Pai = 1/2, Pa2 = 1/2 and Pb = 1/3. 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level. 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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1/2, and PB = 1/3). If tids assumption is correct, then the payoflf structure and the 
experimental design had no influence on the subjects' decisions. Under the assumption of 
random behavior, there are three possible hypotheses. Since non-random play is expected to 
be intuitive or imintuitive, these hypotheses are Ho: Tj = 0.083 versus HA: T; > 0.083, Ho: Tu 
= 0.25 versus HA: TU > 0.25, and Ho: T = 0.083 and Tu = 0.25 versus HA: T > 0.083 and Tu > 
0.25. The first two hypotheses independently test random play versus intuitive or unintuitive 
play, while the third hypothesis jointly tests random play versus intuitive and unintuitive play. 
First, consider Ho: T = 0.083 versus HA: T > 0.083. In 7 of the 15 roimds, the 
hypothesis is rejected at the five percent level (see Table 5, Column 1). Therefore, the 
hypothesis is rejected for entire set of 15 observations. Taking each roimd individually, an 
observation is rejected if the joint cumulative probabihty of the observation under the null 
hypothesis is greater than 0.95. Under the null hypothesis, the probabihty of rejecting 2 or 
fewer of the 15 observations at a five percent level is 0.96. This suggests that Ti > 0.083 or 
that subject play was non-random and in the direction of the intuitive equilibrium. 
Second, consider Ho: Tu = 0.25 versus HA: TU > 0.25. In 12 of the 15 rounds, the 
hypothesis is rejected at the five percent level (see Table 5, Column 2). Therefore, the 
hypothesis is rejected for entire set of 15 observations. Taking each roimd individually, an 
observation is rejected if the joint cumulative probability of the observation under the null 
hypothesis is greater than 0.95. Under the null hypothesis, the probability of rejecting 2 or 
fewer of the 15 observations at a five percent level is 0.96. This suggests that Tu > 0.25 or 
that subject play was non-random and in the direction of the unintuitive equihbrixun. 
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Third, consider Ho: T; = 0.083 and Tu = 0.25 versus HA: Ti > 0.083 and Tu > 0.25. In 
6 of the 15 rounds, the hypothesis is rejected at the five percent level (see Table 5, Column 3). 
Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected for entire set of 15 observations. Taking each round 
individually, an observation is rejected if the joint cumulative probabiUty of the observation 
imder the null hypothesis is greater than 0.95. Under the null hypothesis, the probability of 
rejecting 2 or fewer of the 15 observations at a five percent level is 0.96. This suggests that T 
> 0.083 and Tu > 0.25 or that subject play was non-random and in the direction of the intuitive 
and unintuitive equilibria. 
The first 5 hypotheses tested suggest several conclusions. Subjects did not play 
strictly intuitively or strictly unintuitively. However, subjects did not play randomly either. In 
general, the subjects played in the dkection of both the intuitive and unintuitive equilibria.^' 
Systematic differences between roimds, sessions and incentive mechanisms are now 
considered. Since sessions 2 and 3 are identical accept for the subject pool and the history, 
these two sessions are contqiared first. 
Pairing the observations by roimd for sessions 2 and 3, consider Ho: The median 
difference in Tj between sessions 2 and 3 is equal to 0 versus HA: The median difference in T, 
between sessions 2 and 3 is not equal to 0. The null hypothesis is rejected at the five percent 
level because 5 of the 5 differences are positive. At the five percent level, the null hypothesis is 
rejected for the paired-sign test when all of the differences are positive or all of the differences 
Probit analysis indicates that the Als played randomly, that the A2s played in the direction of their 
equilibrium action, and that the Bs played in the direction of the intuitive and unintuitive equilibria in sessions 
2 and 4, and randomly in session 3. 
104 
are negative. The rejection of Ho suggests that there was a statistical difference in the 
probability of intuitive play between sessions 2 and 3. 
Groupmg the data by session, consider Ho: T is identically distributed across sessions 
2 and 3 versus HA: Tj is not identically distributed across sessions 2 and 3. The null 
hypothesis is rejected at the five percent level because the Mann-Whitney U statistic is 23. At 
the five percent level, the null hypothesis is rejected for the Mann-Whitney U test if the Mann-
Whitney U statistic is less than or equal to 2, or greater than or equal to 23. The rejection of 
Ho suggests that there was a statistical difference in the probabiUty of unintuitive play between 
sessions 2 and 3. 
Pairing the observations by round for sessions 2 and 3, consider Ho: The median 
difference in Tu between sessions 2 and 3 is equal to 0 versus HA: The median difference in Tu 
between sessions 2 and 3 is not equal to 0. The null hypothesis is not rejected at the five 
percent level because 3 of the 5 differences are positive. At a five percent level, the null 
hypothesis is rejected for the paired-sign test when all of the differences are positive or all of 
the differences are negative. The failure to reject Ho suggests that there was no statistical 
difference in the probabihty of unintuitive play between sessions 2 and 3. 
Groupmg the data by session, consider Ho: Tu is identically distributed across sessions 
2 and 3 versus HA: TU is not identically distributed across sessions 2 and 3. The null 
hypothesis is not rejected at the five percent level because the Mann-Whitney U statistic is 13. 
At the five percent level, the null hypothesis is rejected for the Mann-Whitney U test if the 
Mann-Whitney U statistic is less than or equal to 2, or greater than or equal to 23. The failure 
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to reject Ho suggests that there was no statistical difference in the probability of unintuitive 
play between sessions 2 and 3. 
The rejection the null hypotheses for a difference in the probabiUty of intuitive play 
between sessions 2 and 3, and the failure to reject the null hypotheses for a difference in the 
probability of unintuitive play between sessions 2 and 3 provide inconclusive support for 
differences in subject play between sessions 2 and 3. In order to test if a jointly significant 
difference exits, the joint cumulative probabiUty of ^, and is calciUated, and a paired-sign 
tests and Mann-Whitney U tests are performed on these joint cumulative probabilities paired 
by rovmd and grouped by session. 
Recall that values for PAI, PA2 and PB must be specified in order to calculate the joint 
cimiulative probabiUty of T) , andr„. These values are specified using the maximum UkeUhood 
estimates for the pooled data under three alternative assunq)tions. First, PAI, PA2, and PB are 
assumed to be invariant across rounds and sessions such that maximum UkeUhood estimates 
are obtained by pooling the data by session and round. Second, PAI, PA2, and PB are 
assumed to be invariant across rounds but not across sessions such that maximum UkeUhood 
estnnates are obtained by pooling the data by round. Third, PAI, PA2, and PB are assumed to 
be invariant across sessions but not across rounds such that maximimi likelihood estimates are 
obtained by pooling the data by session. Table 6, Colimms 1, 2 and 3 report the joint 
cumulative probabiUty of T) , and 7^ by session, round and assun:q)tion. Column 1 corresponds 
The maximum likelihood estimates used for the alternative hypothesized values of PAI, PAI ,  and PB are 
reported in notes to Table 6. 
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Table 6: Tests for differences across sessions and rounds for sessions 2 and 3 
Session Round t  t  Column r Column 2*" Column 3" 
2 1 0.139 0.403 0.0518 0.0165 0.3206 
2 2 0.161 0.426 0.1238 0.0507 0.2594 
2 3 0.191 0.552 0.5407 0.3730 0.3076 
2 4 0.186 0.458 0.2759 0.1684 0.3976 
2 5 0.330 0.405 0.3293 0.3068 0.1137 
3 1 0.111 0.365 0.0076 0.0348 0.1229 
3 2 0.113 0.437 0.0313 0.1119 0.1151 
3 3 0.130 0.515 0.1456 0.3387 0.0502 
3 4 0.144 0.28 0.0027 0.0108 0.0175 
3 5 0.144 0.6 0.3137 0.5662 0.0342 
Paired-Si: gn Test 5* 3 5* 2 5* 
Mann-Whitney U 23* 13 20** 13 23* 
® Column 1 reports the joint cumulative probability that an observation for Tu and Ti is less 
than and ^ under the null hypothesis that PAI = 0.512, PA2 = 0.872 and PB = 0.396. 
^ Column 2 reports the joint cumulative probability that an observation for Tu and Ti is less 
than and f, imder the null hypothesis that Pai = 0.536, Pa2 = 0.84 and Pb = 0.504 for 
session 2 and Pai = 0.488, Pa2 = 0.904 and Pb = 0.288 for session 3. 
" Column 3 reports the joint cumulative probabiUty that an observation for Tu and Tj is less 
than and ^ under the null hypothesis that PAI = 0.52, PA2 =0.74 and PB = 0.36 for round 1, 
PAI = 0.54, PA2 = 0.8 and PB = 0.38 for round 2, PAI = 0.58, PA2 = 0.92 and PB = 0.42 for 
round 3, Pai = 0.4, Pa2 = 0.94 and Pb = 0.32 for round 4, and Pai = 0.52, Pa2 = 0.96 and Pb = 
0.5 for roimd 5. 
* Significant at the five percent level for a two-tail test. 
** Significant at the ten percent level for a one-tail test. 
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to the assun^tion of invariance across rounds and sessions. Column 2 corresponds to the 
assumption of invariance across rounds, and Column 3 corresponds to the assumption of 
invariance across sessions. The paked-sign statistics and the Mann-Whitney U statistics are 
also reported at the bottom of each column in Table 6. 
Pairing the observations in Colimms 1, 2 and 3 by roimd, consider Ho: The median 
difiFerence in the joint cumulative probability of 7], and between sessions 2 and 3 is equal 
to 0 versus HA: The median difference in the joint cumulative probability of , and 7^ 
between sessions 2 and 3 is not equal to 0. The null hypothesis is rejected at the five percent 
level for Columns 1 and 2 because 5 of the 5 differences are positive. The null hypothesis is 
not rejected at the five percent level for Column 2 because 2 of the 5 diflFerences are positive. 
At a five percent level, the null hypothesis is rejected for the paired-sign test when all of the 
differences are positive or all of the differences are negative. The rejection of Ho for Columns 
1 and 3, and Mure to reject Ho for Column 2 suggest that there were statistically significant 
differences between sessions 2 and 3, but not across rounds within a session. 
Grouping the observations in Columns 1, 2 and 3 by session, consider Ho: The joint 
ciunulative probability of f., and 7^ is identically distributed across sessions 2 and 3 versus 
HA: The joint cumiilative probability of f,, and is not identically distributed across sessions 
2 and 3. The null hypothesis is not rejected at the five percent level for Columns 1 and 2 
because the Mann-Whitney U statistics are 20 and 13, respectively. The null hypothesis is 
rejected for Column 3 because the Mann-Whitney U statistic is 23. At the five percent level, 
the null hypothesis is rejected for the Mann-Whitney U test if the Mann-Whitney U statistic is 
108 
less than or equal to 2, or greater than or equal to 23. The failure to reject Ho for Columns 1 
and 2 and the rejection of Ho for Column 3 suggest that there is some statistical evidence to 
support differences between sessions, but not across rounds within a session. 
The results of the paired-sign tests and Mann-Whitney U tests in Columns 1,2 and 3 
suggest that there are differences across sessions in the median differences of the joint 
cumulative probabiUties and in the distribution of the joint cimiulative probabihties. Extending 
these results to suggest that these same differences exist across sessions but not across rounds 
for PAI, PA2, and PB, must be done cautiously because the distribution of the joint cumulative 
probabihties will generally differ for different null hypotheses regarding PAI, PA2, and PB. 
Therefore, the reported levels of significance should be regarded as suggestive and not exact. 
Finally, while the general assumptions of game theory imply that observations are independent 
if subjects are treating each game as a one-shot game, this assumption should be treated 
cautiously in the dynamic context of the experiment. Therefore, the nonparametric tests for 
differences across sessions and rounds should be considered cautiously. 
To test for differences due to alternative incentive mechanisms, only the first two 
roimds in sessions 4 are considered because these rounds contained the entire population of 
tournament participants. For comparison, the analysis is also considers the first two rounds of 
sessions 2 and 3. Pooling rounds 1 and 2 for sessions 2, 3 and 4, the maximimi likeUhood 
Probit analysis suggests that there are no differences across rounds or sessions for the Als, that there are 
diSerences across rounds and sessions for the A2s, and that there are differences across sessions for the Bs. 
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Table 7: Test for differences across session 2, 3 and 4 and rounds 1 and 2 
Session Round Column r 
2 1 0.2057 
2 2 0.3379 
3 1 0.0588 
3 2 0.1720 
4 1 0.0286* 
4 2 0.5452 
® Column 1 reports the joint cumulative probability that an observation for Tu and Ti is less 
than and f. under the null hypothesis that PAI = 0.524, PAJ = 0.81 and PB = 0.331. 
* Significant at the ten percent level. 
estimates are obtamed for the hypothesized values of PAI, PA2, and PB.^"* Table 7 reports the 
joint cumulative probabiUties of , and T) by session and round. 
Consider Ho: PAI = 0.524, PA2 = 0.81 and PB = 0.331 versus HA: PAI 9^ 0.524, PA2 
0.81 and Pb 0.331. At the five percent level of significance, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected for any of the observations. Considering the set of six observation, the null 
hypothesis can not be rejected at the five percent level of significance. Taking each round 
individually, an observation is rejected if the joint cumulative probability of the observation 
imder the null hypothesis, is greater than 0.975 or less than 0.025. Under the null hypothesis, 
the probability of rejecting 1 or more of the 6 observations at a five percent level is 0.98. The 
rejection of Ho suggests that the tournament did not significantly change the subjects play.^^ 
The estimated hypothesized values of PAI, PA2, and PB are reported in the notes to Table 7. 




While there is not enough concrete statistical evidence to conclude that the intuitive 
equilibrium predicts aggregate subject behavior any better than the unintuitive equilibrium, 
there is enough statistical evidence to conclude that aggregate subject behavior is non-random 
and in the general direction of the intuitive and imintuitive equiUbria. There is also sufficient 
statistical evidence to conclude that that there was significant difference in aggregate subject 
behavior between sessions 2 and 3. 
While aggregate behavior was non-random and differed between sessions 2 and 3, a 
closer look at the data reveals that these results do not hold for all subject types considered 
independently. Table 2, Figure 11 (a) and probit analysis suggest that the Als played 
randomly in all sessions and rounds. Table 3, Figure 11 (b) and probit analysis suggest that 
the A2s converged to equilibrium play at different rates in all three sessions. Table 4, Figure 
11 (c) and probit analysis suggest that the Bs play was non-random in sessions 2 and 4 and 
that differences in play existed across all three sessions. These results provide evidence to 
support Plott's (1995) discovered preference hypothesis. 
Plott's (1995) discovered preference hypothesis asserts that e^qperimental subjects 
move through three stages of rationality when confi'onted with a new or unfamiliar task. In 
the first-stage, subjects play seems random or without purpose. During this stage, subjects 
are beconmig familiar with the experimental environment. In the second-stage, subject 
behavior becomes more purposefiiL, and this purpose starts to reveal the subject's preferences. 
In the third-stage, subject behavior becomes sophisticated. Subjects' actions reveal well 
developed preferences and an anticipation for other subjects' actions. Plott (1995) asserts that 
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these three stages generally serve to describe subject behavior in an experiment. He also 
asserts that not aU subjects vsdll encounter all three stages of rationality in any given 
experiment. Some agents may start in the &st-stage of rationality and never advance beyond 
this stage, while other agents may start in later stages or move quickly through all three 
stages. 
This discovered preference hypothesis can explain the general behavior of the subjects 
in the SLAPP e?q)eriment. In early roimds, about 50.0% of the A2s started oflF playing in 
equilibriimi. All but one of the A2s moved to equilibrium play by Roimd 5. This suggests that 
about half of the A2s started in Plott's third-stage of rationality. The remaining A2s started in 
Plott's first-stage of rationahty and all but one quickly advanced to Plott's third-stage of 
rationality. Through all five rounds, just over half of the Bs played pwe strategies that 
suggest purposefiil actions and Plott's second-stage of rationality. On average, just under a 
quarter of the Bs played an equilibrium strategy that was optimal given the A2s chose their 
equilibrium strategy. The proportion of Bs playing optimally given the A2s were playing in 
equihbrium generally increased in later rounds. By roimd 5, a majority of the subjects that had 
started in Plott's second-stage of rationality had made it to Plott's third-stage of rationahty. 
Of the remaining Bs, half seemed to still be m Plott's first-stage of rationahty by round 5 while 
the other half seemed to have reached Plott's second-stage of rationahty by Round 5. 
Through all five rounds in all three sessions, the Als generally played randomly or without an 
apparent purpose suggesting Plott's first-stage of rationahty. 
The A2s and the Bs generally seemed to progress through Plott's three stages of 
rationahty, while the Als showed little advancement past Plott's first-stage of rationahty. 
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Recalling Figure 12 (a), the A Is' average eflficiency given their random play was generally as 
high as or higher than the average eflficiency of playing unintuitively. This suggest that the 
Als payoflFs were not salient. By improving the saliency of the Als payoflfs and providing 
subjects with additional rounds to learn, conclusive support for the intuitive or unintuitive 




The primary purpose of this dissertation is to construct a game theoretic model to 
explore the economic incentives encowaging strategic lawsuits against public participation 
(SLAPPs), and to explore the eflSciency consequences of eliminating SLAPPs. This model is 
a two-stage contest with asymmetric inconq)lete information regarding agents' benefits. 
Using the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept, equilibriimi behavior is characterized 
assuming a ratio contest success fimction with asymmetric abihty. Con^arative static results 
are derived for the second-stage of the contest, and efficiency is evaluated using contest 
efficiency (see Appendix B) as the primitive measure of efficiency. Given the general 
ambiguity of the efficiency results, the contest success fimction is parameterized and efficiency 
is evaluated for a wide range parameter values assummg that the firm has normal a priori 
beliefs regarding the distribution of the homeowner's benefit fi"om winning the contest. 
Finally, the predictive power of the perfect Bayesian equihbrium is tested using experimental 
methods and of a specific form of the SLAPP game. 
First, the analysis suggests that the firm's and homeovmer's equilibrium levels of effort 
in the second-stage of the game and equilibrium actions in the first-stage of the game depend 
crucially on a measure of each agent's relative strength which is referred to as relative resolve. 
With the ratio form of the contest success fimction, an agent's relative benefit and relative 
ability contribute equally to the agent's relative resolve. Intuitively, this result inqiUes that an 
agent's strength determines an agent's equilibrium actions, and whether this strength comes 
from a strong desire to win or natural abihty is urelevant. 
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Equilibrium effort in the second-stage of the game is determined by the sequence of 
play in the first-stage of the game, by relative resolve and by the firm's expected relative 
resolve given its inconq)lete information. The proportion of the leader's benefit that the leader 
dissipates in equilibrium is determined by relative resolve when the leader's information is 
complete and by expected relative resolve when the leader's information is incomplete. The 
follower's equihbrium effort is determiaed by the follower's best response fimction and the 
proportion of the leader's benefit that the leader dissipates in equilibriuia The shape of the 
follower's best response ilmction depends on whether the leader's effort is a strategic 
con^lement or substitute to the follower. That is, when the leader's effort is a strategic 
con^lement (substitute) to the follower, the follower's best response fimction is increasing 
(decreasing) in the leader's effort. Therefore, strategic complementarity and substitutability 
play an important role in determining equilibrium efforts. When agents move simultaneously, 
the agent with incon^lete information exhibits leader type behavior because equilibriimi 
efforts will generally fall off this agent's best re^onse fimction. The agent with conq)lete 
information exhibits follower type behavior because equilibriiun efforts will lie on this agent's 
best response fimction. 
Equilibrium timing decisions in the first-stage of the game also depend on relative 
resolve and the firm's expected relative resolve given its incomplete information. In the 
SLAPP game, the firm's inconq)lete information leads to timing decisions that would not 
occur if the firm had complete information. Some homeowners' types that would normally 
choose Sue because of their low relative resolve now choose Squawk to take advantage of the 
firm's mis-perception that these homeowners' types are stronger than they actually are. Some 
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homeowners' types that would normally choose Squawk because of their high relative resolve 
now choose Sue because of the firm's mis-perception that these homeowners' types are 
weaker than they actually are. When SLAPPs are eliminated, similar incentives exist for some 
homeowners' types to eTcploit the firm's incon^lete mformation. However, the parameterized 
model suggests that these mcentives are msignificant. That is, in the SLAPP-fi-ee game, 
equilibriiun behavior is the same whether or not the firm's information is incomplete because 
information effects are weak. 
Second, efficiency depends on relative resolve and the firm's expected relative resolve 
given its incomqplete mformation to the extent that these &ctors influence equiMbrium efforts. 
Whether this equihbrium effort is efficient depends on relative benefits and relative abihties. 
Ex post efficiency is higher when the agent with high (low) relative benefit has high (low) 
relative ability. Efficiency is lower when the agent with high (low) relative benefit has low 
(high) relative abihty. Therefore, it is efficient for an agent with high relative resolve to 
employ high amounts of effort only if the agent's high relative resolve is due partially to high 
relative benefits. 
Third, imder the parameterizations considered here, the SLAPP game is always at least 
as efficient as the SLAPP-fiee game ex ante. In a con^lete information contest, it is most 
efficient for the relatively weak agent to lead in an attempt to reduce the amoimt of 
equilibrium effort expended by a the relatively strong agent (see Baik and Shogren 1992). If 
timmg decisions are endogenous, then the relatively weak agent will choose to lead and the 
relatively strong agent will choose to follow. Eliminating SLAPPs has the effect of 
eUminatmg the abihty of the weak agent to choose her preferred and most efficient action. 
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Incomplete information weakens this result slightly, but does not change this result when a 
ratio contest success function is specified and the firm's behefs are normally distributed. 
Fifth, in some instances, the parameterized model leads to multiple equilibria in the 
SLAPP game. An experimental test using a specific form of the SLAPP game provided little 
concrete statistical support for either of these two perfect Bayesian equilibria. There is 
concrete statistical support for non-random play in the direction of these equilibria and for 
differences between session where sessions varied only by the subject pool and by the history 
revealed to the subjects. There is also evidence to support Plott's (1995) discovered 
preference hypothesis. 
Recommendations 
Contests are inherently inefBcient because agents expend non-productive resources 
attempting to secure a prize or property right. Three factors serve to exacerbate the inherent 
inefficiency of the contest considered here. First, the contest tends to be less efficient when 
the agent vsdth the highest relative resolve strategically commits effort. Second, asymmetric 
incomplete information generally reduces efficiency. Third, when the contests is between an 
agent with a high relative benefit and low relative abiUty and an agent with a low relative 
benefit and a high relative ability, efficiency tends to be lower. 
In the model presented here, the elimination of SLAPPs represents the elimination of 
the ability of an uninformed agent (the agent with incomplete information) to strategically 
commit effort. This does not affect the efficiency of the contest provided the uninformed 
agent has a relatively high benefit and abiUty and the informed agent (the agent vsdth complete 
information) chooses to strategically commit effort. However, if the uninformed agent has a 
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low relative benefit and ability or the informed agent does not choose to strategically commit 
effort, then the efficiency of the contest will tend to be lower. Therefore, a poUcy that 
eliminates SLAPPs exacerbates the inherent inefficiency of the contest. If the policy goal is to 
maximize the efficiency of the contest, then SLAPPs should not be eliminated. 
Efficiency in the contest presented here can also be improved by improving 
information. For instance, sponsoring research that values non-market resowces and 
measures agents' abilities can create a pool of information that can be used to enhance 
efficiency. This pool of information can serve to enhance efficiency by improving the 
iminformed agent's information. This pool of information can also be used by policy makers 
to determine the primary characteristics of a non-market resource and of agents that signal the 
agents' benefits and abilities. If poUcy makers can influence relative ability, then the efficiency 
of the contest can be improved by using benefit information to design institutional mechanisms 
that augment the ability of the agent with the highest benefit. 
Future Research 
There are four important Unes on which to extend this research. First, the model can 
be extended to consider alternative information structures. Second, the model can be 
expanded into a more general model of conflict resolution. Third, additional experiments can 
be conducted to test for hypothesized equiUbrium behavior in games of incomplete 
information. Fourth, new empirical models can be constructed to improve the analysis of 
experimental data. 
The contest model developed here restricts its attention to one-sided incomplete 
information regarding the homeowners benefit. In many instances, the assumption of two-
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sided inconq)lete information is more appropriate. While two-sided inconqilete information 
has been addressed for perfectly discriminating contest success functions (see HiUman and 
Riley 1989), I have not foimd research that explores the eflfect of two-sided incomplete 
information for inq)erfectly discriminating contest success fimction. The results above are 
applicable when an agent chooses to strategically commit effort. However, when agents move 
simultaneously, analyzing the agents' best response functions becomes troublesome. Recall 
that the firm's incomplete information lead the firm to exhibit leader type behavior. If both 
agent's have inconq)lete information, then both agents are Ukely to exhibit leader type 
behavior as in the con:q)lete information contest. The key to analyzing a solution for an 
inq)erfectly discriminating contest with two-sided incomplete information is likely be found in 
the leader-follower solution structure. 
Another important area for future research is the extension of the source of incomplete 
information to include ability. To foreshadow the result, independent benefits and abilities will 
have Uttle intact on the model, while positive or negative correlation will significantly impact 
levels of effort and efficiency. Positive correlation will most likely tend to in^rove eflficiency 
and negative correlation will most likely tend to decrease efficiency because efficiency is 
higher when agents with a high benefit also have a high ability. 
The contest explored here assumes that a contest is the only available conflict 
resolution mechanism. It is more likely that agents can choose fi^om a list of conflict 
resolution mechanisms when deciding whether or not to enter a contest. For exanq)le, this list 
might include mediation, bribery and coercion. A more general model can be developed to 
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e7q)lore when it is efficient to have an inefficient contest that encourages agents to choose a 
more efficient alternative conflict resolution mechanism 
Futitfe work must also continue to explore the predictive power of alternative game 
theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, before strong statistical results can be established, 
experimental methods must advance along with the statistical models used to analyze 
experimental data. The design presented here explicitly controls a subject's history, and risk 
attitudes due to randomization. It also samples a subject's beUefs and takes multiple san^les 
of a subject's preferred action given these beUefs. The data provides an opportunity to 
decon^ose subject behavior into learning behavior and equilibrium behavior. The primary 
draw back of this experimental design is that it does not fixUy control for risk preferences 
when some subjects play out of equilibrium or in mixed strategies. Current methods of 
inducing risk neutral preferences are generally not sufficient to guarantee this result. 
Therefore, additional research must be done to develop more suitable methods for controlling 
risk attitudes and to test the efficacy of current methods. The basic game in this experiment 
can then be reparameterized to compare and test a number of perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
refinements. 
To improve the statistical analysis of this experimental data, there are two distinct 
avenues to e?q)lore depending on the questions of interest. If the dynamic nature of subject 
behavior across rounds and sessions is of interest, a model that combines the basic elements of 
dynamic discrete choice models and static en^irical models of discrete games is necessary 
[For examples, see Fisher and Nijkamp (1987), Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Hotz, Miller and 
Smith (1994) and Breshnahan and Reiss (1991)]. If convergence towards a particular 
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equilibrium is of interest, a simpler nonparametric test that considers whether a sequence of 
observations is moving significantly towards a given point might su£5ce. 
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 2 THROUGH 9 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
The ith agent's resolve is defined as p^ = . Taking the partial derivative with 
respect to the ith agent's relative benefit and relative ability yields 
££L= Q.E.D. 
\  4 a /  
Claim 1: The homeowner's eqiuhbrium effort is a strategic complement (substitute) to the 
firm in the Citizen suit subgame as > (<)a^ x^, while the firm's equilibrium effort is a 
strategic conq)lement (substitute) to the firm in kth subgame as x^ < (>)a^ x^ where k = S or 
Proof of Claim 1: Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klen^erer (1985) define strategic conq)lements 
and substitutes based on how one agent's actions affect another agent's marginal profitability. 
If an agent's action increases (decreases) another agent's marginal profitability, then the 
agent's action is a strategic conqilement (substitute) to the other agent. 
The firm's marginal profitabiUty or payoff in the Citizen suit subgame is 
N. 
Taking the partial derivative of the 
firm's marginal payoff with respect to the homeowner's effort yields 
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dxj  dx^{v)  veR 
a, (x^  -a ,x , )  
( x ^ + a , x , { v ) y  
do(y, t) . Therefore, the homeowner's eflFort is a 
strategic cotiq)lement (substitute) to the firm as x^ > (<)af, x^. 
The homeowner's marginal profitabiUty or payoflFin the kth subgame is 
( X y , x J  
dx^ 
=  K  
/ \ 
a , X f  
( x j + a , x , y  
1 where k = S or N. Taking the partial derivative of 
/ 
the homeowner's marginal payoff with respect to the firm's eflFort yields 
^x^ dXj 
=  V u  
\ 
[ x f  +a,x,) 
Therefore, the firm's eflFort is a strategic 
complement (substitute) to the homeowner as x. < {>)a^ x^. Q.E.D. 
Claim 2: The firm's equilibrium eflFort in the kth subgame is a strategic complement 
(substitute) to the homeowner as 1 > {<C)2pjP^ where k = S or N. 
Proof of Claim 2: From the proof of claim one, the firai's eflFort is a strategic complement 
(substitute) to the homeowner in the kth subgame as Xj < (>)a^ x^. Substituting [xf\ Xh''] 
fi-om above then inches that the firm's equilibrium eflFort in the kth subgame is a strategic 
conq)lement (substitute) to the homeowner as j or, 
rearranging terms, as 1 > {<)2pj/3^. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
The partial derivatives of Xf^ and Xh'' with respect to t are 







l ^ v , ( p , - 2 p ; p , ) ^  
Whenk = S ^ = 
' dr 2 dz 
dx]  
0 by assun^tion. Therefore, —— > 0 and 
dx 
dx 
> (<)0 as 1 > {<)2pjPg or, from claim 2, as the firm's equilibrium efifort is a strategic 
conq)lement (substitute) to the homeowner. 
Whenk = N, = 
dx dx + +Var^^{p,)y 
>(<)0 as 
dx'^ dx^ 
1 > i<)2E^^ {pj)Pn- Therefore, > (<)0 as 1 > {<)2E^^ (py )p^. As > 0, 
dx 
d x ^  d x ^  d x ^  
^ >(<)0 as \>(<)2pfPj^. As—^<0,—^>(<)Oas 1 <(>)2yo^/9^. From 
dx dx dx 
claim 2, 1 > (<)2/7jPf^ as the firm's equilibrium efifort is a strategic con:q)lement (substitute) 
to the homeowner. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 4: 
The partial derivatives of Xf^ and Xh*^ with respect to t are 
dB, 
and 
When k = S, = 0 by assumption. Therefore, —— = 0 and = 0. 
dx dx dx 
_ g  
When k = N, — = ^^ < 0. Therefore, —— < 0, and 
dx^ 
—^>(<)0 as l<(>)2pfPff. From claim 2, \ <(>)2pfB^ as the firm's equilibrium effort 
dx •' 
is a strategic substitute (conq)lement) to the homeowner. Q.E.D. 
Claim 3: In the Citizen suit subgame, the homeovmer's equiUbrium effort is a strategic 
con^lement (substitute) to the firm as 1 > {<)lp^Pf,. 
Proof of Claim 3: From claim 1, the homeowner's effort is a strategic complement 
(substitute) to the firm as > {<)a^ x^. Substitutmg Xh'^], the homeowner's 
equiUbriimi effort is a strategic complement (substitute) to the firm as 
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Vf[pHpc{^h^cCh,'^)-[phPc(^h^(^h^T^)f] > i<)(^hVhPc(^h^(^h^ "f")'' or rearranging terms, 
as \ >{<)2p^Pc- Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
First, consider the partial derivatives of "Sf and Xh'' with respect to tUh where k = S or 





* = r, 
= '^VfP. 
dwu 
dwu M* -p/V.) 
Recall that and BQ^IJ ajj^ ^lxq independent of rnh 
2 1 + ^.1.4^/') 
such that = 0. Therefore, = 0 and = F. > o. 
dvj dm. dm. 
dx^f 
—^ = Vf 
dm. 
and 
Second, consider the partial derivatives of x/^ and Xh^ with respect to toh-
dx^ 
dm. Pc dm. 
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Recall yff c = such that . Substitution implies 
= K PhPc ^i^PhPc) 
tlT. 




> (<)0 as 1 > (<)2p^/0c' froni claim 3, as the homeowner's equilibriimi eflEbrt is a 
strategic conq)lement (substitute) to the firm Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
First consider the kth subgame where k = S or N. The partial derivatives of Xf' and Xh'' 
with respect to ah are 
d x )  d B ,  





{ P f P k ^  P f P k  
a. 2a, 
When k = S, . Substituting and rearrangmg terms, 
da^ 2a, 
dx] Vjps dxl V, 
— -  =  — <  0  a n d  — -  =  —  
dah da^ a^ 
2(p//?s)' -PfPs\>i<)^ as 2/7^/9^ >(<)1. 
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Therefore, from claim 2, —— > (<)0 as the firm's eflFort is a strategic substitute 
(complement) to the homeowner in the SLAPP subgame. 
When k = N, ^ where ^ )—. Substituting and rearranging 
da^ 2a^ 
dx'^ V B ^ 
terms, (<)0 as | >(<) 0, and 
da. au 
{PfpN y - 0 ~ ^) > (<)0 as (p^p^ f - > (<)0 since 1 > ^. 
^ >(<) 0 as {p/)> (<)1 • {Pf/^N f - > (<)1, or from claim 2, 
as the fiirm's equiUbrium eJOTort is a strategic substitute (complement) to the homeowner. 
Now, consider the Citizen suit subgame. The partial derivatives of Si and Xh^ with 
respect to an are 
\ 2 ^  dx^i 
—- = y f  
dau 
P H PC  { P h P c )  
\ 2^/1 a h y 
and 




1 > {<)2pf^Pc-> or claim 3, as the homeowner's equilibriiun efifort is a strategic 
conq)lement (substitute) to the firm. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 7: 
First, note that Xh^ is always positive such that the homeowner's expected payoflFis 
always positive provided she chooses Sue. Therefore, the set of homeowner's types that 
choose Squawk over Sue must also have positive payoffs. This inqihes an interior solution for 
the kth subgame for k = S or N given the homeowner chooses Squawk. Substituting Xf^ and 
Xh'' into the firm's expected payoff fimction for an interior solution where k = S or N yields 
Assume the firm's payoff in the NASH subgame is always strictly greater than the 
firm's payoff in the SLAPP subgame. This inq)lies that 





Maximizing the left-hand side of (Al) with respect to (v)^ j implies that 
1 
< —. Therefore, (Al) can never be satisfied and the firm's payoff in the 
(l + £,{p,(v)')) ^ 
NASH subgame can never dominate the firm's payoff in the SLAPP subgame. Q.E.D. 
Claim 4: Given the firm's updated beliefs in the kth subgame, if 
n =—\\-^\-2p^{m^,a^,T)\ and , then the 
homeowner chooses Squawk when v^<m^<v^, and chooses Sue when 0 < or 
Proof of Claim 4; Given the firm's updated beliefs m the kth subgame, the homeowner's 
expected payoff fi"om choosing Squawk is (l - PjP^, {nr^,. The homeowner's 
expected payoff fi-om choosing Sue is [p^Pc(^hPc{^h») • Therefore, the 
homeowner chooses Squawk (Sue) when 
V h { ^ - > { < W h [ P h P c { ^ h ^ < ^ h ^ ' ^ ) - P c i ^ h ^ a h ^ - ^ y ) -  ( A 2 )  
/ \ \ K/ L OC L 
Substituting p ^ , a ^ , T )  =  and rearranging terms in (A2), the homeowner 
chooses Squawk (Sue) when 
^k{Ph) = -\Ph +^/,-^*(®'/„ah,^)>(<)0- (A3) 
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Notice that (A3) is a quadratic form such that = 0 when 
Ph =l±Vl-2y0^(c7;,,afc,r), A;j'(p^) = 0 when p^ = l,and A/'(ph)<0. Assuming an 
i n d i f f e r e n t  h o m e o w n e r  c h o o s e s  S q u a w k ,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  w h e n  < m , , < v ^ ,  A [ p ^ )  >  0  
and the homeowner prefers Squawk. When or A^{pc) < 0 and the 
homeowner prefers Sue. Finally, each agent's valuation must be positive if an agent is willing 
to enter this game, so ta^>0. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 8: 
Recall that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires two conditions, sequential 
rationaUty and consistent beUefs (behefs updated by Bayes rule where possible). Since the 
play of the game specified in proposition 8 inches that the firm should never witness a 
homeowner choose Squawk, the firm's updated behefs given Squawk have 0 probabihty of 
being on the equilibrium path. This impUes that the firm can not use Bayes rule to update its 
beUefs. In this case, consistency requires that the firm's updated beliefs support the 
equihbrium. Given propositions 1 and 7, claim 4 inq}hes that for Sue to be sequentially 
rational for all homeowner's types A ^ (^p^ (v)) < 0 for all v. Recall fi"om the proof of clann 4 
that A^(p;,) ismaxmiizedwhen p^ = 1. Therefore,if Aj(l)<0 given then 
1 
Ajj(/7^(V)) <0 for allv. From(A3), A^(l)<0 when—. So, if 
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(g7^, Of;,, r) > —, all homeowner's types choose Sue, and from proposition 1, strategically 
commit a level of eflFort Xh^. The firm responds vsdth a level of effort given Xh*^. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 9; 
From claim 4, sequential rationaUty requires that given the firm's updated behefs the 
homeowner chooses Squawk when <v^, and Sue when OKtcTf, <v^ or 
By Bayes rule, the firm's updated behefs are 
0, for < V, 
for v^<m^<v, . (A4) 
1, for V, < m. 









= _ . . • (A8) 
l + t lvaj 
When the SLAPP subgame is played given the homeowner chooses Squawk, equations (A4), 
(A5), (A6) and (A7) determine 4>j(v,r), v^, V5,and y0^(cr^,a^,r) should they exist. 
When the NASH subgame is played given the homeowner chooses Squawk, equations (A4), 
(A5), (A6)and (A8) determine <I>^(v,r), v^, , and p^{m^,af„T) should they exist. 
Since these systems of equations are nonlinear and non-monotonic, a unique equilibrium is not 
guaranteed. 
From proposition 1, if the homeowner chooses Sue, the homeowner strategically 
commits a level of effort xi,'^ and the firm responds by selecting a level of effort Sf. If the 
homeowner chooses Squawk and the kth subgame is played given the homeowner chooses 
Squawk, proposition 1 implies that the firm chooses a level of effort -Xf, and the homeowner 
chooses a level of effort Xh'^. Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX B. RENT DISSIPATION AND EFFICIENCY IN A CONTEST WITH 
ASYMMETRIC VALUATION' 
A paper submitted to Public Choice 
Terrance M. Hurley 
Abstract 
This paper argues that rent dissipation does not measure all the significant benefits and 
costs associated with efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuation. The paper proposes 
an alternative measure of efficiency defined as the expected proportion of the maximum 
obtainable benefit captured by the contest, and demonstrates that this alternative measure of 
efficiency can lead to conclusions that difier significantly firom conclusions drawn using rent 
dissipation. The primary conclusion is that rent dissipation is a potentially biased measure of 
efficiency in contest with asymmetric valuations. 
' I thank Jason Shogren for his patience while reading numerous earlier drafts. I would also 
like to thank Kyung Hwan Baik and Jack Hirshleifer for usefiil comments. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the seminal work by TuUock (1967, 1980), eflficiency in rent-seeking and contest 
models has been primarily judged based on rent dissipation where rent dissipation is defined as 
the total expenditure of resources by all agents in an eflFort to capture a rent or prize. With the 
exception of Ellingsen (1991), I have found no divergence fi-om this trend. In fact, when 
agents value a prize symmetrically, there seems to be little rational to deviate firom this 
standard. However, when the assun^tion of symmetric valuation is relaxed as in Hillman and 
Riley (1989), Hirshleifer (1989), Suen (1989), Ellingsen (1991), Baik (1994) and Baik and 
Shogren (1994), rent dissipation is a potentially biased measiu'e of eflficiency. 
This paper argues that when agents have asymmetric valuations eflficiency may 
increase even when rent dissipation increases. The paper also shows that the change in rent 
dissipation due to a change in the contest environment generally provides a biased estimate of 
the change in efficiency. The logic behind this coimter intuitive result is based on the 
supposition that eflficiency is based on the expected net value of the contest.^ Given this 
supposition, eflficiency increases as the probability of success of the agent with highest 
valuation of the prize increases holding all other factors constant. If an increase in the 
expected benefit of the agent with the highest valuation exceeds the increased cost of eflFort, 
eflficiency increases. 
^While the distribution of costs and benefits across agents is crucial to social welfare, it is conunon in the rent seeking 
literature to separate questions regarding efficiency fi'om distribution by assuming all costs and benefits can be fi-eely 
redistributed to all members of society. 
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n. Rent Dissipation and Contest Efficiency Defined 
Consider an N-agent contest where each agent i expends an observable, irreversible 
level of e£fort Xi to increase the probability that she wdns a prize.^ The cost of the ith agent's 
effort is Ci(xi). Assiune that cost functions posses the standard positive, non-decreasing 
marginal cost, Ci'(xi) > 0, and Ci"(xi) ^ 0. The ith agent's probabihty of winning the contest 
given aU agents' investments in effort isP'(xi,...,Xi,...,XN) where 0 < < 1 
N 
and P' (x,,..., X,,...,) = 1. Assume the ith agent's effort mcreases her probabihty of (=1 
winning at a decreasmg rate, (x,)> 0 and P,', ) < 0, 
in^lying P'(xi,...,Xi,...,XN) is twice continuously differentiable.'* If the ith agent wins the 
contest, the value of prize commensurate in con^arable units is Gj. All agents are assumed to 
have common knowledge about the con^lete specification of the game. 




As R increases, the total cost of resources expended contesting the prize increases. This has 
traditionally been interpreted as a decrease in efficiency. 
^ The contest I consider is a slightly more general, but similar to Baik (1994). 
While 1 am considering imperfectly discriminating contest in this model, the arguments presented here can be 
extended to a perfectly discriminating contest vt^ere the contest success function is discontinuous. 
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Consider an alternative measure of efficiency defined as the expected proportion of the 
maximum obtainable benefit captured by the contest. The cost of the contest is the total cost 
of ejBFort expended by all agents, rent dissipation. The benefit of the contest is the value of the 
prize to the winner of the contest. Given the N agents' investments in eflFort, the expected 
N 
benefit of the contest is ^ P' (Xj,.,., x,,..., )G,. The maximimi obtainable benefit of the 
contest is the maximimi valuation of the prize. This can occur only if all agents agree to allow 
the agent with the highest valuation to claim the prize without expending any effort. This 
result might take place if the distribution mechanism was a competitive market, or second bid 
Vickery auction as opposed to a contest. Therefore, contest efficiency can be written as the 
net expected benefit of the contest, the expected benefit minus rent dissipation, divided by the 
maximum valuation, 
CE = . (B2) 
Max{G„...,G„...,G,) 
The maxnnum value of CE is 1 if P'(x,,...,x,,...,x^) = 1 for the agent with the highest 
N 
valuation and 2] C, (x,) = 0. There is no similar natural lower bound on CE. As CE 
/=i  
increases and approaches 1, the contest is capturing a larger expected net benefit and is 
considered more efficient. 




CE = = 1- —. (B3) 
G G 
In this case, rent dissipation is inversely related to contest efficiency, and the two measures are 
essentially equivalent.^ 
m. Rent Dissipation Vs. Contest EfHciency 
It is common in the hterature for efficiency comparisons to be made between 
alternative institutional structures. One common comparison is between a Coumot-Na&h 
simultaneous move contest and a Stackelberg leadership contest as in Dixit (1987) and Baik 
and Shogren (1992). Another comparison, Baik and Shogren (1994), considers efficiency 
across contest with alternative player reimbiu'sement schemes. This research is important 
because it provides insights into what types of poUcies may increase the efficiency of a 
contest. This section argues that rent dissipation and contest efficiency may lead to different 
conclusions regarding which institutions are more efficient when agents have asymmetric 
valuations. Contest efficiency provides a better measure of efficiency because it captures all 
relevant costs and benefits of a contest. 
As a motivating example, consider a contest under two ahemative institutional 
structures. The first institutional structure is such that each agent pays the full amount of her 
effort. The second institutional structure is such that the agent with the lower valuation must 
' This equivalency holds as long as we do not consider the relationship between efBciency and G vv4ien talking about 
equilibrium behavior such that rent dissipation is a function of G. This will become more apparent in my discussion 
below. 
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reimburse a portion of her opponent's effort given her opponent wins the contest [see Baik 
and Shogren (1994)]. Without loss of generality, assume the agent with the highest valuation 
X  O "  X  is agent 1. Also assume Gi = 400, Ga = 100, P\x^,x2) = , P^{x^,x^) = — 
x ^ + a x ^  X ,  + £ 7 X 2  
and C, (x,) = X, where a is an ability parameter as defined in Baik (1994) and is assumed to 
be 0.5. Following Baik and Shogren (1994), the proportion of agent I's effort that agent 2 
must reimbiu-se given agent 1 wins the contest is p. Under the first institution, let P = 0. In 
this case, agent 1 and 2's equilibrium efforts are 39.506 and 9.877 which inq)ly rent 
dissipation is 49.383 and contest efficiency is 72.7%. Under the second institution assume P = 
0.5. Now agent 1 and 2's equilibrium efforts are 54.563 and 8.729 which imply rent 
dissipation is 63.292 and contest efficiency is 73.8%. Notice that rent dissipation suggest that 
the first institution is more efficient than the second institution because rent dissipation is 
lower, 49.383 < 63.292, while contest efficiency suggest the second institution is more 
efficient than the first institution, 73.8% > 72.7%. Therefore, which institution leads to a 
more efficient contest? 
The second institution leads to a more efficient contest because, while both contest 
efficiency and rent dissipation take into account the additional cost of effort, only contest 
efficiency takes into accoimt how this additional effort influences the probability of success of 
the agent with the highest valuation. Therefore, the increase in the probabihty of success of 
agent 1 due to an increase in her effort is a benefit, and in this case, is enough of a benefit to 
outweigh the additional rent dissipated. The second institution is more efficient because it 
leads to the capture of a higher expected net benefit than the first institution. 
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Consider two alternative equilibrium levels of efifort, (XI',...,XN') and (XI",...,XN")-
Assume that the difference in rent dissipation between (XI',...,XN') and (XI",...,XN") is positive 
such that 
AR='Z{Cj ( X j ' ) - C j ( X j " ) ) > 0 .  (B4) 
The difference in contest eflBciency between (XI',...,XN') and (XI",...,XN") is 
ACE = ^ . (B5) 
Max(G„...,G^) 
The numerator of (B5) represents the difference in the expected net benefit of the two 
alternative equilibria. The first term in the numerator of (B5) represents the difference in the 
expected benefits of the two alternative equilibria, while the second term represents the 
difference in rent dissipation. 
N 
I f  2 ] ( p - ' ( x / , . . . , > M ,  t h e n  ACE>0. While rent j=i 
dissipation inqilies that the second equilibriimi is more efficient, contest eflOiciency implies that 
the first equilibriiun is more eflficient. This result is summarized in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: Given two alternative equilibrium levels of effort, contest eflBciency is greater 
for the equilibriimi with the higher rent dissipation when the difference in the ejq)ected benefit 
of the altemative equilibria is greater than the difference in rent dissipation. 
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Proposition 1 implies that even if more resources are spent in a contest, eflSciency may 
be higher if the increased resource expenditures lead to increases probabihties that agents with 
higher valuations win the contest. The crux of the argument is that when valuations are 
asymmetric society has a stake in who wins the contest. While increases in resource 
expenditmes tend to reduce the value of a contest to society, if these increased expenditiu'es 
improve the odds that a more desirable state occiu-s, then the benefit of the expenditures may 
exceed the cost and increase efficiency. 
IV. Rent Dissipation, Contest Efficiency, and Comparative Statics 
Section m established that for identical contest success functions and benefits, rent 
dissipation and contest efficiency can provide different conclusions regarding efficiency when 
considering alternative equilibria. This section considers the difference between rent 
dissipation and contest efficiency when evaluating comparative static effects, and 
demonstrates that even when both measures lead to the same conclusion rent dissipation is a 
biased measure of the change in contest efficiency. 
Assume N = 2, Gi = aG and G2 = G. In this case, a scales agent I's valuation relative 
to agent 2's valuation without loss of generaUty. Contest efficiency is then defined as 
_ ^(^1 > ^2 ^ ~ ^2 ))^ ~ Q (^1) ~ ^2 (^2) (^l\ 
Max{a,\)G 
If a >(<) 1, then agent 1 's valuation exceeds (is less than) agent 2's valuation and the 
denommator of CE is aG (G). 
148 
As an exan^le, consider the relationships between agents' relative valuations, rent 




— Cj Xj + Cj x~ , (B8) 
dx dx 
where x, = —^ and = —-. The partial derivative of contest efficiency with respect to 
da ° da 
a IS 
dCE 
dn, dn. n ^  n ^ 
— + — ^ ^ 2  + - ^  « G x ,  -  P G x ,  
dx, dx^ -
da Max(a,l)G (B9) 
Max{a, iyG 
where P aG-Cj' ,^^ = -P G-C' , and 
dx, " dx^ "  '  
A = P(Xi,X2)aG + (l-P(x,,X2))G-C,(x,)-C2(x2). 
The interpretation of (B8) is straight forward and represents the change in rent 
dissipation due to an increase in agent I's relative valuation. If both agents' equilibrium 
efforts increase (decrease), then rent dissipation unambiguously increases (decreases). If one 
agent's effort increases while the other agent's effort decreases, then rent dissipation may 
increase or decrease depending on each agent's marginal cost of effort and the magnitude of 
each agent's equilibrium change in effort. 
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The right-hand-side of (B9) is grouped into two categories. The first e:iq)ression in 
brackets represents the indirect effect of a change in a, while the second expression in curly 
brackets represents the direct effect of a change in a. The mdirect effect measures the change 
in the net expected benefit due to the change in the equilibrium levels of effort associated with 
an increase in a. The direct effect measures the change in the expected net benefit and the 
maximum obtainable benefit directly associated with an increase in a. 
The indirect effect in the first ejqiression on the right-hand-side of (B9) can be broken 
down into indirect-own (10) effect and indirect-cross (IC) effect. As agents alter their 
equilibrium levels of effort, this change influences an agent's own expected benefit and cost of 
the contest. The first and second terms in brackets capture this lO effect for agent 1 and 
agent 2. As an agent alters her equihbriimi level of effort, this not only affects her own 
expected benefit and cost, but it also affects her opponent's e>q)ected benefit by reducing the 
probability of success of her opponent. The third and fourth terms in the square brackets 
capture the IC effect. The third terra in square brackets represents the marginal decrease in 
agent I's e)q)ected payoff due to an increase in agent 2's equilibrium level of effort, while the 
fourth term in square brackets represents the marginal decrease in agent 2's expected payoff 
due to an increase in agent 1 's equilibrium level of effort. 
The first term in curly brackets on the right-hand-side of (B9) represents the direct 
effect of a change in a on the expected net benefit (NB) of the contest, while the second term 
in ciuly brackets represents the direct effect of a change in a on the maxnnum obtainable 
benefit (MOB). Therefore, the net direct effect (ND) is equal to NB effect minus the MOB 
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eflFect, ND = NB - MOB. The MOB effect is subtracted from the NB effect because we are 
considering a change in the ratio. As a increases holding equilibrium levels of effort constant, 
the NB effect increases because the value of agent 1 's prize increases. As a increases the 
MOB effect is non-decreasing. If a < 1, then = 0. The only direct effect is due 
to an increase m the NB effect which tends to increase efSciency as a increases. If a > 1, then 
^Max(a,l)  ,  ^ /v> .  . .  ,  • X ,  
= 1. In this case, the ND effect is positive (negative) as the percentage change m 
aa 
the NB effect is greater (less) than the percentage change in the MOB effect, 
<?A ^Max{a,l) 
da , . da 
> (<) . 
A Max{a,\) 
Consider a contest where both agents choose their equilibrium levels of eflFort 
sunultaneously. In this case, agent I's and agent 2's expected payoffs are 
71 ^ = P(x^,x^)aG~ Ci(x;,) and = (l~ (x^). The first-order conditions 
^ 7Z ^ 7C for agents 1 and 2 are —^ = P,aG- C.'= 0 , and —^ = -P, G - C, '= 0 . Assuming the 
equilibrium exists and is an interior solution, the equihbrium levels of effort satisfy both first-
order conditions.® 
Consider how an increase in a influences contest ef&ciency in this Coumot-Nash 
contest. Substitutmg the first-order conditions into (9) yields 







Ma*(a,l)G Mrc(a,l)^G (BIO) 
while the same substitution into (B8) has no effect on the change in rent dissipation. This 
substitution allows us to eliminate the 10 effect in (BIO), and to transform the IC effect in the 
first term on the right-hand-side of (BIO) such that it resembles the change in rent dissipation 
in (B8). 
Rewriting equation (BIO) as 
' dR 
dCE da ^ 1  + ( l  a ) C 2 ' A f 2 „  
da Max{a,\)G Max(a,l)G (Bll) 
+ -
Max(a,l)^G 
suggest two sources of bias. The first term on the right-hand-side of (B11) is the change in 
contest efl&ciency due to a change in rent dissipation. The second term is the first source of 
bias and is associated with the IC effect. The third term is the second source of bias and is 
associated with the ND effect. 
The direction of the IC effect bias depends on the relative size of the agents' marginal 
costs, valuations and changes in equiUbrium level of effort. When a <(>) 1, increases in agent 
I's equihbrium level effort lead to a negative (positive) bias, while increases in agent 2's 
equihbrium level of effort lead to positive (negative) bias. When a = 1, the IC effect bias is 0. 
The larger the magnitude of an agent's marginal cost or change in equihbrium effort, the 
greater the IC effect bias associated with that agent's increase in equihbrium effort. 
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The direction of the ND effect bias depends on the change in the net benefit and the 
maximum obtainable benefit directly associated with an increase in a. If a < 1, the maximum 
obtainable benefit does not change and the ND eflFect bias is positive. If a > 1, then the ND 
effect bias is positive (negative) as the percentage change in the NB effect is greater (less) 
than the percentage change in the MOB effect. This result is summarized in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: The change in rent dissipation due to a change in agent I's relative valuation 
is a biased measure of the change in contest efSciency in a Coumot-Nash simultaneous move 
contest. 
While the net bias is theoretically indeterminate in the general model presented above, 
once more structure is assumed, the direction of bias is straightforward to measure. Are the 
biases significant enough m more common specifications of the model to warrant a change to 
the more complex measure of efficiency? Figure B1 provides the answer for a commonly 
X  
used specification of a contest where /'(x,, Xj) = — and C, (x,) = x^ for i = 1,2. 
X, +X2 
Assuming G = 1, let a vary fi-om 0 to 3. 
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As a increases from arbitrarily close to 0 to 1, the ND ejSect bias increases from 
approximately 0 to 0.5. The strong positive bias as a approaches 1 is due to the increase in 
the net benefit directly associated with the increase in a. Once a becomes arbitrarily greater 
than 1, the MOB efifect bias becomes negative and offsets the NB effect bias. This leads to 
the discontinuous drop in the ND effect bias which approaches 0 as a approaches 1 from 
above. As a increases from arbitrarily close to 1 to 3, the positive NB effect bias is greater 
than the negative MOB effect bias. This leads to a positive ND effect bias over this range. 
As a increases from arbitrarily close to 0 to 3, the IC effect bias increases at a 
Bias 
Net bias 
IC effect bias 
0.5 
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' ' • ' ' I ' 
2 
' ' ' I ' ' 
2.5 3 
Figure Bl: Net bias, IC effect bias and ND bias given Player I's benefit 
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decreasing rate, and eventually begins to decrease. The IC effect bias is negative up to a = 1. 
At a = 1, the IC ejBFect bias is 0. For a > 1, the IC eflFect bias is positive. When a < 1, rent 
dissipation does not account for the additional cost that an increase in agent I's equiUbrium 
level of effort imposes by reducing the probabihty that agent 2, the agent with the highest 
valuation, wins the contest. This causes the IC effect bias to be negative. When a = 1, the 
change in rent dissipation is equivalent to the change in the IC effect bias because both agents 
have the same valuation. Therefore, the indirect change in probabilities associated with the 
change in agents' equiUbrium levels of effort has no effect on the benefit of the contest. When 
a > 1, rent dissipation does not account for the additional benefit that an increase in agent I's 
equiUbrium level of effort in^oses by reducing the probabiUty that agent 2, the agent with the 
lowest valuation, wins the contest. This causes the IC effect bias to be positive. 
The Net bias is increasing for 0 < a < 1. The Net bias becomes 0 around a = 0.5 as 
the positive ND effect bias exactly offsets the negative IC effect bias. At a = 1, the Net bias 
discontinuously jumps and approaches 0 as a approaches 1 from above. For 1 < a < 3, the 
Net bias is positive since both the ND and IC effect biases are positive. In this range the Net 
bias is at first increasing, but then begins to decrease as both the ND and IC effect biases start 
to decrease. 
In Figure B1, the Net bias is 0 at only one point in the range. Given the bias does not 
generaUy disappear, is the Net bias significant enough for rent dissipation and contest 
efficiency to yield contradictory results? The answer is provided in Figure B2 which suggest 
contradictory results may exist. 
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In both regions I and 11, as agents' valuations diverge (as a approaches 0 in region I, 
and as a approaches 3 in region 11), contest efiBciency is at first decreasing, but then increases. 
However, as agents' valuations become more diverse, rent dissipation is decreasing in region I 
and increasing in region n. As a is close to 1 and decreases in region I, rent dissipation 
indicates that efficiency is increasing, while contest efficiency indicates that efficiency is 
decreasing. This contradictory result is attributable to the large positive ND effect bias as a 
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Figure B2: Rent dissipation and Contest efficiency given Player I's benefit 
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indicates that efficiency is decreasing, while contest efficiency indicates that efficiency is 
increasing. This contradictory result is attributable to a combination of the positive ND and 
IC effect biases. Therefore, even with one of the simplest forms of a contest model with 
asymmetric valuation, the bias associated with the rent dissipation as a measure of contest 
efficiency can be significant. 
V. Conclusions 
The primary purpose of this paper is to propose an alternative measure of efficiency in 
a contest with asymmetric valuation. Contest efficiency is defined as the proportion of the 
maximimi obtainable benefit captured by a contest, and is argued to be a better measure of 
efficiency than rent dissipation because contest efficiency accounts for the influence of effort 
on the probability that the agents with the higher valuations win the contest. The two 
measures can provide significantly different results whether comparing two altemative 
equilibria or con:q)arative static changes in the proportion of one agent's benefit relative to her 
opponent assuming Coumot-Nash behavior. 
While the bias of rent dissipation as a measure of contest efficiency is only considered 
for a change in the relative valuation, the extension to altemative exogenous parameters that 
might be incorporated into the model, such as ability parameters, is straight forward, and does 
not significantly alter the results. Also, the analysis is confined to Coumot-Nash behavior for 
this presentation, but the extensions to Stackelberg type equilibria are straight forward and 
lead to similar if not more striking conclusions. Hillman and Riley (1989) present a model 
with transfers such that the success of one agent comes at a cost to all other agents. This is 
easily incoiporated into contest efficiency by redefining the maximum obtainable benefit as the 
157 
maximum net value of the contest. While the analysis here does not expUcitly investigate 
perfectly discriminating contest success functions, the sources of bias remain in mixed strategy 
equilibria where there is always a positive probabiUty that an agent with a lower valuation 
wins the contest. 
Admittedly, contest efficiency is generally a more complex and less tractable measure 
of efficiency. However, rent dissipation fails to account for a mmiber of costs and benefits 
captured by contest efficiency. These costs and benefits can significantly alter the conclusions 
that are drawn. However, if one can determine that the direct and indirect-cross effects are 
small or nonexistent, then the change in rent dissipation may be a reasonable measure of 
efficiency. Which measure is used must be judged within the context of any given model, and 
should atteiiq)t to account for all significant costs and benefits. 
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APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTION , EXAMPLE ROUND STRATEGY 
SHEETS, EXAMPLE ROUND EARNINGS SHEETS, AND FIGURES 1 AND 2 
Instructions and Example Round Strategy and Earnings Sheets for Sessions 2 and 3 
This is an experiment in group decision making that should take between 2 and 2 1/2 hoius to 
con:q)lete. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for your participation in cash. 
Different subjects may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on yom* 
decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. You will find it helpful to 
refer to Figures 1 and 2, your Strategy Sheets, yoiu* Example Round Strategy Sheet and 
yoiu- Example Round Earnings Sheet as you read these instructions. After you read these 
instructions, please conq)lete the quiz. When all subjects have completed the quiz, the answers 
will be read out loud and any questions will be answered. Please do not talk to or try to 
communicate with any other participants during this experiment. If you have a 
question during the experiment, please raise your hand and an experimenter will help 
you. If you fail to follow these instructions, you will be asked to leave and forfeit any 
moneys earned. 
1. AN OVERVIEW; During the experiment, you participate in five rowds. In each 
round, you play five games against randomly selected players. In each game, you 
receive tokens based on the decisions that you and the randomly selected player make. 
The first round is a practice roimd to help you learn the game. In the final four 
rounds, each token you earn is worth $0.01. You will also earn up to $1.00 a roimd 
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for correctly anticipating the randomly selected players' responses, and a $10.00 
participation fee. 
THE PLAYERS; There are Meen players randomly assigned to one of three types. 
Your type is shown at the top your Strategy Sheets. 
a) There are five Al-type players, which are referred to as Als. 
b) There are five A2-type players, which are referred to as A2s. 
c) There are five B-type players, which are referred to as Bs. 
THE GAME (Figures 1 and 2 provide a visual summary of the game): 
a) Player Matches for each game; 
i) A1 plays a B. 
ii) A2 plays a B. 
ill) B plays an A1 and an A2 at the same time. 
b) Payoffs (in tokens): 
i) Ar s payoffs are the first numbers in parentheses in Figure 1. 
ii) A2's payoffs are the first numbers in parentheses in Figure 2. 
iii) B's payoffs are the second niunbers in parentheses in Figures 1 and 2. 
c) Game Play: A1 and A2 may choose R or L. If A1 and/or A2 choose R, B may 
choose U, M or D. 
i) When A1 chooses L, A1 earns 60 and B earns 45. 
ii) When A2 chooses L, A2 earns 105 and B earns 50. 
iii) When A1 chooses R, and 
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a) B chooses U, A1 earns 100 and B earns 50. 
b) B chooses M, A1 earns 50 and B earns 40. 
c) B chooses D, A1 earns 0 and B earns 10. 
iv) When A2 chooses R, and 
a) B chooses U, A2 earns 100 and B earns 0. 
b) B chooses M, A2 earns 50 and B earns 30. 
c) B chooses D, A2 earns 0 and B earns 40. 
4. THE EXPERIMENT PROCEEDS AS FOLLOWS; 
a) There are five rounds in the experiment. The first round, Round 1, is a 
practice round. 
b) Round Play; 
i) A round consists of five games. 
ii) Before each round you will complete a two part Strategy Sheet. 
a) Part I asks you to anticipate how the randomly selected players 
will play the five games. For example, on yoiu" Example 
Strategy Sheet, 
3 is circled in (i), 
5 is circled in (ii), 
1 is circled m (iii) and 
4 is circled in (iv). 
This impUes that you think 3 of the randomly selected Als will 
choose R, and 2 will choose L. 
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You think 5 of the randomly selected A2s will choose R and 
none will choose L. 
You think 1 of the randomly selected Bs will choose U, 4 will 
choose M and none will choose D. 
Each time you respond correctly, you earn $0.25. 
Part n asks you to indicate how you will play each of the five 
games. 
(1) If you are an A1 or A2, you must choose between R or 
L for each of the five games. You can pick either R or 
L for all five games, or any combination of R and L. 
For exanq)le, on your Example Strategy Sheet, 
R is circled for Game 1, 
R is circled for Game 2, 
L is circled for Game 3, 
L is circled for Game 4 and 
R is circled for Game 5. 
This inches that you choose to play R for games 1, 2 
and S, and L for games 3, and 4. 
(2) If you are a B, you must choose how you will play each 
game provided A1 and /or A2 choose K You can pick 
either U, M or D for all five games, or any combination 
of U, M and D. For exanq)le, on your Example 
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Strategy Sheet, 
U is circled for Game 1, 
D is circled for Game 2, 
M is circled for Game 3, 
U is circled for Game 4 and 
D is circled for Game 5. 
This iiiq)lies that if A1 and/or A2 choose R you choose 
to play U for games 1 and 4, M for game 3, and D for 
games 2 and 5. 
Once everyone has conq)leted their Strategy Sheets, the sheets are 
collected, and the match-ups are determined. 
a) For each game a different B is randomly selected and his or her 
choice is recorded on the Als' and A2s' Round Earnings 
Sheet. For exan^le, if you are an A1 or A2 and 
the first (randomly selected) B chose U, 
the second (randomly selected) B chose M, 
the third (randomly selected) B chose M, 
the fourth (randomly selected) B chose D and 
the fifUi (randomly selected) B chose D, 
then, on your Example Round Earnings Sheet, 
U is circled for Game 1, 
M is circled for Game 2, 
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M is circled for Game 3, 
D is circled for Game 4 and 
D is circled for Game 5. 
For each game a dijSerent A1 is randomly selected and his or 
her choice is recorded on the Bs' Round Earnings Sheet. For 
exanq)le, if you are a B and 
the first (randomly selected) A1 chose R, 
the second (randomly selected) A1 chose R, 
the third (randomly selected) A1 chose R, 
the fourth (randomly selected) A1 chose L and 
the fifth (randomly selected) A1 chose L, 
then, on your Example Round Earnings Sheet, 
R is circled for Game 1, 
R is circled for Game 2, 
R is circled for Game 3, 
L is circled for Game 4 and 
L is circled for Game 5. 
For each game a different A2 is randomly selected and his or 
her choice is recorded on the Bs' Round Earnings Sheet. For 
example, if you are a B and 
the first (randomly selected) A2 chose L, 
the second (randomly selected) A2 chose R, 
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the third (randomly selected) A2 chose R, 
the fourth (randomly selected) A2 chose R and 
the fifth (randomly selected) A2 chose L, 
then, on yoiir Example Round Earnings Sheet, 
L is circled for Game 1, 
R is circled for Game 2, 
R is circled for Game 3, 
R is circled for Game 4 and 
L is circled for Game 5. 
iv) After the match-ups are determined, the results are recorded and 
returned to you on your Round Earnings Sheet. Please carefully 
review this sheet before completing your next Strategy Sheet. 
Yoiu* total earnings for a roimd is recorded at the bottom of your Round 
Earnings Sheet. For exartq)le, if you are an Al, A2 or B you would have 
earned $3.20, $4.10, or $4.10 for the example roimd. 
i) You earn $0.25 each time you correctly anticipate the randomly 
selected players' responses. For example, on your Example Round 
Earnings Sheet, you would have earned a total of $0.50. 
$0.25 for correctly anticipating the niunber of Als who 
chose R. 
$0.00 for incorrectly anticipating the niunber of A2s who 
chose R. 
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$0.25 for correctly anticipating the number of Bs who 
chose U. 
$0.00 for incorrectly anticipating the niunber of Bs who 
chose M. 
11) In roimds 2 through 5, you also receive $0.01 for each token you earn 
in the five games. For exan^le, if you are an Al, A2 or B player you 
would multiply 270, 360 or 360 by $0.01 to determine your earnings 
for the five games in the example round. 
5. After the fifth roimd is conq)leted, please wait for fiirther instructions. 
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QUIZ 
If Al chooses L, and A2 chooses L, 
a) what is Al's payoff? 
b) what is A2's payoff? 
c) what is B's payoff"from playing Al? 
d) what is B's payoff"from playing A2? 
e) what is B's total payoff? 
If Al chooses R, A2 chooses L, and B chooses D, 
a) what is Al's payoff? 
b) what is A2's payoff? 
c) what is B's payoff"from playing A1? 
d) what is B's payoff"from playing A2? 
e) what is B's total payoff? 
If 2 of the randomly selected Als choose R and 3 choose L, how much would you 
have earned if you had circled 4 in Part I (i) of your Strategy Sheet? 
If 5 of the randomly selected A2s choose R and none choose L, how much would you 
have earned if you had circled 5 in Part I (ii) of your Strategy Sheet? 
If 4 of the randomly selected Bs choose U, none choose M and 1 chooses D, how 
much would you have earned if you had circled 4 in Part I (iii) and 0 in Part I (iv) of 
your Strategy Sheet? 
What would your total earnings have been for correctly anticipating the other players' 
responses in questions 3, 4 and 5? 
How much money do you earn for a token 
a) in Round 1? 
b) in Roimds 2, 3, 4 and 5? 
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Al-type player 
Example Round Strategy Sheet 
Part I: Please indicate how you anticipate the other players will play the five games by 
conq)leting the statements below. Con^lete statements (i) through (iv) by 
circling the appropriate nimibers. Please circle only one number. You earn 
$0.25 for each correct response. 
(i) I think the (randomly selected) Als will choose Rin[0 1 2 (^4 5] of the 
five games. 
(ii) I think the (randomly selected) A2s will choose Rin[0 1 2 3 4(^]ofthe 
five games. 
(iii) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose Uin[0(p 2 3 4 5] of the five 
games. 
(iv) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose M in [ 0 1 2 3 5 ] of the 
five games. Note that the sum of your responses in statements 3 and 4 should not 
exceed 5. 
Part II; Please mdicate how you will play each of the five games in this round by 
circling the appropriate letter below. Please circle only one letter for each 
game. 
1) For Game 1,1 choose 
2) For Game 2,1 choose 
3) For Game 3,1 choose 
4) For Game 4,1 choose 
5) For Game 5,1 choose 
A1-type player 
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Example Round Earnings Sheet 
Game Results 
Game B's Choices Your Choices Your Payoflf 
1 (y) M D ® L 100 
2 U D ® L 50 
3 U (5^ D R & 60 
4 U M (P R © 60 
5 U M (g) 0 L 0 
Yom earnings for the five games; 270 
Earnings from Correctly Anticipating Players' Responses 
(i) Number of times you thought the Als 
w o u l d  c h o o s e  R ;  0  1 2 ^ 4 5  
Number of times the Als actually 
chose R; 0 1 2 ^ 4 5 
<^0.2^ 
$0.00 
(ii) Number of times you thought the A2s 
would choose R: 0 1 2 3 4 
Niunber of times the A2s actually 
chose R:0 1 2 @ 4 5 
$0.25 
(iii) Number of times you thought the Bs 
would choose U: 0 0 2 3 4 5 
Number of times the Bs actually 
chose U: 0 0 2 3 4 5 
($0.2p 
$0.00 
(iv) Number of times you thought the Bs 
would choose M: 0 12 3 5 
Nimiber of times the Bs actually 
chose M: 0 1 (2) 3 4 5 
$0.25 
(Jo^ 
Total Earnings: $0.50 
Total Earnings for the Round: 270 X $0.01 + $0.50 = $3.20 
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A2-type player 
Example Round Strategy Sheet 
Part I: Please indicate how you anticipate the other players will play the five games by 
completing the statements below. Conqilete statements (i) through (iv) by 
circling the appropriate numbers. Please circle only one number. You earn 
S0.25 for each correct response. 
(i) I think the (randomly selected) Als will choose Rin[0 1 2(3)4 5] of the 
five games. 
(ii) I think the (randomly selected) A2s will choose Rin[0 1 2 3 4 (^] of the 
five games. 
(iii) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose U in [ 0 (T) 2 3 4 5 ] of the five 
games. 
(iv) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose Min[0 1 2 3 (^5] of the 
five games. Note that the sum of your responses in statements 3 and 4 should not 
exceed 5. 
Part n: Please indicate how you will play each of the five games in this round by 
circling the appropriate letter below. Please circle only one letter for each 
game. 
1) For Game 1,1 choose 
2) For Game 2,1 choose 
3) For Game 3,1 choose 
4) For Game 4,1 choose 








Example Round Earnings Sheet 
Game Results 
Game B's Choices Your Choices YourPayoflF 
1 y M D ® L 100 
2 U D ® L 50 
3 U ^ D R © 105 
4 U M (B) R (I) 105 
5 U M ® ® L 0 
Your earnings for the five games; 360 
Earnings from Correctly Anticipating Players' Responses 
(i) Number of times you thought the A Is 
would choose R; 0 1 2 (p 4 5 
Number of times the Als actually 
c h o s e  R : 0  1  2  @  4  5  
($0.2^ 
$0.00 
(ii) Number of times you thought the A2s 
would choose R: 0 1 2 3 4 
Number of times the A2s actually 
c h o s e  R : 0  1  2  ®  4  5  
$0.25 
(joOQ) 
(iii) Number of times you thought the Bs 
would choose U: 0 2 3 4 5 
Number of times the Bs actually 
chose U: 0 (T) 2 3 4 5 
C$0.25> 
$0.00 
(iv) Number of times you thought the Bs 
would choose M: 0 1 2 3 Q) 5 
Number of times the Bs actually 
chose M: 0 1 © 3 4 5 
$0.25 
(|o!^  
Total Earnings: $0.50 
Total Earnings for the Round: 360 X$0.01+ $0.50 = $4.10 
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B-type player 
Example Round Strategy Sheet 
Part I: Please indicate how you anticipate the other players will play the five games by 
completing the statements below. Complete statements (i) through (iv) by 
circUng the appropriate niunbers. Please circle only one number. You earn 
$0.25 for each correct response. 
(iii) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose U in [ 0 Q) 2 3 4 5 ] of the five 
games. 
(iv) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose M in [ 0 1 2 3 5 ] of the 
five games. Note that the sum of your responses in statements 3 and 4 should not 
exceed 5. 
Part n: Please indicate how you will play each of the five games in this round by 
circUng the appropriate letter below. Please circle only one letter for each 
(i) I think the (randomly selected) Als will choose R in [ 0 1 
five games. 
(ii) I think the (randomly selected) A2s will choose R in [ 0 1 2 3 
five games. 
5 ] of the 
game. 
1) For Game 1, if A1 and/or A2 choose R, I choose 
2) For Game 2, if A1 and/or A2 choose R, I choose 
3) For Game 3, if A1 and/or A2 choose R, I choose 
4) For Game 4, if A1 and/or A2 choose R, I choose 








Example Round Earnings Sheet 
Game Results 






1 ® L R (i; (5i) M D 50 50 100 
2 (R) L ® L U M (g) 10 40 50 
3 ® L (fe) L U ^ D 40 30 70 
4 R (g ® L 5J) M D 45 0 45 
5 R ® R 0 U M ^ 45 50 95 
Your earnings for the ive games: 360 
Earnings from Correctly Anticipating Players' Responses 
(i) Number of times you thought the Als 
would choose R: 0 1 2 4 5 
Number of times the Als actually 
c h o s e  R : 0  1  2  4  5  $0.00 
(ii) Number of times you thought the A2s 
would choose R: 0 1 2 3 4 
Number of times the A2s actually 
c h o s e  R : 0  1  2  @  4  5  
$0.25 
($0^ 
(iii) Number of times you thought the Bs 
would choose U: 0 (p 2 3 4 5 
Number of times the Bs actually 
chose U; 0 ® 2 3 4 5 
($0^5) 
$0.00 
(iv) Number of times you thought the Bs 
would choose M: 0 12 3 5 
Number of times the Bs actually 
chose M: 0 1 3 4 5 
$0.25 
Total Earnings: $0.50 
Total Earnings for the Round: 360 X$0.01+ $0.50 = $4.10 
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Instructions and Example Round Strategy and Earnings Sheets for Session 4 
This is an experiment in group decision making that should take about 2 hours to conqilete. 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for your participation in cash. Different 
subjects may earn different amounts. What you eam depends partly on yoiu" decisions, partly 
on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. You will find it helpfiil to refer to Figures 1 
and 2, your Practice Round Strategy Sheet, your Example Round Strategy Sheet and 
your Example Round Earnings Sheet as you read these instructions. After you read these 
instructions, please conqjlete the quiz. When all participants have conq)leted the quiz, the 
answers will be read out loud and any questions will be answered. Please do not talk to or 
try to communicate with any other participants during this experiment. If you have a 
question during the experiment, please raise your hand and an experimenter will help 
you. If you fail to follow these instructions, you will be asked to leave and forfeit any 
moneys earned. 
1. AN OVERVIEW: During the experiment, you participate in two to five roimds. In 
each roimd, you play four games against randomly selected players. In each game, 
you receive tokens based on the decisions that you and the randomly selected player 
make. The first round is a practice round to help you leam the game. After the first 
roimd, you will participate in a smgle elimination tournament. You advance in the 
tournament by earning more tokens than a randomly selected participant. If you are 
eliminated in the first roimd, you are paid $0.01 for each token you eam in the first 
round of the toumament. If you are eliminated in the second round, you are paid 
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$0.05 for each token you earn in the second round of the tournament. If you are 
eliminated in the third rotmd, you are paid $0.10 for each token you earn in the third 
roimd of the tournament. If you advance to the fourth roimd, you are paid $0.25 for 
each token you earn in the fourth rotmd of the toiunament. All players also receive a 
$5.00 participation fee. 
2. THE PLAYERS; There are twenty-four players randomly assigned to one of three 
types. Your type is shown at the top your Practice Round Strategy Sheet. 
a) There are eight Al-type players, which are referred to as Als. 
b) There are eight A2-type players, which are referred to as A2s. 
c) There are eight B-type players, which are referred to as Bs. 
3. THE GAME (Figures 1 and 2 provide a visual summaiy of the game); 
a) Player Matches for each game; 
i) A1 plays a B. 
ii) A2 plays a B. 
ill) B plays an A1 and an A2 at the same time. 
b) PayoflFs (in tokens): 
i) Al's payoffs are the &st numbers in parentheses in Figure I. 
ii) A2's payoffs are the first nxmibers in parentheses in Figure 2. 
iii) B's payoffs are the second numbers in parentheses in Figures 1 and 2. 
c) Game Play; A1 and A2 may choose R or L. If A1 and/or A2 choose R, B may 
choose U, M or D. 
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i) When A1 chooses L, A1 earns 60 and B earns 45. 
ii) When A2 chooses L, A2 earns 105 and B earns 50. 
iii) When A1 chooses R, and 
a) B chooses U, A1 earns 100 and B earns 50. 
b) B chooses M, A1 earns 50 and B earns 40. 
c) B chooses D, A1 earns 0 and B earns 10. 
iv) When A2 chooses R, and 
a) B chooses U, A2 earns 100 and B earns 0. 
b) B chooses M, A2 earns 50 and B earns 30. 
c) B chooses D, A2 earns 0 and B earns 40. 
4. TBOE EXPERIMENT PROCEEDS AS FOLLOWS: 
a) Li the ejq)eriment, you partic^ate in two to five rounds. The first round, is a 
practice round. Afler the practice round, you participate in a foiu* round single 
elimination tournament. 
b) Round Play: 
i) A round consists of four games. 
ii) Before each round you will complete a two part Strategy Sheet. 
a) Part I asks you to anticipate how the randomly selected players 
will play the four games. For example, on your Example 
Strategy Sheet, 
3 is circled in (i), 
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4 is circled in (ii), 
1 is circled in (iii) and 
3 is circled in (iv). 
This implies that you think 3 of the randomly selected Als wiQ 
choose R, and 1 will choose L. 
You think 4 of the randomly selected A2s will choose R and 
none will choose L. 
You think 1 of the randomly selected Bs will choose U, 3 will 
choose M and none will choose D. 
Note that since there are only four games in a round the 
sum of your responses to (iii) and (iv) must not exceed 4. 
Also note that your responses to (i) through (iv) will be used 
as a tie breaker. Therefore, the more accurate your 
responses to (i) through (iv), the more likely you are to 
advance in the tournament in the event of a tie. 
Part n asks you to indicate how you will play each of the foiu^ 
games. 
(1) If you are an Al or A2, you must choose between R or 
L for each of the fotu- games. You can pick either R or 
L for all foiu- games, or any combination of R and L. 
For exaiiq)le, on your Example Strategy Sheet, 
R is circled for Game 1, 
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R is circled for Game 2, 
R is circled for Game 3 and 
L is circled for Game 4. 
This implies that you choose to play R for games 1, 2 
and 3, and L for game 4. 
(2) If you are a B, you must choose how you will play each 
game provided A1 and /or A2 choose R. You can pick 
either U, M or D for all four games, or any combination 
of U, M and D. For example, on yom^ Example 
Strategy Sheet, 
U is circled for Game 1, 
D is circled for Game 2, 
M is circled for Game 3 and 
U is circled for Game 4. 
This inq)lies that if A1 and/or A2 choose R you choose 
to play U for games 1 and 4, M for game 3, and D for 
game 2. 
Once everyone has con^leted their Strategy Sheets, the sheets are 
collected, and the match-ups are determined. 
a) For each game a B is randomly selected and his or her choice is 
recorded on the Als' and A2s' Round Earnings Sheet. For 
example, if you are an A1 or A2 and 
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the first (randomly selected) B chose U, 
the second (randomly selected) B chose M, 
the third (randomly selected) B chose D and 
the fourth (randomly selected) B chose D, 
then, on yow Example Round Earnings Sheet, 
U is circled for Game 1, 
M is circled for Game 2, 
D is circled for Game 3 and 
D is circled for Game 4. 
For each game an A1 is randomly selected and his or her choice 
is recorded on the Bs' Round Earnings Sheet. For example, if 
you are a B and 
the first (randomly selected) A1 chose R, 
the second (randomly selected) A1 chose R, 
the third (randomly selected) A1 chose R and 
the fourth (randomly selected) A1 chose L, 
then, on your Example Round Earnings Sheet, 
R is circled for Game 1, 
R is circled for Game 2, 
R is circled for Game 3 and 
L is circled for Game 4. 
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c) For each game an A2 is randomly selected and Ms or her choice 
is recorded on the Bs' Round Earnings Sheet. For example, if 
you are a B and 
the first (randomly selected) A2 chose L, 
the second (randomly selected) A2 chose R, 
the third (randomly selected) A2 chose R and 
the fourth (randomly selected) A2 chose R, 
then, on your Example Round Earnings Sheet, 
L is circled for Game 1, 
R is circled for Game 2, 
R is circled for Game 3 and 
R is circled for Game 4. 
After the match-ups are determiaed, the results are recorded and 
returned to you on your Round Earnings Sheet. Your earnings for 
the round (in tokens) is equal to the sum of your earnings for Games 1 
through 4. For exanq)le, on your Example Earnings Record Sheet, if 
you are an Al, A2 or B, then your earnings in tokens for the round 
would be 210, 255 or 265. The number of times you correctly 
anticipated the randomly selected players' choices is also recorded. For 
instance, on your Example Round Earnings Sheet, since 3 was 
circled for (i) on your Example Round Strategy Sheet and 3 of the 
randomly selected Als chose R, you would have responded correctly. 
Since 4 was circled for (ii) on yoiir Example Round Strategy Sheet 
and 3 of the randomly selected A2s chose R, you would have 
responded incorrectly. Since 1 was circled for (iii) on your Example 
Round Strategy Sheet and 1 of the randomly selected Bs chose U, 
you would have responded correctly. Since 3 was circled for (iv) on 
your Example Round Strategy Sheet and 1 of the randomly selected 
Bs chose M, you would have responded incorrectly. Therefore, on 
your Example Round Earnings Sheet, you would have correctly 
anticipated the randomly selected players choices twice. 
Tournament Play: 
i) Practice Round: Once all 24 participants have con^leted their 
Practice Round Strategy Sheets, the sheets are collected. The results 
of the Practice Round are recorded and returned to you on your 
Practice Round Earnings Sheet along with your Round 1 Strategy 
Sheet. Please carefully review your Practice Round Earnings Sheet 
and complete yow Round 1 Strategy Sheet. 
ii) Round 1: After all 24 participants have coiiq)leted their Round 1 
Strategy Sheets, the sheets are collected. The results of Round 1 are 
recorded and returned to you on your Round 1 Earnings Sheet. If 
you earn more tokens than the participant of your type that you are 
matched with, then you advance to Round 2. For exan^le, on your 
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Example Round Earnings Sheet, the participant you are matched 
with earned 200 tokens for the round. Therefore, you would advance 
to Round 2, while the participant you are matched with would be 
eluninated. In the event of a tie, the participant that made the most 
correct responses to (i) through (iv) for Round 1 advances. For 
instance, if your earnings in tokens on your Example Round Earnings 
Sheet was 200, then you and the participant you are matched with 
would have tied. If the participant you are matched with had correctly 
responded to (i) through (iv) three times, he/she would advance to 
Round 2 and you would be eliminated since you have correctly 
responded twice to (i) through (iv) in the example round. If you and 
the participant you are matched with earn the same number of tokens 
and respond correctly to (i) through (h^) the same number of times, 
then the tie is broken with a coin toss. If you are eliminated, you are 
paid immediately and allowed to leave. If you advance, you receive a 
Round 2 Strategy Sheet. Please carefiiUy review your Round 1 
Earnings Sheet and conq)lete your Round 2 Strategy Sheet. 
Round 2: After the remaining 12 participants have coiiq)leted their 
Round 2 Strategy Sheets, the sheets are collected. The results of 
Round 2 are recorded and returned to you on yotu* Round 2 Earnings 
Sheet. If you earn more tokens than the new participant of your type 
that you are matched with, then you advance to Round 3. In the event 
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of a tie, the participant that made the most correct responses to (i) 
through (iv) for Round 2 advances. If you are still tied, then the tie is 
broken with a coin toss. If you are eliminated, you are paid immediately 
and allowed to leave. If you advance, you receive a Round 3 Strategy 
Sheet. Please carefully review your Round 2 Earnings Sheet and 
complete your Round 3 Strategy Sheet. 
Round 3: Aiter the remaining 6 participants have con:q)leted their 
Round 3 Strategy Sheets, the sheets are collected. The results of 
Round 3 are recorded and returned to you on your Round 3 Earnings 
Sheet. If you earn more tokens than the only remaining participant of 
your type, then you advance to Round 4. In the event of a tie, the 
participant that made the most correct responses to (i) through (iv) for 
Round 3 advances. If you are still tied, then the tie is broken with a 
coin toss. If you are eliminated, you are paid immediately and allowed 
to leave. If you advance, you receive a Round 4 Strategy Sheet. 
Please carefully review your Round 3 Earnings Sheet and complete 
your Round 4 Strategy Sheet. 
Round 4: After the remaining 3 participants (one of each type) have 
conq)leted their Round 4 Strategy Sheets, the sheets are collected. 
The results of Round 4 are recorded and returned to you on yoiu 
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Round 4 Earnings Sheet. Please wait for an experimenter to call on 
you so that you can be paid. 
5. EARNINGS FOR THE EXPERIMENT: In addition to a $5.00 participation fee, 
your earnings for the experiment include the value of your tokens earned for the last 
round in which you participated. 
Last Round of Participation Value of a Token 
Round 1 $0.01 
Round 2 $0.05 
Round 3 $0.10 
Round 4 $0.25 
For instance, if you are eliminated in Round 1 and you earned 360 tokens in Round 1, 
then you earn $5.00 + (360 X $0.01) = $8.60. If you are eliminated ia Round 2 and 
you earned 360 tokens in Round 2, then you earn $5.00 + (360 X $0.05) = $23.00. If 
you are eliminated in Round 3 and you earned 360 tokens in Round 3, then you earn 
$5.00 + (360 X $0.10) = $41.00. If you advance to Round 4 and you earned 360 
tokens in Round 4, then you earn $5.00 + (360 X $0.25) = $95.00. 
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QVJZ 
If A1 chooses L, and A2 chooses L, 
a) what is A1 's payoff? 
b) what is A2's payoflF? 
c) what is B' s payoflf from playing A1 ? 
d) what is B's payoff"from playittgA2? 
e) what is B's total payoff? 
If A1 chooses R, A2 chooses L, and B chooses D, 
a) what is A1 's payoff? 
b) what is A2's payoff? 
c) what is B's payoff"from playing Al? 
d) what is B'spayoff"from playing A2? 
e) what is B's total payoff? 
What type of participant are you matched with to determine if you advance hi the 
tomnament? 
What type(s) of players do you play m each of the four games in a round? 
If you earn 395 tokens in a round and you are match with a participant that earned 380 
tokens, do you advance to the next round? 
If you and the participant you are matched with earn the same number of tokens in a 
round and you responded correctly to (i) and (iii) and the participant you are matched 
with responded correctly to (i), (ii) and (iv), do you advance to the next roimd? 
If you are elimmated in Round 3 and you eamed 350 tokens in Round 3, how much 
do you earn for the experiment? 
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A1-type player 
Example Round Strategy Sheet 
Part I: Please indicate how you anticipate other players will play the foiu* games by 
completing the statements below. Conq)lete statements (i) through (iv) by 
circling the appropriate number. Please circle only one number for each 
statement. Remember that the number of correct responses you make will 
be used to determine who advances in the tournament in the event of a tie. 
(i) I think the (randomly selected) Als will choose R in [0 12^ 4 ] of the four 
games. 
(ii) I think the (randomly selected) A2s will choose Rin[0 1 2 3 of the four 
games. 
(iii) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose Uin[0(l) 2 3 4] of the four 
games. 
(iv) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose Min[0 1 2 {|) 4] of the four 
games. Note that the sum of your responses in (iii) and (iv) should not exceed 4. 
Part 11: Please indicate how you will play each of the four games in this roimd by 
circling the appropriate letter below. Please circle only one letter for each 
game. 
1) For Game 1,1 choose 
2) For Game 2,1 choose 
3) For Game 3,1 choose 







Example Round Earnings Sheet 
Game Results 
Game B's Choices Your Choices Yoxu" Payoff 
1 (y) M D CE) L 100 
2 U D ® L 50 
3 U M © (B L 0 
4 U M ® R ( 9  60 
Yoiu payoff in tokens for the round: 210 
Your Responses to Part I Randomly Selected Players' 
Choices 
Correct 
(i) Number of times you thought the Als 
would choose R: 0 1 2 4 
Number of tunes the Als actually 
c h o s e  R : 0  1  2  ( p  4  No 
(ii) Number of times you thought the A2s 
would choose R: 0 12 3^ 
Number of times the A2s actually 
c h o s e  R : 0  1  2  ®  4  
Yes 
(iii) Number of times you thought the Bs 
would choose U; 0 0 2 3 4 Number of times the Bs actually chose U: 0 ® 2 3 4 No 
(iv) Number of tunes you thought the Bs 
would choose M: 0 1 2 ^ 4 
Number of times the Bs actually 
chose M: 0 (p 2 3 4 
Yes 




The round earnings in tokens of the participant you are matched with: 200 
In the Event of a Tie: The niunber of times the participant you are 
matched with responded correctly to (i) through (iv): 3 
Would you have advanced in the tournament? No 
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A2-type player 
Example Round Strategy Sheet 
Part I; Please indicate how you anticipate other players will play the four games by 
con:q)leting the statements below. Complete statements (i) through (iv) by 
circling the appropriate niunber. Please circle only one number for each 
statement. Remember that the number of correct responses you make will 
be used to determine who advances in the tournament in the event of a tie. 
(i) Ithink the (randomly selected) A1 swill choose R in [ 0 12 0 4]ofthefoxu-
games. 
(ii) I think the (randomly selected) A2s will choose R in [ 0 1 2 3 0] of the four 
games. 
(iii) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose Uin[0(J) 2 3 4] of the four 
games. 
(iv) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose Min[0 1 2 0 4] of the four 
games. Note that the sum of your responses in (iii) and (iv) should not exceed 4. 
Part n: Please indicate how you will play each of the four games in this round by 
circling the appropriate letter below. Please circle only one letter for each 
game. 
1) For Game 1,1 choose 
2) For Game 2,1 choose 
3) For Game 3,1 choose 







Example Round Earnings Sheet 
Game Results 
Game B's Choices Your Choices Your Payoff 
1 (jLi) M D ® L 100 
2 U D ® L 50 
3 U M eg) ® L 0 
4 U M ^ R ^ 105 
Your payoflFin tokens for the round: 255 
Your Responses to Part I Randomly Selected Players' 
Choices 
Correct 
(i) Number of times you thought the Als 
would choose R: 0 1 2 (5) 4 
Number of times the Als actually 
choseRO 1 2 ® 4 No 
(ii) Number of tunes you thought the A2s 
would choose R: 0 1 2 3 <3) 
Number of times the A2sactually 
choseRO 1 2 {D 4 
Yes 
(iii) Number of tunes you thought the Bs 
would choose U: 0 Q) 2 3 4 
Number of times the Bs actually 
chose U: 0 0 2 3 4 
<Yei) 
No 
(iv) Number of times you thought the Bs 
would choose M: 0 1 2 (3) 4 
Nmnber of times the Bs actually 
c h o s e  M :  0 ^ 2 3 4  
Yes 




The roxmd earnings in tokens of the participant you are matched with: 200 
In the Event of a Tie: The number of times the participant you are 
matched with responded correctly to (i) through (iv); 3 
Would you have advanced in the tournament? lYes; No 
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B-type player 
Example Round Strategy Sheet 
Part I; Please indicate how you anticipate other players will play the foiu" games by 
con:q)leting the statements below. Complete statements (i) through (iv) by 
circling the appropriate niunber. Please circle only one number for each 
statement. Remember that the number of correct responses you make will 
be used to determine who advances in the tournament in the event of a tie. 
(i) I think the (randomly selected) Als will choose Rin[0 1 2 (^4] of the foiu 
games. 
(ii) I think the (randomly selected) A2s will choose R in [ 0 1 2 3 of the fow 
games. 
(iii) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose Uin[O0 2 3 4] of the four 
games. 
(iv) I think the (randomly selected) Bs will choose Min[0 1 2 (5) 4] of the fow 
games. Note that the sum of your responses in (iii) and (iv) should not exceed 4. 
Part n: Please indicate how you will play each of the four games in this round by 
circling the appropriate letter below. Please circle only one letter for each 
game. 
1) For Game 1, if A1 and'or A2 choose R, I choose (i^ M. D. 
2) For Game 2, if A1 and/or A2 choose R, I choose U. M. 
3) For Game 3, if A1 and/or A2 choose R, I choose u. % D. 
4) For Game 4, if A1 and/or A2 choose R, I choose M. D. 
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B-type player 
Example Round Earnings Sheet 
Game Results 






1 ® L R ^ (iP M D 50 50 100 
2 (k) L ® L U M (g) 10 40 50 
3 L ® L U D 40 30 70 
4 R (y ® L (l^ M D 45 0 45 
Your payoflFin tokens for the round: 265 
Your Responses to Part I Randomly Selected Players' 
Choices 
Correct 
(i) Niunber of times you thought the Als 
w^ould choose R: 0 1 2 © 4 
Number of times the Als actually 
chose R: 0 1 2 4 
^e^ 
No 
(ii) Number of times you thought the A2s 
w^ould choose R: 0 12 3® 
Number of times the A2s actually 
c h o s e  R : 0  1  2  ®  4  
Y s^ 
(iii) Niunber of times you thought the Bs 
would choose U: 0 (j) 2 3 4 
Niunber of times the Bs actually 
chose U: 0 <D 2 3 4 No 
(iv) Number of times you thought the Bs 
would choose M: 0 1 2 ® 4 
Number of tunes the Bs actually 
c h o s e  M :  0 ^ 2 3 4  
Yes 




The roimd earnings in tokens of the participant you are matched with: 200 
In the Event of a Tie: The nimiber of times the participant you are 
matched with responded correctly to (i) through (iv); 3 
Would you have advanced in the tournament? 
193 
Figures 1 and 2 
Each subject had a copy of the Figure CI below. 
Figure 1; Payoff tree for the A1 and B players. 
(100,50) 
A1 
(50,40) (60, 45) 
(0, 10) 
Figure 2: Payoff tree for the A2 and B players. 
(100,0) 
A2 
(105, 50) (50,30) 
(0, 40) 
Figure CI: Extensive form game given to subjects to determine their payoffs 
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APPENDIX D. EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
General Data Definitions 
Session: Sessions 2 and 3 paid subjects based on their performance in rounds 2 
through 5, while session 4 used the toiunament incentive mechanism 
described above. Note: session 0 and 1 were pilot sessions that are not 
reported here. 
Round;; Each session had five rounds. Round 1 was a practice round in which the 
incentive mechanisms were not binding. In session 4, Round 2 was the first 
round of the single eUmination tournament. 
Specific Definitions for Strategy Sheet Response Data 
Pnumber: Represents the subject's number. For sessions 2 and 3, each subject of a given 
type was identified with a number 1 through 5. For session 4, each subject of a 
given type was identified with a number 1 through 8. 
PPartli: The nimiber of randomly selected Als that the subject predicted to choose R 
PPartlii: Hie number of randomly selected A2s that the subject predicted to choose R 
PPartliii: The number of randomly selected Bs that the subject predicted to choose U. 
PPartliv: The number of randomly selected Bs that the subject predicted to choose M. 
G[Game number]; The subject's strategy choice for game [Game number]. For type A1 
or A2, 1 denotes R and 2 denotes L. For type B, 1 denotes U, 2 
denotes M and 3 denotes D. 
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Strategy Sheet Response Data 
Strategy sheet response data for type A1 players 
Session Pnumber Round PPartli PPartlii PPartliii 
2 1 1 1 2 1 
2 I 2 2 3 2 
2 1 3 1 2 2 
2 1 4 2 3 3 
2 1 5 1 2 2 
2 2 1 4 4 1 
2 2 2 4 2 2 
2 2 3 3 2 3 
2 2 4 3 1 3 
2 2 5 3 1 2 
2 3 1 3 1 0 
2 3 2 3 1 1 
2 3 3 3 5 1 
2 3 4 3 0 3 
2 3 5 3 1 3 
2 4 1 1 0 1 
2 4 2 1 0 2 
2 4 3 0 0 2 
2 4 4 2 1 3 
2 4 5 1 1 2 
2 5 1 3 1 1 
2 5 2 2 1 1 
2 5 3 1 0 0 
2 5 4 3 1 1 

































































































































































4 2 2 2 0 2 
4 2 3 2 0 2 
4 3 1 2 3 1 
4 3 2 2 1 2 
4 3 3 1 0 2 
4 3 4 1 0 1 
4 3 5 1 0 2 
4 4 1 2 0 2 
4 4 2 2 0 2 
4 5 1 3 2 1 
4 5 2 2 1 2 
4 5 3 1 0 1 
4 6 1 3 2 0 
4 6 2 1 1 1 
4 7 1 2 3 2 
4 7 2 1 3 3 
4 8 1 2 4 2 
4 8 2 1 0 2 
4 8 3 1 0 2 
4 8 4 1 0 2 
Strategy sheet response data for type A1 players continued 
PPartliv G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
2 2 2 1 2 2 
1 2 2 2 1 1 
3 2 2 1 1 2 
1 1 2  1 2  2  
2  2  1 1 2  2  
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4 1 1 2 1 
4 1 1 2 1 
2 1 1 2 2 
2 1 2 1 
3 1 1 1 1 
3 2 1 1 2 
3 2 1 1 2 
3 2 1 1 
2 2 1 1 2 
2 2 1 1 1 
4 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 1 2 
3 2 2 1 2 
3 1 2 1 2 
3 1 1 2 2 
3 2 2 1 2 
3 1 2 2 1 
3 2 1 2 1 
3 1 1 2 2 
4 1 1 2 2 
3 1 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 1 
3 2 1 1 2 
4 2 1 2 1 
2 2 2 2 1 












































































1 2 1 











2 2 1 
2 2 1 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
2 2 1 
1 2 2 
1 2 1 
2 1 2 
1 2 1 
1 2 2 
1 1 2 
2 1 2 
2 1 1 
2 1 1 
1 1 1 






























2 1 2 2 1 0 
3 2 1 2 1 0 
1 2 1 1 2 0 
2 2 1 1 1 0 
2 1 2 1 1 0 
2 2 1 1 1 0 
2 1 2 2 1 0 
1 2 2 2 1 0 
2 1 1 2 2 0 
1 2 2 2 1 0 
2 2 1 2 2 0 
2 2 1 2 2 0 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































4 7 2 2 2 2 
4 8 13 12 
4 8 2 1 1 1 
4 8 3 1 0 1 
Strategy sheet resporise data for type A2 players continued 
artliv G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
4 2 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 2 
0 2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
1 2 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 2 
4 2 1 1 2 2 
3 1 2 2 2 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
4 2 2 1 2 2 
3 2 2 1 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 








































































































































































0 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 
1 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 
2 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 
2 1 2 1 2 
1 2 1 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 
4 2 2 2 2 
4 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 
1 2 2 2 2 
1 2 2 2 2 
2 2 1 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 1 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 


























Strategy sheet response data for type B players 
Session Pnumber Round PPartli PPartlii PPartliii 
2 1 1 1 0 5 
2 1 2 0 1 2 
2 1 3 1 1 2 
2 1 4 1 1 2 
2 1 5 1 1 2 
2 2 1 4 3 
2 2 2 3 1 3 
2 2 3 2 1 2 
2 2 4 3 1 2 
2 2 5 3 1 2 
2 3 1 4 0 4 
2 3 2 4 0 3 
2 3 3 4 5 3 
2 3 4 3 1 3 
2 3 5 2 1 2 
2 4 1 1 0 1 
2 4 2 2 0 1 
2 4 3 2 0 2 
2 4 4 4 0 3 
2 4 5 5 0 5 
2 5 1 3 4 4 
2 5 2 3 4 5 
2 5 3 5 4 4 
2 5 4 2 3 4 
2 5 5 3 3 3 
3 1 1 3 4 3 
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3 1 2 4 3 
3 1 3 2 2 
3 1 4 3 2 
3 1 5 3 1 
3 2 1 2 3 
3 2 2 4 3 
3 2 3 3 3 
3 2 4 1 1 
3 2 5 4 0 
3 3 1 5 0 
3 3 2 5 0 
3 3 3 5 1 
3 3 4 5 0 
3 3 5 4 0 
3 4 1 2 4 
3 4 2 5 1 
3 4 3 1 1 
3 4 4 2 0 
3 4 5 3 0 
3 5 1 3 4 
3 5 2 4 2 
3 5 3 4 1 
3 5 4 4 1 
3 5 5 4 0 
4 1 1 3 0 
4 1 2 2 1 
4 2 1 3 2 






























4 2 3 2 2 1 
4 3 1 3 2 2 
4 3 2 2 3 1 
4 4 1 4 0 4 
4 4 2 4 0 4 
4 4 3 4 0 4 
4 4 4 4 0 4 
4 4 5 4 0 4 
4 5 1 2 3 2 
4 5 2 3 2 0 
4 6 1 2 2 2 
4 6 2 2 3 3 
4 6 3 3 2 2 
4 6 4 2 0 1 
4 7 1 3 0 2 
4 7 2 2 0 2 
4 8 1 2 0 1 
4 8 2 2 0 2 
4 8 3 2 0 2 
Strategy sheet response data for type B players continued 
PPartliv G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
0  1 1 1 1 1  
3  1 2  1 1 1  
3  1 1 1 1 1  
3  1 1 1 1 1  
3  1 1 1 1 1  



















































































































































































































































































































1 2 3 1 2 0 
4 2 1 3 2 0 
1 1 2 1 3 0 
1 3 2 1 2 0 
2 2 3 1 2 0 
3 1 3 1 3 0 
2 2 1 2 1 0 
1 1 2 2 3 0 
3 2 2 2 2 0 
1 2 2 2 2 0 
2 2 2 2 2 0 
Specific Definitions for History Data 
APart li: The number of randomly selected Als that actually chose R, 
APartlii: The number of randomly selected A2s that actually chose K 
APartliii: The number of randomly selected Bs that actually chose U. 
APart liv: The number of randomly selected Bs that actually chose M. 
[Player type]G[Game numberjP; The subject of type [Player type] whose strategy was 
randomly selected for game [Game number]. For 
sessions 2 and 3, each subject of a given type was 
identified with a number 1 through 5. For session 4, 
each subject of a given type was identified wdth a 
number 1 through 8. 
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[Player type]G[Game number]R: The choice of the randomly selected subject of type 
[Player type] for game [Game number]. For type A1 or 
A2, 1 denotes R and 2 denotes L. For type B, 1 denotes 
U, 2 denotes M and 3 denotes D. 
flistory Data 
Session Roimd APartli APartlii APartliii APar 
2 1 3 1 2 3 
2 2 1 1 2 2 
2 3 3 1 3 2 
2 4 1 1 2 3 
2 5 3 0 3 2 
3 1 4 1 2 2 
3 2 1 1 2 3 
3 3 4 0 2 3 
3 4 4 0 1 3 
3 5 2 0 1 3 
4 1 1 0 2 1 
4 2 1 0 1 3 
4 3 1 0 1 3 
4 4 2 0 2 0 
4 5 3 0 4 0 
AIGIP AIGIR A2G1P A2G1R BGIP BGIR 
4 2 4 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 2 2 
























































































































































2 2 1 
8 1 5 
3 1 5 
A1G3P A1G3R A2G3P 
5 1 2 
1 2 5 
1 1 2 
2 2 4 
3 1 2 
4 1 1 
2 2 1 
2 2 2 
5 2 4 
2 1 1 
3 2 8 
8 2 2 
5 1 5 
3 1 5 
3 1 5 
A1G4P A1G4R A2G4P 
1 2 1 
2 1 3 
3 1 3 
5 1 1 
2 1 4 
2 1 2 
2 4 1 
2 6 3 
2 4 1 
A2G3R BG3P BG3R 
2 1 1 
1 1 1 
2 3 1 
2 3 1 
2 2 2 
2 3 2 
2 2 1 
2 5 1 
2 2 2 
2 1 3 
2 5 1 
2 3 2 
2 2 2 
2 4 1 
2 4 1 
A2G4R BG4P BG4R 
2 4 2 
2 3 1 
2 5 2 
2 5 2 
2 1 1 
1 2 3 
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1 2 3 
5 1 5 
3 1 3 
3 2 2 
2 1 7 
4 1 1 
8 2 8 
3 2 1 
3 2 5 
2 3 2 
2 2 2 
2 3 2 
2 3 2 
2 7 1 
2 6 2 
2 8 2 
2 6 3 
2 4 1 
AIGSF* A1G5R A2G5P A2G5R BG5P BG5R 
3 1 3 2 5 2 
5 2 4 2 5 3 
2 14 2 11 
1 2 3 2 2 2 
5 2 5 2 3 1 
3 1 3 2 5 1 
4 1 5 2 5 2 
1 1 1 2  1 1  
2  1 1 2  5  1  
® There are only ten sets of observations for Game 5 because the tournament had only four 
rounds. These ten observations are for sessions 2 and 3. 
